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91 
“BECAUSE OF SEX” 
Jack B. Harrison 
           
Many Americans currently believe that federal law prohibits 
discrimination because of sexual orientation and gender identity in the 
workplace.  While it is true that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(“Title VII”) prohibits employers from discriminating because of an 
employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, courts and 
legislators have historically been slow to extend these protections to 
LGBT workers.  The result of this reluctance is that LGBT employees 
remain largely unprotected under an unpredictable patchwork of laws 
and policies, consisting of presidential executive orders, private 
employer initiatives, city and county ordinances, gubernatorial 
executive orders, and state legislation.  As a result, discrimination in 
the workforce remains a constant in the lived experience of LGBT 
persons.  
As of 2016, thirty-two states and the District of Columbia had 
taken some steps, either legislatively or through executive action, to 
limit or prohibit workplace discrimination on the bases of gender 
identity or sexual orientation.  Yet even among these states, victims of 
workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender 
identity were provided redress through a private right of action in only 
twenty-two states and the District of Columbia.  Section I of this article 
discusses this background. 
 Section II article discusses development of the prohibition 
against discrimination “because of sex” that is contained in Title VII, 
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including the legislative history of Title VII and the initial 
interpretations of the meaning of “because of sex” in the Title VII 
context.  Section III is focused on general questions regarding the 
applications of Title VII to claims of discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, with Sections IV and V focused more specifically on 
treatment by the EEOC and the courts, respectively, of the question of 
whether Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation.  
Section VI, the concluding section of this article, examines the theories 
through which Title VII has been seen by courts to prohibit 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.  Ultimately, this article 
attempts to propose a unified theory under which discrimination based 
on sexual orientation would be included under Title VII’s prohibition 
against discrimination “because of sex.” 
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I.  INTRODUCTION: GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE 
While much justifiable celebration occurred among gay and 
lesbian persons and their allies following the decision in Obergefell v. 
Hodges,1 it is critical to place this historic turn in its proper place along 
a continuum toward greater inclusion of gay and lesbian persons 
within American society. Professor Katie Eyer has smartly argued that 
while the decision in Obergefell may have many parallels with the 
decision in Loving v. Virginia,2 which found bans on interracial 
marriage unconstitutional, there is a profound and fundamental 
difference between where these two decisions lie along the trajectory 
toward “the institutionalization of a formal equality regime (that is, a 
legal regime in which discrimination against a group is presumptively 
unlawful).”3 Now, several years following the decision in Obergefell, 
it seems clear that Professor Eyer is correct in her assessment of the 
historical placement of Obergefell. 
Obergefell leaves gay and lesbian persons in a rather odd position. 
On one hand, their marriages are legally protected in every state in the 
union and at the federal level. On the other hand, they are denied 
protections against discrimination in employment,4 housing, or public 
 
 1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 3. See Katie Eyer, Brown, Not Loving: Obergefell and the Unfinished Business of Formal 
Equality, 125 YALE L.J. F. 1, 1–2 (2015) [hereinafter Eyer, Brown, Not Loving]. As Professor Eyer 
points out: 
Whereas Loving marked the endpoint of an era of the institutionalization of formal racial 
equality norms in constitutional Equal Protection doctrine and in federal statutory law, 
Obergefell stands much closer to the beginning of such a process. Indeed, although the 
L/G/B rights movement has achieved substantial success—in shifting public opinion, 
and in securing litigation victories—explicit guarantees of formal equality have—at least 
at the federal level—largely remained elusive. 
Id. at 2 (footnotes omitted). In her essay, Professor Eyer defines “formal equality” in the following 
manner: “‘formal equality’ signifies a legal regime in which invidious use of a particular 
classification is deemed presumptively unlawful. In the statutory domain, this generally takes the 
form of an explicit statutory proscription on discrimination on the basis of a particular 
characteristic, and, in the contemporary constitutional domain, generally takes the form of 
‘protected class’ status triggering heightened scrutiny.” Id. at 1 n.3; see also Tomiko Brown-Nagin, 
The Civil Rights Canon: Above and Below, 123 YALE L.J. 2698, 2719–21 (2014); Devon Carbado 
et al., After Inclusion, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 83, 87 (2008); Katie R. Eyer, Have We Arrived 
Yet? LBGT Rights and the Limits of Formal Equality, 19 L. & SEXUALITY 160 (2010) [hereinafter 
Eyer, LGBT Rights]. 
 4. Eyer, Brown, Not Loving, supra note 3, at 8 n.31 (providing a demonstrative list of 
employment cases brought under Title VII alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, 
wherein the disposition of the case in favor of the employer was based on the lack of any formal 
equality statutory scheme protecting against discrimination based on sexual orientation). This 
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accommodations5 at the federal level and in the twenty-nine states that 
do not have statewide protections based on sexual orientation or 
gender identity.6 Thus, for example, gay and lesbian couples can be 
married and have their marriage legally recognized in Ohio or 
Kentucky today, and then be lawfully fired from their job or evicted 
from their home tomorrow simply for being gay or lesbian; a fact that 
might be revealed when employees exercise their constitutional right 
to marry someone of the same gender.7 Likewise, Obergefell does not 
answer whether it was unlawful for an employer to deny spousal 
benefits to gay and lesbian couples who were legally married in one 
state prior to Obergefell, on the basis that the couple’s state of 
residence and employment did not recognize their marriage.8 This lack 
of institutional formal equality will define and drive the next steps in 
 
Article primarily focuses on LGBT rights in the context of the workplace. However, as this section 
briefly discusses, LGBT advocates are fighting for equality in many other areas of everyday life, 
such as public accommodations and housing. See Carlie Armstrong, Slow Progress: New Federal 
Rules Only Begin to Address Housing Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity, 9 MOD. AM. 1 (2013); Justin Muehlmeyer, Toward a New Age of Consumer Access Rights: 
Creating Space in the Public Accommodation for the LGBT Community, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & 
GENDER 781 (2013). 
 5. As Eyer notes: 
Public accommodations law (the body of antidiscrimination law governing access to 
services like restaurants hotels and service providers) also is largely governed by statute, 
rather than the Constitution. There is very little, if any, ability for L/G/B litigants to bring 
public accommodations claims under federal law, because federal law does not proscribe 
sex discrimination in public accommodations, and sex discrimination is the primary 
argument that L/G/B litigants have relied on in the absence of explicit protections for 
sexual orientation. 
Eyer, Brown, Not Loving, supra note 3, at 7–8 n.30; see also Jack B. Harrison, At Long Last 
Marriage, 24 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC. POL’Y & THE L. 1, 56–60 (2015). 
 6. Eyer, Brown, Not Loving, supra note 3, at 7–11; see also, e.g., David S. Cohen & Leonore 
Carpenter, Anti-gay Bias Legal in Indiana Before New Law, USA TODAY (Mar. 31, 2015, 4:58 
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/03/31/indiana-religious-freedom-restoration-
act-discrimination-anti-gay-column/70723684 (noting that twenty-nine states do not prohibit 
sexual orientation discrimination, and that few protections exist under federal law). 
 7. For information on state protections for individuals based on sexual orientation or gender 
identity, see State Maps of Laws and Policies, HUMAN RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/ 
state-maps (last updated June 11, 2018). 
 8. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 258 (2015). This issue forms the crux of a lawsuit 
recently filed against Walmart, alleging that Walmart’s pre-2014 policy of denying benefits to 
same-sex couples, unless required by state law, was unlawful. See Steven Nelson, Wal-Mart Sued 
for Alleged Anti-Gay Discrimination, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 14, 2015), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/14/wal-mart-sued-for-alleged-anti-gay-
discrimination. Ultimately, Walmart elected not to contest the plaintiff’s interpretation of Title VII, 
opting instead to settle the case for $7.5 million. See Mark Joseph Stern, The Gay Rights Movement 
Just Scored a Massive Legal Victory Thanks to Walmart, SLATE (Dec. 5, 2016, 3:27 PM), 
https://slate.com/human-interest/2016/12/gay-rights-movement-scores-a-massive-victory-thanks-
to-walmart.html. 
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the trajectory of LGBT9 inclusion. 
In an oddly prescient fashion, the concerns raised by the 
dissenters in Obergefell regarding the protection of the religious 
liberties of those opposed to same-sex marriage have provided an 
ongoing framework within which LGBT persons continue the struggle 
to achieve institutional formal equality. Can public officials, such as 
county clerks, charged by state law with issuing marriage licenses, opt 
out of the constitutional requirements for marriages between persons 
of the same sex recognized in Obergefell based on their own personal 
religious objections?10 Can places of public accommodation, such as 
hotels, wedding venues, restaurants, or bakeries, in the absence of a 
state law prohibiting discrimination because of sexual orientation or 
gender identity in public accommodations, simply refuse to provide 
wedding services to gay and lesbian persons based on their own 
personal religious objections?11 Under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), can an employer fire an employee for being 
gay or lesbian, a fact made known to the employer as a result of the 
employee’s wedding?12 
 
 9. This Article will use this acronym throughout to represent LGBT people generally. At 
times, however, this Article will also use lesbian and gay, where the proposition or source does not 
include transgender persons. 
 10. See, e.g., Adam Beam, Clerk Prayed Over Decision to Stop Issuing Marriage Licenses, 
AP NEWS (July 20, 2015), https://apnews.com/7052404793bf4e19aed429e308027215; Robert P. 
Jones, After Same-Sex Marriage, Then What?, THE ATLANTIC (June 24, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/after-same-sex-marriage-then-what/396659/; 
Tribune wire rep., Same-Sex Marriage Fight Turns to Clerks Who Refuse Licenses, NEW YORK 
TIMES (June 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/06/30/us/ap-us-gay-marriage 
.html. 
 11. See generally Matthew W. Green Jr., Same-Sex Sex and Immutable Traits: Why Obergefell 
v. Hodges Clears a Path to Protecting Gay and Lesbian Employees from Workplace Discrimination 
under Title VII, 20 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 1 (2017); Nancy J. Knauer, Religious Exemptions, 
Marriage Equality, and the Establishment of Religion, 84 UMKC L. REV. 749 (2016); Douglas 
NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion 
and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015); Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion in State Public 
Accommodations Laws, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 631 (2016); Kyle C. Velte, All Fall Down: A 
Comprehensive Approach to Defeating the Religious Right’s Challenges to Antidiscrimination 
Statutes, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2016); Deborah A. Widiss, Intimate Liberties and Antidiscrimination 
Law, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 2083 (2017); see also Garrett Epps, When Beliefs and Identities Clash in 
Court, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive 
/2017/09/when-beliefs-and-identities-clash-in-court/540069/; Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: 
Conservative Majority Leaning Toward Ruling for Colorado Baker, SCOTUS BLOG (Dec. 5, 
2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/12/argument-analysis-conservative-majority-leaning-
toward-ruling-colorado-baker/; Jones, supra note 10. 
 12. See Melissa Boughton, Charlotte Catholic School Teacher Fired for Same-Sex Marriage 
Announcement Files Federal Suit, NC POL’Y WATCH: THE PROGRESSIVE PULSE (Jan. 11, 2017), 
http://pulse.ncpolicywatch.org/2017/01/11/charlotte-catholic-school-teacher-fired-sex-marriage-
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Following Loving, federal and state structures were already in 
place that made it unlawful for public officials, such as county clerks, 
who are charged by state law with issuing marriage licenses, to opt out 
of the constitutional requirements for marriages of persons between 
different races based on their own personal religious objections. These 
constitutional exemptions also applied to places of public 
accommodation, such as hotels, wedding venues, restaurants, or 
bakeries, to simply refuse to provide wedding services for interracial 
couples based on their own personal religious objections.13 By the 
time of Loving, there were also legal protections in place against 
discrimination in housing, employment, and public accommodations 
based on race.14 
Despite the fact that Obergefell was a significant victory for the 
LGBT community, in the aftermath, a same-sex couple who gets 
married over the weekend may be fired from their jobs on Monday for 
simply displaying or posting pictures of their wedding.15 Because no 
 
announcement-files-federal-suit/#sthash.csqKyUIj.dpbs; see also Dave Bakke, Wedding 
Announcement Costs Gay Woman Her Job at Benedictine University, THE ST. J.-REG., 
http://www.sj-r.com/x1109354817/Newspaper-wedding-announcement-costs-gay-woman-her-
job-at-Benedictine-University (last updated Nov. 10, 2010, 9:11 AM); Chris Brennan, Firing of 
Teacher in Same-Sex Marriage Roils Philadelphia Catholic School, THE PHILA. INQUIRER (July 8, 
2015, 6:41 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/education/20150708_Firing_of_teacher_in_same-
sex_marriage_roils_Catholic_school.html http://www.post-gazette. 
 13. Eyer, Brown, Not Loving, supra note 3, at 12. As Professor Eyer writes: 
But marriage’s political, cultural, and social significance should not be mistaken for its 
legal centrality. Unlike Loving, a favorable ruling for marriage equality in Obergefell is 
unlikely to establish a broader legal regime of formal equality in constitutional doctrine; 
and it is sure not to do so in the context of statutory rights. As such, while Obergefell 
will no doubt have real significance—social, political, and, in part, legal—it should not 
be mistaken for formal equality. For that unfinished business, as after Brown, much 
continuing work—in the courts, in the legislature, and among the people—lies ahead. 
Id. 
 14. See generally Brown-Nagin, supra note 3 (noting that many contemporary civil rights 
leaders, including Martin Luther King Jr., understood that formal equality would not alone be 
enough to achieve real equality for African Americans); D. Wendy Greene, Categorically Black, 
White, or Wrong: “Misperception Discrimination” and the State of Title VII Protection, 47 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 87 (2013); Anne-Marie G. Harris, A Survey of Federal and State Public 
Accommodations Statutes: Evaluating Their Effectiveness in Cases of Retail Discrimination, 13 
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 331 (2006); Brian K. Landsberg, Public Accommodations and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964: A Surprising Success? HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1 (2014); Nancy Leong & 
Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 
105 GEO. L.J. 1271 (2017); Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Ismail Alsheik, A Missing Piece: Fair 
Housing and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 48 HOW. L.J. 841, 903–04 (Spring, 2005); Widiss, supra 
note 11. 
 15. Brandon Lorenz, Historic Marriage Equality Ruling Generates Momentum for New Non-
Discrimination Law, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (July 7, 2015), http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/historic-
marriage-equality-ruling-generates-momentum-for-new-non-discrimina/. 
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explicit federal antidiscrimination law encompassing LGBT persons 
exists in the United States, the employer’s action in firing an employee 
because they were gay or lesbian would be legal in a majority of 
states.16 Therefore, marriage equality ironically makes employment 
discrimination against LGBT workers easier, in that employers are 
now more aware of who in their workforce identifies as LGBT because 
of their marital status and request for spousal benefits.17 
In 2013, the year the Supreme Court invalidated the Defense of 
Marriage Act in United States v. Windsor,18 approximately twenty 
percent of same-sex couples were married.19 In contrast, by October 
2015, four months after the Obergefell decision, approximately forty-
five percent of same-sex couples reported being married.20 As a result 
of this trend, same-sex couples are increasingly demanding spousal 
benefits from their employers; constructively notifying their 
employers of their sexual orientation. These requests for spousal 
benefits potentially increase the vulnerability of these employees to 
adverse employment actions. Accordingly, the necessity that 
discrimination because of gender identity and sexual orientation be 
clearly cognizable under Title VII has become even more critical. 
LGBT employees should not be faced with the choice of being married 
or being employed. 
Many Americans currently believe that federal law prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity 
in the workplace.21 While it is true that Title VII prohibits employers 
from discriminating because of an employee’s race, color, religion, 
 
 16. Sexual Orientation Discrimination, WORKPLACE FAIRNESS, 
https://www.workplacefairness.org/sexual-orientation-discrimination (last visited Aug. 23, 2018) 
(“Outside of the newly clarified right to marry, there is currently no federal law prohibiting other 
types of sexual orientation discrimination.”). 
 17. Emma Green, Can States Protect LGBT Rights Without Compromising Religious 
Freedom?, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive 
/2016/01/lgbt-discrimination-protection-states-religion/422730/. 
 18. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 19. Id. at 2680; GARY J. GATES & TAYLOR N. T. BROWN, MARRIAGE AND SAME-SEX 
COUPLES AFTER OBERGEFELL 3 (The Williams Inst. Nov. 2015), 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Marriage-and-Same-sex-Couples-after-
Obergefell-November-2015.pdf. 
 20. Brown, supra note 19, at 1. Indeed, 96,000 same-sex couples got married within four 
months of the Obergefell ruling. Id. at 3. 
 21. Civil Rights—Employment Discrimination—Executive Order Prohibits Federal 
Government and Contractor Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation or 
Gender Identity.—Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 23, 2014), 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 1304, 1305 (2015) [hereinafter Exec. Order No. 13,672] (footnote omitted). 
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sex, or national origin, courts and legislators have historically been 
slow to extend these protections to LGBT workers.22 This reluctance 
leaves LGBT employees largely unprotected under an unpredictable 
patchwork of laws and policies, consisting of presidential executive 
orders, private employer initiatives, city and county ordinances, 
gubernatorial executive orders, and state legislation.23 Thus, 
discrimination in the workforce remains a constant in the lived 
experience of LGBT persons.24 
 
 22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); Stephanie Rotondo, Employment Discrimination Against 
LGBT Persons, 16 GEO J. GENDER & L. 103, 104 (2015). 
 23. Ted Johnson, Next LGBT Battle Must Be Legislation on Employment, Housing, Education, 
VARIETY (July 1, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://www.variety.com/2015/biz/news/lgbt-comprehensive-
legislation-employment-housing-education-1201531938/. 
 24. As one commentator noted: 
Scholars estimate that more than eight million individuals within the current 
workforce identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender. In 2008, the University of 
Chicago’s National Opinion Research Center conducted the “General Social Survey.” 
The survey found that 42% of gay, lesbian, or bisexual respondents “experienced at least 
one form of employment discrimination because of their sexual orientation at some point 
in their lives and 27% had experienced [employment] discrimination” within the five 
years preceding the survey. Of the respondents who were open about their sexuality at 
work, “56% had experienced at least one form of employment discrimination . . . at some 
point in their lives, and 38% had experienced [such] discrimination within the five years” 
preceding the survey. Comparatively, of the gay, lesbian, or bisexual respondents who 
were not open about their sexuality at work, only ten percent reported experiencing 
employment discrimination within the five years preceding the survey. Additionally, 
58% of gay, lesbian, or bisexual respondents in a 2009 survey “reported hearing 
derogatory comments about sexual orientation and gender identity in their workplaces.” 
“Harassment was the most [widely] reported form of sexual orientation-based 
discrimination by [employees] who were open” with their sexuality at work. Thirty-five 
percent of openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual respondents reported experiencing workplace 
harassment within their lifetime, and 27% reported experiencing harassment within the 
five years preceding the survey. Further, 16% of openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual 
respondents reported having lost a job due to their sexual orientation within their 
lifetimes, and seven percent reported losing a job within the five years preceding the 
survey. Finally, other studies have shown that up to 41% of gay, lesbian, or bisexual 
employees have experienced verbal or physical abuse in the workplace or have had their 
workspaces vandalized. 
In 2011, the National Center for Transgender Equality and the National Gay and 
Lesbian Task Force published the findings of the largest, most comprehensive 
transgender discrimination survey ever conducted. The survey produced devastating 
statistics surrounding transgender discrimination in the workplace. First, transgender 
individuals experience “[d]ouble the rate of unemployment . . . of the general 
population,” while transgender people of color are unemployed at “up to four times” the 
rate of the general population. Respondents who had been terminated due to gender-
identity discrimination are four times more likely to experience homelessness than 
respondents who had not. An astounding 90% of transgender individuals experience 
harassment in the workplace—almost triple the rate reported by the gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual survey. Approximately 47% of respondents indicated they had experienced an 
adverse employment action—such as losing their job or not being hired—because of 
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As of 2016, thirty-two states and the District of Columbia had 
taken some steps, either legislatively or through executive action, to 
limit or prohibit workplace discrimination on the bases of gender 
identity or sexual orientation.25 Yet even among these states, victims 
of workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender 
identity were provided redress through a private right of action in only 
twenty-one states and the District of Columbia.26 
After Obergefell, much work remains to be done in building a 
regime of institutional formal equality that provides protection for gay 
and lesbian persons. Not only is this formal equality important in the 
context of marriage, but also in the much wider context of where 
individuals work, live, and choose to seek services.27 Some of this 
 
their status as transgender. Further, of the transgender individuals fired due to biases, 
16% reported being “compelled to engage in underground employment”—11% reported 
resorting to sex work. Perhaps the most devastating finding revealed that 41% of the 
transgender respondents indicated having “attempt[ed] suicide[,] compared to 1.6% of 
the general population.” Indeed, 55% of transgender respondents who had lost a job due 
to gender identity discrimination reported having attempted suicide. 
Tessa M. Register, The Case for Deferring to the EEOC’s Interpretations in Macy and Foxx to 
Classify LGBT Discrimination as Sex Discrimination under Title VII, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1397, 
1408–10 (2017); see M.V. Lee Badgett et al., Bias in the Workplace: Consistent Evidence of Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity Discrimination 1998–2008, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 559–60 
(2009); Jennifer C. Pizer et al., Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination 
Against LGBT People: The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination and Providing 
for Equal Employment Benefits, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 719 (2012); see also Alex Reed, 
Redressing LGBT Employment Discrimination via Executive Order, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS 
& PUB. POL’Y 133 (2015); Jaime M. Grant et al., Injustice at Every Turn: A Report of the National 
Transgender Discrimination Survey, THE NAT’L LGBTQ TASK FORCE (2011), 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/injustice-every-turn-report-national-transgender-discrimination-
survey/; State Maps of Laws & Policies, HUMAN RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/state-
maps/employment (last visited Aug. 23, 2018); BRAD SEARS & CHRISTY MALLORY, 
DOCUMENTED EVIDENCE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION & ITS EFFECTS ON LGBT PEOPLE 1 
(The Williams Inst. 2011), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Sears-
Mallory-Discrimination-July-20111.pdf. 
 25. Jerome Hunt,  A State-by-State Examination of Nondiscrimination Laws and Policies, 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (2012), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/reports 
/2012/06/11/11696/a-state-by-state-examination-of-nondiscrimination-laws-and-policies/ 
(identifying California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington as states that 
provide legal recourse for both sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination, while 
Wisconsin and New Hampshire only provide legal recourse for sexual orientation discrimination). 
 26. Id. 
 27. For example, on July 16, 2015, the United States Equal Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) held, for the first time, in Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (EEOC 
July 16, 2015), that the prohibition against discrimination based on “sex” contained in Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes a prohibition against discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. As the EEOC stated: 
Sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination because it necessarily entails 
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critical and important work related to workplace protections is taking 
place within the courts. It is this process that is the focus of this Article. 
Obergefell remains the beginning of the work, not the end. 
Section II of this Article discusses development of the prohibition 
against discrimination “because of sex” that is contained in Title VII,28 
including the legislative history of Title VII and the initial 
interpretations of the meaning of “because of sex” in the Title VII 
context.29 Section III is focused on general questions regarding the 
applications of Title VII to claims of discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, while Sections IV and V focus more specifically on 
treatment by the United States Equal Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) and the courts, respectively, on the question of whether 
Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation.30 
Section VI, the concluding section of this Article, examines the 
theories through which Title VII has been seen by courts to prohibit 
 
treating an employee less favorably because of the employee’s sex. For example, 
assume that an employer suspends a lesbian employee for displaying a photo of 
her female spouse on her desk, but does not suspend a male employee for displaying 
a photo of his female spouse on his desk. The lesbian employee in that example can 
allege that her employer took an adverse action against her that the employer 
would not have taken had she been male. That is a legitimate claim under Title 
VII that sex was unlawfully taken into account in the adverse employment 
action. See Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 
(1978) (“Such a practice does not pass the simple test of whether the evidence 
shows ‘treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be 
different.’”). The same result holds true if the person discriminated against is 
straight. Assume a woman is suspended because she has placed a picture of her 
husband on her desk but her gay colleague is not suspended after he places a 
picture of his husband on his desk. The straight female employee could bring a 
cognizable Title VII claim of disparate treatment because of sex. 
Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *6–7 (EEOC July 16, 2015) (emphasis 
added). 
 28. Section 2002e(a) states: 
         It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer: 
  (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; 
or 
  (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities 
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 29. See infra Part II. An earlier version of this discussion of the historical development of the 
understanding of Title VII appeared in Jack B. Harrison, “To Sit or Stand”: Transgender Persons, 
Gendered Restrooms, and the Law, 40 U. HAW. L. REV. 49, 63–83 (2017). 
 30. See infra Parts III–V. 
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discrimination based on sexual orientation.31 Ultimately, this Article 
attempts to propose a unified theory under which discrimination based 
on sexual orientation would be included under Title VII’s prohibition 
against discrimination “because of sex.” 
II.  DISCRIMINATION “BECAUSE OF SEX”  
UNDER TITLE VII 
A.  Genesis of Title VII 
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . .”32 “Although the 
protected classifications of Title VII may appear to be self-explanatory 
on their face, the meaning of ‘[because of] sex’ under Title VII has 
been subject to intense debate in academic and judicial circles” since 
its inception.33 
In part, this debate originates from the fact that the legislative 
history of Title VII contains little to no guidance for determining what 
constitutes discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII. As 
introduced in the House of Representatives, the legislation that 
ultimately became Title VII did not mention discrimination based on 
sex.34 The statutory text of Title VII never defines the terms 
“discriminate” or “sex.”35 Attempting to determine the legislative 
intent of the term “sex” is further complicated by the fact that the 
documentary record is meager.36 The legislative record contains only 
one afternoon of debate and, surprisingly, no committee reports or 
legislative hearings on the issue of discrimination “because of sex.”37 
 
 31. See infra Part VI; see also Luke A. Boso, Acting Gay, Acting Straight: Sexual Orientation 
Stereotyping, 83 TENN. L. REV. 575 (2016); Brian Soucek, Hively’s Self-Induced Blindness, 127 
YALE L.J. F. 115 (2017); Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title 
VII, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 715 (2014); Jessica A. Clarke, Frontiers of Sex Discrimination Law, 115 
MICH. L. REV. 809 (2016) (reviewing KIMBERLY A. YURACKO, GENDER NONCONFORMITY AND 
THE LAW (2016)). 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 33. See Harrison, supra note 29, at 63. 
 34. Charles R. Calleros, The Meaning of “Sex”: Homosexual and Bisexual Harassment under 
Title VII, 20 VT. L. REV. 55, 55–56 (1995). 
 35. Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 1307, 1319 (2012). 
 36. Id. at 1318. 
 37. Id. 
(8)51.1_HARRISON (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2019  3:29 PM 
104 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:91 
On January 31, 1964, following the assassination of President 
Kennedy, the House of Representatives took up debate on H.R. 7152, 
a civil rights bill championed by Kennedy before his death the 
previous November.38 The House debate lasted only eleven days 
before a passing vote was cast on February 10.39 In those eleven days, 
some eighteen amendments to the bill were adopted.40 The “Smith 
Amendment,” adding “sex” as one of the classes protected under Title 
VII, was offered only two days before final passage by House Rules 
Committee Chairman Howard W. Smith, a Democrat from Virginia.41 
The original rationale for the amendment, which added “sex” as a class 
protected under Title VII’s employment discrimination rubric, has 
long been the subject of debate among legal scholars and 
congressional historians.42 
Some have argued that Smith’s record as a staunch conservative 
on civil rights, exemplified by quotes such as, “[t]he Southern people 
have never accepted the colored race as a race of people who had equal 
intelligence. . . as the white people of the South,” formed the basis for 
his efforts to add “sex” to the legislation, hoping that it would serve as 
a “poison pill” insuring that the bill would not pass.43 This attempted 
sabotage, according to some scholars and courts, led to the ambiguity 
of the meaning of “sex” under Title VII.44 As one court noted, “sex 
was added to the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination by a 
congressional opponent at the last moment in the hopes that it would 
dissuade his colleagues from approving the bill; it did not,” and, as a 
result, the court reasoned that the “legislators had very little 
preconceived notion of what types of sex discrimination they were 
dealing with when they enacted Title VII.”45 
 
 38. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND 
XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 10 (1968). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id.; Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of 
Public Policy, 9 L. & INEQUALITY: J. OF THEORY & PRAC. 163, 178 (1991). 
 42. Freeman, supra note 41. 
 43. CHARLES W. WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 115–17 (2010); see Francine Tilewick Bazluke & Jeffrey 
J. Nolan, “Because of Sex”: The Evolving Legal Riddle of Sexual vs. Gender Identity, 32 J.C. & 
U.L. 361, 363 (2006); Calleros, supra note 34, at 57. 
 44. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville (City of Belleville I), 119 F.3d 563, 572 (7th Cir. 
1997). In support of this proposition, the City of Belleville decision cited Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB 
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 45. City of Belleville I, 119 F.3d at 572 (citations omitted); see also Calleros, supra note 34, 
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 Other scholars have argued that, in light of H.R. 7152’s likely 
passage in both houses and with President Johnson ready to sign the 
bill, Smith added “sex” as a protective measure for white women who 
would otherwise be relegated to the back of the hiring line if no 
protective measures for sex were added.46 Proponents of this theory 
often point to Smith’s address to the House upon introduction of the 
amendment.47 
In introducing the amendment, Smith read excerpts from a letter 
he received from a “lady” in which the letter writer chastised the 
government for the numerical disparity apparent in the male and 
female populations of the United States.48 Referencing the 1960 
census, the letter asserted that the imbalance of 2,661,000 more 
females in the United States than males was due in large part to wars 
occasioned by prior administrations and policies of the U.S. 
government.49 Smith’s reading of these excerpts, coupled with his own 
wry cynical wit, was met with laughter on the House floor.50 However, 
in concluding his statement, Smith’s tone took a markedly more 
serious turn: “I read that letter just to illustrate that women have some 
real grievances and some real rights to be protected. I am serious about 
this thing. I just hope that the committee will accept it.”51 
Whatever his motivation in introducing the amendment, when 
called upon to offer support for it during debate, Smith responded with 
strong, serious arguments in favor of adding sex to level the playing 
field for white women, whom he feared would face a serious 
disadvantage in employment matters if race were protected, but not 
sex.52 
 
at 57 (noting that the last-minute nature of the amendment including “sex” confused legislators); 
Major Velma Cheri Gay, 50 Years Later . . . Still Interpreting the Meaning of “Because of Sex” 
Within Title VII and Whether It Prohibits Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 73 A.F. L. REV. 61, 
67 (2015) (noting that, because the House of Representatives debate on the amendment was very 
brief, the legislators’ reasoning is largely a mystery). 
 46. See generally Michael E. Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons Congress Added 
Sex to Title VII and Their Implication for the Issue of Comparable Worth, 19 DUQ. L. REV. 453, 
453 (1981) (challenging “[t]he conventional view . . . that sex was added as a protected class to the 
employment discrimination title of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for the purpose of defeating it by 
making it unacceptable to some of its supporters or by laughing it to death.”). 
 47. Id. at 458. 
 48. 110 CONG. REC. 2547, 2577 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1964) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. at 2578; WHALEN, supra note 43, at 116–117. 
 51. 110 CONG. REC. 2547, 2577 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1964) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
 52. As Smith asserted in debate: 
I put a question to you on behalf of the white women of the United States. Let us assume 
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Discussion of the “Smith Amendment” was but a moment when 
compared to H.R. 7152’s eleven days and eighteen amendments on 
the House floor and what would eventually become the longest 
legislative debate in Senate history.53 After eighty-three days of 
debate, which included the invocation of cloture to break the filibuster 
orchestrated by Southern senators vehemently opposed to civil rights 
measures, the bill was passed in the Senate and signed into law by 
President Johnson on July 2, 1964.54 
B.  Early Understandings of the Meaning of “Because of Sex” 
Shortly after Title VII became law, EEOC Chairman Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Jr. stated to President Lyndon B. Johnson that 
“[i]mplementation of Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination on 
account of sex has been a particularly challenging assignment for the 
Commission.”55 Roosevelt admitted that some “traditional ideas” 
about women’s roles needed to be “drastically revisited” in response 
to Title VII.56 Turning a broad, general mandate into comprehensive 
and comprehensible standards of employer conduct proved so difficult 
for the EEOC that Luther Holcomb, Vice Chairman of the EEOC, 
went so far as to request that Congress remove the prohibition of sex 
discrimination from the law.57 
Much of the EEOC’s frustration was increased by the lack of 
guidance given by Congress.58 In Congress’s brief debate regarding 
the amendment prohibiting discrimination based on sex, it did not 
 
that two women apply for the same job and both of them are equally eligible, one a white 
woman and one a Negro woman. The first thing that the employer will look at [unless 
the Smith amendment is approved] will be the provision with regard to the records he 
must keep. If he does not employ that colored woman and has to make that record, that 
employer will say, “Well, now, if I hire the colored woman I will not be in any trouble, 
but if I do not hire the colored woman and hire the white woman, then the [Equal 
Employment Opportunity] Commission is going to be looking down my throat and will 
want to know why I did not. I may be in a lawsuit.” That will happen as surely as we are 
here this afternoon. You all know it. 
Id. at 2583. 
 53. See Whalen & Whalen, supra note 43; U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra 
note 38, at 10.  
 54. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 38, at 11. 
 55. Franklin, supra note 35, at 1329 (quoting EEOC Reports to President on First 100 Days 
of Activity, [1965-1968 Transfer Binder] Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶8024, at 6036 (Nov. 12, 1965); 
see also, Franklin, supra note 35, at 1380. 
 56. Franklin, supra note 35, at 1329. 
 57. Id. at 1333. 
 58. See id. 
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reach a consensus about post-enactment viability.59 Moreover, in these 
debates, advocates of the amendment did not even consider whether 
Title VII would prevent employers from making distinctions between 
males and females.60 Further complicating the situation was the fact 
that much of the EEOC staff had little experience in the field of sex 
discrimination or women’s rights.61 
These factors, among others, led to some early EEOC decisions 
that are contradictory in light of the current understanding of Title VII. 
For example, just three months after Title VII took effect, the EEOC 
concluded that the practice of employment advertisement seeking only 
men or only women did not qualify as sex discrimination because 
“[c]ulture and mores, personal inclinations, and physical limitations 
will operate to make many job categories primarily of interest to men 
or women.”62 The EEOC, at the time, believed this was not sex 
discrimination as segregating ads by sex allowed both applicants and 
employers to find appropriate employment opportunities more 
efficiently.63 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, courts also consistently held 
that discrimination based on a woman being or becoming pregnant did 
not constitute sex-based discrimination.64 The most notable case came 
before the Supreme Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.65 In 
Gilbert, female plaintiffs brought a class action challenging General 
Electric’s disability plan.66 This plan provided non-occupational 
sickness and accident benefits to all of its employees, but disabilities 
 
 59. Id. at 1330. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1335. 
 62. Id. at 1340; HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE PRESIDENCY: RACE AND 
GENDER IN AMERICAN POLITICS 1960–1972 111 (1992) (citation omitted). 
 63. John Herbers, Help Wanted: Picking the Sex for the Job, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1965, at 
A4. 
 64. See generally Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (finding that company 
policy denying accumulating seniority during pregnancy leave was considered discrimination but 
excluding pregnancy from sick leave compensation was not considered discrimination); Geduldig 
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding the exclusion of public unemployment benefits from 
disability due to pregnancy was not considered sex discrimination because it did not discriminate 
against the people whom the policy intended to protect); Narragansett Elec. Co. v. R.I. Comm’n 
for Human Rights, 374 A.2d 1022 (R.I. 1977) (finding that the policy treating pregnancy disabilities 
differently than other disabilities is not sex discrimination under the State Fair Employment 
Practice Act because pregnancy is a unique disability). 
 65. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
 66. Id. at 125. 
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arising from pregnancy were excluded.67 The Court ruled that in order 
for the plaintiffs to prevail, sex-based discrimination must have 
occurred within the meaning of section 703(a)(1) of Title VII.68 The 
Court reasoned that an exclusion of pregnancy from a disability 
benefits plan was not gender-based discrimination under Title VII.69 
The Court determined that there was no showing that the exclusion of 
pregnancy disability benefits from General Electric’s plan was a 
pretext for discriminating against women.70 The Court noted that 
although pregnancy is confined to women, it is significantly different 
from typically covered diseases or disabilities.71 
Following Gilbert and several other cases that ruled that 
discriminating on the basis of pregnancy was not discrimination 
“because of sex,” Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
(“PDA”) in 1978.72 With the PDA, Congress rejected the court’s 
interpretation that discrimination against pregnant women was not 
discrimination “based on sex.”73 Many legislators in favor of the bill 
expressed surprise that it was necessary to clarify that discrimination 
against pregnant women was, in fact, discrimination “because of sex.” 
In their view, “the assumption that women will become pregnant and 
leave the labor force . . . [was] at the root of the discriminatory 
practices which keep women in low-paying and dead-end jobs.”74 
III.  SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND TITLE VII 
Following the passage of Title VII, gay and lesbian individuals 
brought Title VII sex discrimination claims in which they claimed that 
they had experienced discrimination based on their sexual 
orientation.75 Victims of same-sex discrimination suffered various 
degrees of harassment, including unwanted physical touching, sexual 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 134–36 (citing Geduldig, 417 U.S at 494). 
 69. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 139–40. 
 70. Id. at 135–36. 
 71. Id. at 126. 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Franklin, supra note 35, at 1366–67 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3 (1978), as reprinted 
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4751). 
 75. See, e.g., Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 1089 (1990); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 
1979), abrogated by Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001); Smith v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326–27 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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innuendo, and verbal abuse at the hands of co-workers.76 Nevertheless, 
courts consistently held that discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation was not discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII.77 
In the view of most courts, discrimination suffered by these plaintiffs 
was not covered by Title VII, since it was discrimination because of 
sexual “preference,” and not gender. 
A.  Price Waterhouse and Sex Stereotyping 
Despite the fact that lesbian and gay individuals historically have 
been unable to maintain a sex-based discrimination claim centered on 
allegations of sexual orientation discrimination, such claims have been 
allowed to proceed where the plaintiff has shown that the 
discrimination is on the basis of sex stereotyping.78 In Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,79 the Supreme Court expanded the reach of 
Title VII by concluding that the discrimination “because of sex” 
prohibited by Title VII was not limited only to cases where the 
discrimination was based on biological sex.80 
In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins was a Senior Manager in a 
large accounting firm.81 In 1982, Hopkins was proposed for 
partnership in the firm.82 She was neither offered nor denied the 
partnership; instead, further consideration of her candidacy was 
postponed for one year.83 However, the firm ultimately refused to 
further consider her candidacy to become partner.84 Hopkins brought 
suit in federal district court under Title VII.85 The district court found 
in favor of Hopkins, ruling that Price Waterhouse “unlawfully 
discriminated against her on the basis of sex by consciously giving 
credence and effect to partners’ comments about her that resulted from 
 
 76. See, e.g., Carreno v. Local Union No. 226, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, No. 89-4083-S, 
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13817 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 1990); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, 
Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 77. See, e.g., Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766, at *12 (6th Cir. Jan. 
15, 1992); Williamson, 876 F.2d at 70; DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 331; Hinman v. Dep’t of Pers. Admin., 
213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
 78. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 79. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 80. See id. 
 81. Id. at 231. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 231–32. 
 85. Id. at 232. 
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sex stereotyping.”86 The court of appeals affirmed87 and the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.88 
In evaluating Hopkins’s claims, the Court took into consideration 
her achievements in the workplace, personality traits, and workplace 
relationships.89 The record reflected that Hopkins was praised for her 
accomplishments. She was praised by both clients and partners for 
being “‘an outstanding professional’ who had a ‘deft touch,’ a ‘strong 
character, independence and integrity.’”90 She was described by a 
State Department official as being “extremely competent, 
intelligent,”91 “strong and forthright, very productive, energetic and 
creative.”92 
Despite having top-notch professional qualities, Hopkins’s 
interpersonal skills, according to her former employers, needed 
improvement.93 On many occasions she was aggressive and abrasive 
to staff members.94 Partners evaluating her work counseled her to 
improve her interpersonal skills.95 In her bid for the partnership, both 
supporters and opponents of her candidacy, “indicated that she was 
sometimes overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with and 
impatient with staff.”96 
Nevertheless, the record indicated that it was not her aggressive 
personality alone that caused Hopkins to be denied partnership.97 In 
fact, Hopkins’s lack of femininity in terms of her gender presentation 
and/or expression also played a role in the decision.98 Partners and co-
workers made statements that she “overcompensated for being a 
woman,” was “macho,” needed to take a “course at charm school,” 
and was not appropriately feminine.99 Finally, when inquiring about 
why her candidacy was placed on hold, she was advised to “walk more 
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-
 
 86. Id. at 237. 
 87. Id. at 232. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 233–37. 
 90. Id. at 234. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. at 234–35. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 234. 
 96. Id. at 235. 
 97. See id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”100 
Price Waterhouse attempted to rebut Hopkins’s claim by 
asserting that even if a plaintiff showed that her gender played a role 
in the firm’s employment decision, it was still her burden to show the 
decision would have been different if the employer had not 
discriminated.101 The Court rejected Price Waterhouse’s argument.102 
In doing so, the Court noted that “Congress’ intent to forbid employers 
to take gender into account in making employment decisions appears 
on the face of the statute.”103 The Court further determined that “the 
words ‘because of’ do not mean ‘solely because of,’” and that Title 
VII was “meant to condemn even those decisions based on a mixture 
of legitimate and illegitimate considerations.”104 Thus, the Court 
concluded, when an employer considered both gender and legitimate 
factors in making an employment decision, such a decision would be 
“because of sex.”105 
Because of these conclusions, the Court ruled that when a plaintiff 
in a Title VII case proves that gender played a motivating factor in 
their employment, the defendant could only avoid liability by proving, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant would have 
made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender 
into consideration.106 
B.  Oncale and Same-Sex Sexual Harassment 
Soon after Title VII became law, courts quickly established 
opposite-sex sexual harassment as a cognizable claim under Title 
VII.107 However, according to Justice Scalia, the federal courts had 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 237–38. 
 102. Id. at 253 (“We are persuaded that the better rule is that the employer must make this 
showing by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
 103. Id. at 239. 
 104. Id. at 241. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 252–53 (“The courts below held that an employer who has allowed a discriminatory 
impulse to play a motivating part in an employment decision must prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination. We are 
persuaded that the better rule is that the employer must make this showing by a preponderance of 
the evidence.”). 
 107. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that the plaintiff employee’s 
gender was an indispensable factor in conditioning her job retention on being receptive to the sexual 
advances of her opposite-sex employer); see also Morgan v. Hertz Corp., 542 F. Supp. 123 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1981) (holding that sexually indecent comments towards female coworkers is sexual 
harassment prohibited by Title VII); Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 
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taken a “bewildering variety of stances” in determining whether 
plaintiffs alleging same-sex sexual harassment actually had an 
actionable claim under Title VII.108 Some circuits allowed plaintiffs to 
move forward with same-sex sexual harassment claims just the same 
as an opposite-sex sexual harassment claim under Title VII.109 Other 
circuits would consider the plaintiff’s same-sex sexual harassment 
claim as actionable under Title VII only if the harassed was 
heterosexual and the harasser was homosexual.110 The majority of 
circuits rejected same-sex sexual harassment, finding that it was 
outside the scope of Congress’s intent to provide an actionable claim 
for same-sex harassment under Title VII.111 
In 1998, the Supreme Court ultimately settled the circuit split with 
its decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.112 In 
Oncale, the male plaintiff was subjected to humiliating, degrading, 
and lewd sex-related actions at the hands of his male co-workers.113 
At one point, Oncale was even threatened with rape.114 Oncale 
complained to Sundowner’s supervisory personnel about the 
 
1978) (finding that employment terminated after refusal of repeated sexual advances by employer 
and discrimination against female employee was not evidenced with males in the same position). 
 108. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (“Federal courts have 
taken a bewildering variety of stances. Some . . . have held that same-sex sexual harassment claims 
are never cognizable under Title VII. . . . Other decisions say that such claims are actionable . . . 
.”). 
 109. See Gay, supra note 45, at 80–81; see also Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville (City of 
Belleville I), 119 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding same-sex harassment actionable as sex 
discrimination); Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, No. 94 Civ. 5458 (LAP), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16073 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1995) (finding same-sex harassment actionable under Title VII); Raney 
v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1995) (denying defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment on same-sex harassment under Title VII). Contra Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health 
Care Ctr., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000) (denying relief under Title VII where doctor harassed male 
nurse by “lisping at him” and “flipping his wrist” because the actions were considered 
“homophobic” rather than discriminatory). 
 110. See Yeary v. Goodwill Industries-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 446–48 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s view that “a claim under Title VII for same-sex ‘hostile work 
environment’ harassment may lie where the perpetrator of the sexual harassment is homosexual,” 
but that sexual harassment between two heterosexual males “cannot be ‘considered to be because 
of the [target’s] sex.’” (alteration in original)); see also McWilliams v. Fairfax Cty. Bd. of 
Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195–96 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding no claim for Title VII harassment 
where alleged harasser and victims were heterosexuals of the same sex), abrogated by Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 111. See generally Gay, supra note 45, at 80–81; see also Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 
1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (finding Congress did not intend to sanction same-sex harassment when it 
enacted Title VII). 
 112. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75–82. 
 113. Id. at 77. 
 114. Id. 
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harassment, but no action was taken.115 Since his supervisor took no 
action and the harassment continued, Oncale ultimately quit his job.116 
Subsequently, he brought a Title VII claim against Sundowner and the 
co-workers who harassed him, alleging that he had been discriminated 
against because of his sex.117 The district court granted summary 
judgment, finding that Oncale had no claim under Title VII because 
the harassment was caused by his male co-workers. The Fifth Circuit 
court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.118 
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court held that nothing in 
Title VII necessarily barred a claim of discrimination “because of sex” 
simply because the parties were of the same sex.119 The Court noted 
that male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was not the 
principal evil Congress was concerned about when it enacted Title 
VII, however, “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal 
evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the 
provisions of our law rather than the principal concerns of our 
legislators by which we are governed.”120 
The Court further established three ways plaintiffs alleging same-
sex sexual harassment may have an actionable claim through Title 
VII’s “because of sex” provision.121 First, the Court determined that 
same-sex sexual harassment should not be treated differently from 
opposite-sex sexual harassment if the plaintiff can show credible 
evidence that the harasser is homosexual.122 Second, the Court 
concluded that the harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 79. 
 120. Id. at 79–80. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated: 
We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a categorical rule 
excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII. As some courts 
have observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the 
principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory 
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, 
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our 
legislators by which we are governed. Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ion] . . . because 
of . . . sex” in the “terms” or “conditions” of employment. Our holding that this includes 
sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory 
requirements. 
Id.  
 121. See id. at 80–81. 
 122. Id. at 80. 
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desire to support an inference of sex based discrimination.123 The 
Court found that a claim under Title VII’s sex provision could also be 
actionable if the harasser was motivated by general hostility to the 
presence of the opposite sex in the workplace.124 Lastly, the court 
established that a plaintiff claiming same-sex harassment could also 
prove “because of sex” discrimination through “comparative evidence 
about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a 
mixed-sex workplace.”125 The court cautioned that regardless of the 
evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses, “he or she must always prove 
that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual 
connotations, but actually constituted ‘discrimina[tion] . . . because 
of . . . sex.’”126 
IV.  EEOC DECISIONS INTERPRETING TITLE VII IN THE 
AFTERMATH OF PRICE WATERHOUSE AND ONCALE 
Although the Price Waterhouse and Oncale decisions expanded 
the understanding of what constitutes “because of sex” discrimination 
under Title VII, there has been debate amongst scholars, lower federal 
courts, and the EEOC as to how far the reach of these decisions may 
actually be.127 Following the rulings in Oncale and Price Waterhouse, 
claims came before lower courts alleging “because of sex” 
discrimination under Title VII on the grounds of both same-sex sexual 
harassment and gender stereotyping.128 Despite the guidance given by 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Id. at 81. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Andrea Meryl Kirshenbaum, “Because of . . . Sex”: Rethinking the Protections 
Afforded Under Title VII in the Post-Oncale World, 69 ALB. L. REV. 139, 142–43 (2005) (“Oncale 
and its progeny demonstrate that the assumptions underlying the traditional employment 
discrimination construct can no longer be relied upon to conceptualize the full panoply of sexual 
harassment and discrimination actionable under Title VII.”); see also B.J. Chisholm, The 
(Back)door of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.: Outing Heterosexuality as a Gender-
Based Stereotype, 10 L. & SEXUALITY: REV. LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER LEGAL 
ISSUES 239 (2001) (arguing that “Oncale is little more than a temporary hole in the wall of refusal 
to protect . . . LGBT employees’ rights” and that Congress should “pass broad legislation to prohibit 
[sexual orientation] discrimination.”). But see John W. Whitehead, Eleventh Hour Amendment or 
Serious Business: Sexual Harassment and the United States Supreme Court’s 1997–1998 Term, 71 
TEMP. L. REV. 773, 806 (1998) (“In Oncale, the Supreme Court failed to distinguish between the 
terms sexual harassment and sex-based harassment . . . . According to the EEOC, ‘[s]exual 
harassment is a form of sex discrimination in which the prohibited conduct is sexual in nature, not 
just sex-based.’”). 
 128. See, e.g., Love v. Motiva Enters., LLC, No. 07-5970, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69978 (E.D. 
La. Sept. 16, 2008) (granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in claim of same-sex sexual 
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the Supreme Court in Oncale and Price Waterhouse, lower federal 
courts have interpreted these claims in a variety of ways.129 Moreover, 
Oncale and Price Waterhouse sparked a slew of claims from plaintiffs 
claiming discrimination “because of sex” based on sexual orientation 
and on transgender status or gender identity.130 Likewise, the EEOC’s 
stance on what constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex under 
Title VII has evolved following Oncale and Price Waterhouse.131 
Additionally, lesbian, gay, and transgender employees attempted 
to bring Title VII actions claiming that their discrimination flowed 
 
harassment and gender stereotyping claims against employer); Jones v. Pac. Rail Servs., No. 00 C 
5776, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1549 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2001) (relying on Oncale in denying motion 
to dismiss same-sex harassment and gender-based stereotyping against plaintiff’s employer); 
EEOC v. TruGreen Ltd. P’ship., 122 F. Supp. 2d 986 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (holding plaintiff failed to 
prove defendant harassed plaintiff ‘because of’ his failure to adhere to gender stereotypes). 
 129. Matthew Fedor, Can Price Waterhouse and Gender Stereotyping Save the Day for Same-
Sex Discrimination Plaintiffs Under Title VII? A Careful Reading of Oncale Compels an 
Affirmative Answer, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 455 (2002). In Oncale, Justice Scalia noted that some 
courts have held that “same-sex sexual harassment claims are never cognizable under Title VII.” 
Oncale., 523 U.S. at 79 (citing Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988)). 
Moreover, Scalia pointed out that a few courts have held that such claims are actionable “only if 
the plaintiff can prove that the harasser is homosexual.” Id. (comparing McWilliams v. Fairfax Cty. 
Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996), with Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 
F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996)). Justice Scalia also observed that other courts have suggested that 
“workplace harassment that is sexual in content is always actionable, regardless of the harasser’s 
sex, sexual orientation, or motivations.” Id. (citing Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 
563 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
 130. See Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. 00-3114, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417 (E.D. La. 
Sept. 16, 2002) (the phrase “sex” has not been interpreted to include sexual identity or gender 
identity); see also Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (employee 
born male and identifying as female was fired after using both men’s and women’s bathrooms and 
refusing to identify with a specific gender); Doe v. United Consumer Fin. Servs., No. 1:01 CV 
1112, 2001 WL 34350174 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001) (employee who had Gender Identity Disorder 
terminated because her appearance and behavior did not fit into the company’s sex stereotypes). 
 131. EEOC, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
WAGE AND HOUR DIV. AND THE U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Jan. 6, 2017) (Title 
VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination includes discrimination because of pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions; gender identity (including transgender status); and sexual 
orientation); see also Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *6–8 (EEOC July 
16, 2015) (holding that (1) discrimination because of sexual orientation is premised on sex-based 
preferences, assumptions, expectations, stereotypes, or norms. “Sexual orientation” as a concept 
cannot be defined or understood without reference to sex; (2) sexual orientation discrimination is 
also sex discrimination because it is associational discrimination because of sex; and (3) sexual 
orientation discrimination also is sex discrimination because it necessarily involves discrimination 
based on gender stereotypes); EEOC, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE EQUAL 
EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N AND THE DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE FOR 
CIVIL RIGHTS (Jan. 13, 2017) (describing EEOC laws broadly prohibiting employment 
discrimination against individuals on the basis of race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, 
gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability, genetic 
information, or an individual’s opposition to discrimination or participation in an EEOC 
proceeding). 
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from the fact that they did not conform to traditional sex 
stereotypes.132 Unfortunately, lower federal courts often ignored 
evidence of gender stereotyping and effectively characterized the 
harassment as based on the individual’s perceived sexual orientation, 
rather than sex stereotyping rooted in normative gender 
understandings.133 Since discrimination based on sexual orientation 
historically has not been actionable under Title VII, courts consistently 
ruled against these plaintiffs.134 
However, in Smith v. City of Salem,135 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized that a transgender employee 
could conceivably bring a valid Title VII claim under a sex 
stereotyping theory of recovery.136 In Smith, Jimmie Smith, a 
biological male, was a lieutenant in the Salem, Ohio Fire 
Department.137 Smith had been with the Salem Fire Department for 
seven years.138 Smith was diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder 
(“GID”) and began dressing and acting more femininely.139 Following 
these changes, Smith’s co-workers began to treat him differently, 
commenting on how his appearance and mannerisms were not 
“masculine enough.”140 Smith also informed his supervisor of his 
 
 132. See Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Ohio 2003); see also Oiler, 
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417 (transgender male plaintiff filed Title VII action); Doe v. United 
Consumer Fin. Servs., No. 1:01 CV 1112, 2001 WL 34350174 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001) 
(transgender female plaintiff filed Title VII action). 
 133. Fedor, supra note 129, at 470–71; see also Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 
1084–86 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding Title VII sex harassment claim based on perceived sexual 
orientation was not harassment based on gender), overruled by Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of 
Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 134. See Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 85 F. Supp. 2d 509 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (granting 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment because sexual harassment claim was based on sexual 
orientation and not ‘sex’); see also Metzger v. Compass Grp. U.S.A., Inc., No. 98-2386-GTV, 1999 
WL 714116 (D. Kan. Sept. 1, 1999) (finding plaintiff did not establish sexual harassment occurred 
where defendant made hostile remarks regarding homosexuals but not women); Salvatore v. KLM 
Royal Dutch Airlines, No. 98 Civ. 2450 (LAP), 1999 WL 796172 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 1999) (finding 
harassment based on plaintiff’s sexual orientation could not be the basis for a Title VII sex 
discrimination claim); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Me. 
1998) (upholding lower court’s grant of summary judgment on Title VII discrimination claim based 
on sexual orientation). 
 135. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 136. Id. at 572–73. For a more fulsome discussion of the application of Title VII and Title IX 
to discrimination against transgender persons, see generally Harrison, supra note 29. 
 137. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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intent to make a complete transformation from male to female.141 As 
a result of Smith’s new conduct, city officials discussed their 
intentions of using Smith’s transsexualism as a basis for terminating 
his employment.142 After Smith faced adverse employment action in 
the form of a suspension, he felt the suspension was unjust and filed 
suit claiming Title VII sex discrimination.143 
The district court dismissed his claims, which were subsequently 
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.144 
The court of appeals first addressed whether Smith had stated a claim 
for relief, pursuant to Price Waterhouse’s prohibition on sex 
stereotyping.145 The court of appeals agreed with Smith that he had 
stated a claim for relief pursuant to Price Waterhouse.146 The court of 
appeals determined that Smith’s “failure to conform to sex stereotypes 
concerning how a man should look and behave was the driving force 
behind Defendants’ actions.”147 As a result, the court of appeals 
concluded that Smith had sufficiently pleaded claims of sex 
stereotyping and gender discrimination.148 
The court of appeals further concluded that the lower court had 
reached its decision using a series of federal appellate cases pre-Price 
Waterhouse that held transsexuals, as a class, were not entitled to Title 
VII protection because “Congress had a narrow view of sex in mind” 
and “never considered nor intended that [Title VII] apply to anything 
other than the traditional concept of sex.”149 The court of appeals noted 
that these decisions had been “eviscerated by Price Waterhouse.”150 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 569. 
 144. Id. at 566–67. 
 145. Id. at 571. 
 146. Id. at 572–73. 
 147. Id. at 572. 
 148. Id. at 575. 
 149. Id. at 572 (construing “sex” in Title VII narrowly to mean only anatomical and biological 
sex rather than gender) (citing Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984)), 
overruled by Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 351–352 (7th Cir. 2017) (sexual 
orientation discrimination is actionable under Title VII); see also Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 
667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding transsexuals are not protected under Title VII because 
“the ‘plain meaning’ must be ascribed to the term ‘sex’ in the absence of clear congressional intent 
to do otherwise.”); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661–63 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(declining to extend protection of Title VII to transsexual plaintiff who was terminated following 
her sex change operation because the “traditional meaning” of “sex” refers to present anatomical 
characteristics). 
 150. Smith, 378 F.3d at 573. 
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The court of appeals determined that Price Waterhouse and the facts 
underlying Smith’s claim were analogous.151 The court of appeals 
reasoned that an employer who discriminates against women because 
they fail to wear dresses or makeup is no different from an employer 
who discriminates against men because they do wear dresses and 
makeup.152 
While cases such as Price Waterhouse, Oncale, and Smith 
provided some limited mechanisms through which homosexual and 
transgender individuals could maintain a claim under Title VII, recent 
EEOC rulings suggest that full Title VII protections for discrimination 
based on sexual orientation and transgender status may be on the 
horizon.153 These EEOC rulings recognized discrimination because of 
sexual orientation or transgender status as sex based discrimination 
under Title VII, without requiring that such an argument be rooted in 
gender stereotyping or gender non-conformity. 
A.  Application of Title VII to Gender Identity: Macy v. Holder 
In Macy v. Holder,154 the plaintiff, Mia Macy, was a biological 
male whose gender identity was female.155 Macy was a detective in 
Phoenix, Arizona, but wanted to relocate to San Francisco for family 
reasons.156 To accomplish her goal of moving to California, Macy 
applied for an open position with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) at its Walnut Creek crime 
laboratory.157 Initially, Macy presented herself as a man in phone 
interviews and was given assurances she would get the job following 
a successful background check.158 
Aspen, the contractor responsible for filling the position, then 
contacted Macy and had her fill out the necessary employment 
paperwork, including paperwork for a background check.159 Macy 
“informed Aspen via email she was in the process of transitioning 
from male to female” and requested that the director of the Walnut 
 
 151. Id. at 575. 
 152. Id. at 574. 
 153. Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *10 (EEOC July 16, 2015); see 
also Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012). 
 154. No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995. 
 155. Id. at *1. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
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Creek crime laboratory be informed.160 Five days after Aspen 
informed the director, Macy received an email from the director 
stating that the position was no longer available due to budget cuts.161 
In fact, the position was not cut, but was filled by another candidate.162 
Macy believed the decision not to hire her was because she was 
transgender and she filed an equal opportunity complaint with the 
ATF.163 In her complaint, Macy alleged discrimination based on 
“gender identity” and “sex stereotyping.”164 The ATF accepted her 
complaint, but determined that her claims initially had to be processed 
according to Department of Justice (“DOJ”) administrative policy.165 
The DOJ had separate systems for adjudicating claims, “one system 
for adjudicating claims of sex discrimination under Title VII and a 
separate system for adjudicating complaints of sexual orientation and 
gender identity discrimination.”166 The DOJ process for sexual 
orientation and gender identity discrimination did not include the same 
rights offered under Title VII.167 As a result, Macy appealed to the 
EEOC.168 
 On appeal, the EEOC held that discrimination against a 
transgender individual because of their transgender status is, in fact, 
discrimination because of sex and violates Title VII.169 The EEOC 
determined that when an employer discriminates against an employee 
because the employee has expressed his or her gender in a non-
traditional manner, the employer is making a gender-based 
evaluation.170 As a result, the employer would be violating the law as 
established by Price Waterhouse, because an employer may not take 
gender into account when making an employment decision.171 
B.  Application of Title VII to Sexual Orientation: Baldwin v. Foxx 
In Baldwin v. Foxx,172 David Baldwin, the plaintiff, was a 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at *2. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at *3. 
 169. Id. at *4. 
 170. Id. at *7. 
 171. Id. 
 172. No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (EEOC July 16, 2015). 
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Supervisory Air Traffic Control Specialist.173 Baldwin was allegedly 
passed over for a promotion due to his sexual orientation.174 As a 
result, Baldwin filed a complaint with the agency alleging unlawful 
employment discrimination under Title VII.175 Baldwin’s complaint 
was dismissed, and he appealed to the EEOC.176 
On appeal, the EEOC determined that a claim for sex 
discrimination under Title VII could be maintained if the 
discrimination was a result of an individual’s sexual orientation.177 
The EEOC determined that sexual orientation discrimination is, in 
fact, “discrimination on the basis of sex.”178 In the EEOC’s view, sex 
and sexual orientation are inseparable.179 According to the EEOC, 
“discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is premised on sex-
based preferences, assumptions, expectations, stereotypes, or 
norms.”180 As a result, the EEOC concluded that “‘sexual orientation’ 
as a concept cannot be defined or understood without reference to 
sex.”181 This conclusion rested on the fact that it is not possible to 
determine whether an individual is “gay” or “straight” without first 
taking his or her sex into consideration.182 The EEOC stated that: 
An employee could show that the sexual orientation 
discrimination he or she experienced was sex discrimination 
because it involved treatment that would not have occurred 
but for the individual’s sex; because it was based on the sex 
of the person(s) the individual associates with; and/or 
because it was premised on the fundamental sex stereotype, 
norm, or expectation that individuals should be attracted only 
to those of the opposite sex.183 
The EEOC further concluded that sexual orientation 
discrimination is sex discrimination, because it is based on gender 
stereotyping.184 This argument had been used by homosexual 
 
 173. Id. at *1. 
 174. Id. at *2. 
 175. Id. at *1. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See id. at *10. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at *5. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at *10. 
 184. Id. at *7, *10. 
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plaintiffs in past Title VII sex discrimination claims, but to no avail.185 
Prior to this ruling, homosexual plaintiffs could only find relief for sex 
based discrimination if they could show they were being treated 
differently not because they were homosexual, but because they did 
not act “masculine” or “feminine” enough for their particular 
biological sex.186 
Undoubtedly, the Baldwin opinion is a victory for the LGBT 
community. However, the implications of the case are still evolving, 
as the decision is only binding on federal agencies.187 Guidance from 
the EEOC concerning the interpretation of Title VII will only be 
considered by federal courts as persuasive authority. However, over 
the past two years, we have seen federal courts increasingly willing to 
entertain arguments over the scope of protections provided by Title 
VII against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity. 
V.  TITLE VII LITIGATION ADDRESSING SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION 
In recent years, federal courts have been increasingly willing to 
entertain arguments over the scope of protections provided by Title 
VII against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity. These cases have centered not only on the prohibition against 
gender stereotyping articulated in Price Waterhouse, but have also 
focused on the text of Title VII itself. 
For example, in Boutillier v. Hartford Public Schools,188 where 
an elementary school teacher brought an action against her former 
school district alleging sexual orientation discrimination in violation 
of Title VII “because of . . . sex,” the court held that Title VII protects 
individuals who are discriminated against on the basis of sex because 
of their sexual orientation.189 In recognizing the applicability of the 
 
 185. Id. at *9; see also Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding 
that employee alleging discrimination based on her lesbianism could not satisfy the first element of 
a prima facie case under Title VII because it did not recognize homosexuals as a protected class); 
Martin v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 224 F. Supp. 2d 434 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that 
harassment was purely sexual in nature rather than based on gender). 
 186. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Prowel v. Wise 
Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that employee’s harassment and termination 
were due to sexual discrimination, though employee alleged they were due to gender stereotyping). 
 187. See 29 C.F.R. §1614.110 (2017). 
 188. 221 F. Supp. 3d 255 (D. Conn. 2016). 
 189. Id. at 255. 
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Price Waterhouse holding to Title VII claims based on same-sex 
attraction as a non-conforming gender stereotype, the court asserted, 
“stereotypes concerning sexual orientation are probably the most 
prominent of all sex related stereotypes, which can lead to 
discrimination based on what the Second Circuit refers to 
interchangeably as gender non-conformity.”190 
Whereas, in Winstead v. Lafayette County Board of County 
Commissioners,191 where a former county emergency medical services 
employee brought a claim of employment discrimination based on 
sexual orientation,192 the district court held that sexual orientation 
discrimination was actionable under Title VII, concluding that “[t]o 
hold that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination “because of sex” 
includes a prohibition on discrimination based on an employee’s 
homosexuality or bisexuality or heterosexuality” simply “requires 
close attention to the text of Title VII [and] common sense.”193 
Further, the court stated that all that was required to reach this 
conclusion was an understanding that “[i]n forbidding employers to 
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress 
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men 
and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”194 
In Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club,195 a lesbian 
employee alleged discrimination and harassment in violation of Title 
VII.196 In confronting the employer’s argument that Title VII was not 
applicable to claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation, the 
court asserted: 
Defendant contends that Title VII is inapplicable here 
because the discrimination was on the basis of sexual 
orientation. I disagree. Nothing in Title VII suggests that 
 
 190. Id. at 269. 
 191. 197 F. Supp. 3d 1334 (N.D. Fla. 2016). 
 192. Id. at 1335. 
 193. Id. at 1347. Quoting Justice Scalia’s language in Oncale, the court stated: 
No one doubts that discrimination against people based on their sexual orientation was 
not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But 
statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable 
evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of 
our legislators by which we are governed. 
Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 194. Id. (quoting City of L.A., Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978)). 
 195. 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (D. Or. 2002). 
 196. Id. at 1212. 
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Congress intended to confine the benefits of that statute to 
heterosexual employees alone. Rather, Congress intended 
that all Americans should have an opportunity to participate 
in the economic life of the nation.197 
In Christiansen v. Omnicom Group Inc.,198 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded the 
lower court’s dismissal of a Title VII discrimination claim where an 
employee was offered and rejected an employment package following 
harassment regarding beliefs about his HIV status and for allegedly 
failing to live up to gender stereotypes of how men should behave.199 
In reversing the lower court’s dismissal of the employee’s complaint, 
the appellate court articulated three ways in which a plaintiff could 
successfully allege Title VII discrimination against employers who 
engaged in sexual orientation discrimination: 
First, plaintiffs could demonstrate that if they had engaged in 
identical conduct but been of the opposite sex, they would 
not have been discriminated against. Second, plaintiffs could 
demonstrate that they were discriminated against due to the 
sex of their associates. Finally, plaintiffs could demonstrate 
that they were discriminated against because they do not 
conform to some gender stereotype, including the stereotype 
that men should be exclusively attracted to women and 
women should be exclusively attracted to men.200 
The court concluded by asserting that “in the context of an appropriate 
case our Court should consider reexamining the holding that sexual 
orientation discrimination claims are not cognizable under Title 
VII.”201 
Thus, we have seen courts increasingly expanding the 
understanding of what constitutes prohibited discrimination because 
of sex under Title VII. What follows is an analysis of three critical 
cases addressing these issues over the last year. 
 
 197. Id. at 1222. 
 198. 852 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 199. Id. at 195. 
 200. Id. at 207. 
 201. Id. 
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A.  Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital202 
In Evans, Jameka Evans filed a pro se complaint against Georgia 
Regional Hospital, Charles Moss, Lisa Clark, and Senior Human 
Resources Manager Jamekia Powers, alleging employment 
discrimination under Title VII.203 Evans was employed “at the 
Hospital as a security officer from August 1, 2012, to October 11, 
2013, when she left voluntarily.”204 
Evans’s complaint alleged that “[d]uring her time at the Hospital, 
she was denied equal pay or work, harassed, and physically assaulted 
or battered.”205 She alleged that she was subjected to this 
discriminatory treatment because of sex, in that she was “targeted” 
because she failed to carry herself in a “traditional woman[ly] 
manner.”206 While Evans is lesbian, she stated that “she did not 
broadcast her sexuality” within the workplace.207 Yet, she alleged that 
“it was ‘evident’ that she identified with the male gender,” because of 
the manner in which she chose to present herself—“male uniform, low 
male haircut, shoes, etc.”208 
Evans attached a “Record of Incidents” to her complaint, in which 
she outlined some of the treatment to which she had been subjected.209 
Among these were allegations that Moss repeatedly shut the door on 
Evans “in a rude manner,” that Evans experienced scheduling issues 
and changes in her work shift that were designed to punish her, and 
that Corporal Shanika Johnson was promoted to be her supervisor, 
even though Johnson was less qualified than Evans.210 Evans alleged 
“that someone had tampered with her equipment, including her radio, 
clip, and shoulder microphone.”211 She also included several emails 
and letters from other employees that she asserted provided support 
for her claims of discrimination.212 
 
 202. 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-370, 138 S. Ct. 557 (Dec. 11, 2017). 
 203. Id. at 1250–51. 
 204. Id. at 1251. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. The court of appeals described this additional evidence in the following manner: 
Evans also included an e-mail from Harvey Sanchez Pegues, which stated that Moss had 
harassed Pegues on a daily basis, had a habit of favoritism, changed Pegues’s schedule 
frequently, had created a tense and unpleasant work environment, and had a habit of 
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Following review of her complaint, the federal magistrate judge 
assigned to the case issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”), in 
which the court rejected the claim of discrimination based on Evans’s 
sexual orientation.213 In the R&R, the magistrate judge concluded that, 
based on decisions from all the courts of appeals that had addressed 
the issue, Title VII “was not intended to cover discrimination against 
homosexuals.”214 Regarding Evans’s claim of discrimination based on 
gender non-conformity or sexual stereotyping, the magistrate judge 
incorrectly held that such a claim was “just another way to claim 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.”215 Additionally, the 
magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the retaliation claim, 
concluding that no allegation was included in the complaint that Evans 
had opposed a recognized unlawful employment action.216 The 
magistrate judge recommended that all the claims be dismissed, with 
prejudice, without leave to amend the complaint; concluding that 
Evans had pled no actionable claim, nor was likely to be able to do so 
in the future.217 
Evans objected to the R&R, arguing “that her gender non-
conformity and sexual orientation discrimination claims were 
actionable under Title VII as sex-based discrimination.”218 
Additionally, she asserted that the magistrate judge had erred in not 
giving her the opportunity to amend her complaint, arguing that “new 
supplemental evidence ha[d] arisen that affirm[ed] the consistency of 
the claims alleged in [her] complaint with the claims investigated in 
 
targeting people for termination. Evans also attached a letter from Jalisia Bedgard, which 
stated that Johnson and Moss had expected Evans to quit because of Johnson’s 
promotion and, if not, because of a bad shift change that would cause Evans scheduling 
conflicts. Another attached letter from Cheryl Sanders, Employee Relations Coordinator 
in the human resources department at the Hospital, indicated that the Hospital had 
investigated Evans’s complaints of favoritism, inconsistent and unfair practices, and 
inappropriate conduct, and had found no evidence that she had been singled out and 
targeted for termination. Finally, Evans attached e-mail correspondence between Pegues 
and Evans, which indicated that: (1) Pegues believed that Moss was trying to target 
Evans for termination because she had substantial evidence of wrongdoing against him, 
and (2) Moss had changed the qualifications of a job to prevent other candidates from 
qualifying. 
Id. at 1251–52. 
 213. Id. at 1252. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 1252, 1254–55. 
 216. Id. at 1252. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
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the EEOC charge, satisfying the administrative consistency 
doctrine.”219 
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (“Lambda 
Legal”) sought permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of 
the objections to the R&R.220 The district court granted this request.221 
In its filing, “Lambda Legal argued that an employee’s status as 
lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (‘LGBT’), does not defeat a 
claim based on gender non-conformity” under Price Waterhouse and 
its progeny.222 Lambda Legal also asserted that the magistrate judge 
was incorrect in concluding “that sexual orientation is not an 
actionable basis under Title VII.”223 
In response to Evans’s objections and the filing by Lambda Legal, 
the district court conducted a de novo review of the entire record.224 
Following this review, the district court “adopted—without further 
comment—the R&R, dismissed the case with prejudice, and appointed 
counsel from Lambda Legal to represent Evans on appeal.”225 
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 
Evans, supported by the EEOC as amicus curiae, argued “that the 
[lower] court erred in dismissing her claim that she was discriminated 
against for failing to conform to gender stereotypes,” asserting that the 
Eleventh Circuit had allowed “a separate discrimination claim for 
gender non-conformity.”226 Additionally, Evans argued that “sexual 
orientation discrimination is, in fact, sex discrimination under Title 
VII.”227 
Oral argument was held in the case on December 15, 2016.228 
Judge Pryor229 quickly articulated the issues on appeal, stating “I read 
the complaint as, as potentially raising two different kinds of claims, 
right? One would be a claim of discrimination based on gender 
 
 219. Id. (alteration in original). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 1253. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 1253–54. 
 227. Id. at 1253. 
 228. 11th Cir. 15-15234 Case History, EQUAL. CASE FILES, http://files.eqcf.org/cases/11th-cir-
15-15234-case-history (last updated July 14, 2017). 
 229. 15-15234 Oral Argument, Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, No. 15-15234 (11th 
Circuit), Notes from Oral Argument, December 15, 2016, EQUAL. CASE FILES, http://files.eqcf.org/ 
cases/15-15234-oral-argument (last visited Sept. 9, 2018). 
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nonconformity in conduct or behavior, right, which this court has 
recognized as actionable under Title VII,” and a claim of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.230 As to the former, Judge 
Pryor noted that while the original complaint might be deficient in 
stating sufficient facts to state a claim for discrimination based on 
gender nonconformity, one remedy might be to remand the case to the 
district court, ordering that an amended complaint be allowed.231 As 
to the latter claim of discrimination based on sexual orientation, Judge 
Pryor noted that, prior to the division of the Fifth Circuit resulting in 
the creation of the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit had rejected such 
claims. Accordingly, based on that precedent, the court of appeals was 
bound to conclude that Title VII does not protect against sexual 
orientation discrimination.232 In responding to Judge Pryor’s 
questions, Greg Nevins of Lambda Legal,233 arguing in support of 
Evans, asserted that the line of cases being raised by Judge Pryor are 
no longer good law.234 In light of that, Nevins urged the court to revisit 
these prior decisions.235 Judge Pryor noted that the en banc court of 
appeals might consider that option, should it be necessary.236 
During the oral argument, Judge Rosenbaum237 implied that great 
difficulty lay in attempting to separate sexual orientation from gender 
nonconformity in the context of sex discrimination, asking “where can 
[the court] draw an intellectually honest line between gender 
stereotyping based on gender norms” and discrimination based on 
sexual orientation.238 Accordingly, Judge Rosenbaum appeared to be 
skeptical of the idea that Title VII did not directly prohibit 
 
 230. Oral Argument at 01:11, 02:11, Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(No. 15-15234), http://files.eqcf.org/cases/15-15234-oral-argument-audio. 
 231. 15-15234 Oral Argument, Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, No. 15-15234 (11th 
Circuit), Notes from Oral Argument, December 15, 2016, EQUAL. CASE FILES, 
http://files.eqcf.org/cases/15-15234-oral-argument (last visited Sept. 9, 2018). 
 232. Oral Argument at 02:20, 03:32, Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(No. 15-15234), http://files.eqcf.org/cases/15-15234-oral-argument-audio. 
 233. 15-15234 Oral Argument, Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, No. 15-15234 (11th 
Circuit), Notes from Oral Argument, December 15, 2016, EQUAL. CASE FILES, http://files.eqcf.org/ 
cases/15-15234-oral-argument (last visited Sept. 9, 2018). 
 234. Id. at 05:11. 
 235. Id. at 07:26, 10:05, 12:58. 
 236. Id. at 14:13. 
 237. 15-15234 Oral Argument, Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, No. 15-15234 (11th 
Circuit), Notes from Oral Argument, December 15, 2016, EQUAL. CASE FILES, http://files.eqcf.org/ 
cases/15-15234-oral-argument (last visited Sept. 9, 2018). 
 238. Id. at 16:26. 
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discrimination based on sexual orientation.239 She was sympathetic to 
the argument that claims for discrimination based on sexual 
orientation might, at times, go forward as claims based on gender 
nonconformity.240 
On March 10, 2017, the court of appeals issued its decision, 
affirming the decision of the lower court in dismissing the claim for 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and reversing the decision 
of the lower court dismissing the claim for discrimination based on 
gender nonconformity, ordering that Evans be allowed to amend her 
complaint on remand.241 Judge Martinez authored the decision of the 
court, with Judge Pryor writing a separate concurrence.242 Judge 
Rosenbaum also authored a separate opinion, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part,243 in which she agreed with the majority that Evans 
should be permitted to amend her complaint to allege a gender non-
conformity claim, but disagreed with the majority on the Title VII 
question.244 
In writing for the majority, Judge Martinez concluded that the 
district court had erred in dismissing Evans’s gender non-conformity 
discrimination claim.245 As he noted, the law of the Eleventh Circuit 
permits Evans to bring a separate discrimination claim based on 
gender stereotyping or gender non-conformity.246 Based on this, the 
 
 239. Id. at 07:29. 
 240. Id. at 16:26. 
 241. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 
17-370, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017) (mem.). 
 242. Id. at 1248. 
 243. Id. at 1261. 
 244. Id. (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 245. Id. at 1254–55 (majority opinion). 
 246. Id. In so holding, Judge Martinez wrote: 
Even though we hold . . . that discrimination based on gender non-conformity is 
actionable, Evans’s pro se complaint nevertheless failed to plead facts sufficient to create 
a plausible inference that she suffered discrimination. In other words, Evans did not 
provide enough factual matter to plausibly suggest that her decision to present herself in 
a masculine manner led to the alleged adverse employment actions. Therefore, while a 
dismissal of Evan’s gender non-conformity claim would have been appropriate on this 
basis, these circumstances entitle Evans an opportunity to amend her complaint one time 
unless doing so would be futile. 
. . . . 
. . . [A]nd it cannot be said that any attempt to amend would be futile with respect 
to her gender non-conformity claim and possibly others. Discrimination based on failure 
to conform to a gender stereotype is sex-based discrimination . . . . We hold that the 
lower court erred because a gender non-conformity claim is not “just another way to 
claim discrimination based on sexual orientation,” but instead, constitutes a separate, 
distinct avenue for relief under Title VII. 
(8)51.1_HARRISON_HARRISON_V.6 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2019  3:29 PM 
2018] INCLUDING SEXUAL ORIENTATION IN TITLE VII 129 
court of appeals vacated the order of the district court dismissing the 
part of Evans’s claim based on gender non-conformity.247 The court 
remanded the case to the district court to allow Evans to amend her 
claim to more specifically allege discrimination based on gender non-
conformity.248 
Regarding Evans’s claim that Title VII prohibited discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation, Judge Martinez noted that the 
precedent of the Eleventh Circuit in Blum v. Gulf Oil 
Corporation, which held that Title VII did not prevent discharge from 
a job on the basis of an employee’s sexual orientation, prohibited the 
court from ruling in Evans’s favor in this case.249 Judge Martinez 
explained, “[u]nder our prior precedent rule, we are bound to follow a 
binding precedent in this Circuit unless and until it is overruled by this 
court en banc or by the Supreme Court.”250 
Writing separately in concurrence, Judge Pryor sought to 
challenge and “to explain the error of the argument of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission and the dissent that a person 
who experiences discrimination because of sexual orientation 
necessarily experiences discrimination for deviating from gender 
stereotypes.”251 Judge Pryor asserted that the EEOC and the dissent 
(as well as the majority in Hively) were in error in treating 
discrimination based on sexual orientation as if it were simply another 
manifestation of sex discrimination rooted in gender non-conformity 
or stereotyping.252 Judge Pryor articulated this very narrow 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 247. Id. at 1255. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. (quoting Offshore of the Palm Beaches, Inc. v. Lynch, 741 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th Cir. 
2014)). 
 251. Id. at 1258 (Pryor, J., concurring). 
 252. See id. at 1258–59. In describing his analysis of this point, Judge Pryor wrote: 
  Although a person who experiences the former [discrimination based on sexual 
orientation] will sometimes also experience the latter [discrimination based on gender 
non-conformity], the two concepts are legally distinct. And the insistence otherwise by 
the Commission and the dissent relies on false stereotypes of gay individuals . . . . 
  The majority opinion correctly holds that a claim of discrimination for failure to 
conform to a gender stereotype is not “just another way to claim discrimination based on 
sexual orientation.” Like any other woman, Evans can state a claim that she experienced, 
for example, discrimination for wearing a “male haircut” if she includes enough factual 
allegations. But just as a woman cannot recover under Title VII when she is fired because 
of her heterosexuality, neither can a gay woman sue for discrimination based on her 
sexual orientation. Deviation from a particular gender stereotype may correlate 
disproportionately with a particular sexual orientation, and plaintiffs who allege 
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understanding of Title VII claims arising from discrimination based 
on gender non-conformity in the following manner: 
     The doctrine of gender nonconformity is not an 
independent vehicle for relief; it is instead a proxy a plaintiff 
uses to help support her argument that an employer 
discriminated on the basis of the enumerated sex category by 
holding males and females to different standards of behavior. 
Because a claim of gender nonconformity is a behavior-
based claim, not a status-based claim, a plaintiff still “must 
show that the employer actually relied on her gender in 
making its decision.” 
 . . . . [T]he doctrine of gender nonconformity is not and 
cannot be an independent vehicle for relief because the only 
status-based classes that provide relief are those enumerated 
within Title VII.253 
Thus, according to Judge Pryor, only those specific “status-based 
classes” identified within the statutory language of Title VII itself 
could legitimately seek protection from discrimination under Title 
VII.254 
In concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Rosenbaum 
first agreed with the panel that the district court erred in dismissing 
Evans’s claim based on gender non-conformity.255 However, she 
strongly disagreed with the majority’s decision regarding the question 
of whether Title VII prohibited discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.256 Judge Rosenbaum argued that the decision in Price 
Waterhouse superseded the court of appeals prior decision in Blum, 
such that the court was no longer bound by that precedent.257 
Directly responding to the concurrence of Judge Pryor, Judge 
Rosenbaum wrote: 
Plain and simple, when a woman alleges, as Evans has, that 
she has been discriminated against because she is a lesbian, 
 
discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity will often also have experienced 
discrimination because of sexual orientation. But under Title VII, we ask only whether 
the individual experienced discrimination for deviating from a gender stereotype. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 253. Id. at 1260. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See id. at 1261 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 256. See id. at 1262–65. 
 257. See id. at 1270. 
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she necessarily alleges that she has been discriminated 
against because she failed to conform to the employer’s 
image of what women should be—specifically, that women 
should be sexually attracted to men only. And it is utter 
fiction to suggest that she was not discriminated against for 
failing to comport with her employer’s stereotyped view of 
women. That is discrimination “because of . . . sex,” and it 
clearly violates Title VII under Price Waterhouse.258 
Following the appellate court’s decision, Evans sought to have 
the panel’s decision reviewed en banc by the court of appeals.259 On 
July 6, 2017, the court issued a per curiam opinion declining to review 
the decision en banc.260 
On September 7, 2017, following the en banc decision by the 
United States court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Hively v. Ivy 
Tech, Lambda Legal, on behalf of Evans, filed a Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, asking the Supreme Court to review the decision of the 
court of appeals in this case.261 In the petition, the Supreme Court was 
asked to answer the following question: Whether the prohibition in 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against employment 
 
 258. Id. at 1261 (citation omitted). Judge Rosenbaum further wrote in response to the 
concurrence of Judge Pryor: 
But in the concurrence’s world, only the person who acts on her feelings enjoys 
the protection of Title VII. This makes no sense from a practical, textual, or doctrinal 
point of view. 
As a practical matter, this construction protects women who act or dress in ways 
that the employer perceives as gay, because that behavior fails to conform to the 
employer’s view of how a woman should act. But it allows employers to freely fire 
women that the employer perceives to be lesbians—as long as the employer is smart 
enough to say only that it fired the employee because it thought that the employee was a 
lesbian, without identifying the basis for the employer’s conclusion that she was a 
lesbian. It cannot possibly be the case that a lesbian who is private about her sexuality—
or even a heterosexual woman who is mistakenly perceived by her employer to be a 
lesbian—can be discriminated against by the employer because she does not comport 
with the employer’s view of what a woman should be, while the outwardly lesbian 
plaintiff enjoys Title VII protection. 
. . . Nothing in Price Waterhouse’s reasoning or construction of Title VII justifies 
limiting Price Waterhouse’s holding to cases involving discrimination against women 
for their behavior, as opposed to discrimination against women for being women or for 
their interests and attractions. Nor, for the reasons I have discussed, does it make sense 
to do so. 
Id. at 1267–68. 
 259. See Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. July 6, 2017) (No. 15-15234) (per 
curiam). 
 260. Id. (declining to review the panel decision en banc). 
 261. Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, LAMBDA LEGAL, https://www.lambdalegal.org/in-
court/cases/ga_evans-v-ga-regional-hospital (last visited Aug. 25, 2018). 
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discrimination “because of . . . sex” encompasses discrimination based 
on an individual’s sexual orientation.262 
On October 10, 2017, seventy-six businesses and organizations, 
seventeen anti-discrimination legal scholars and eleven LGBT 
organizations filed briefs on behalf of Evans asking the Supreme Court 
to review the case.263 On the following day, October 11, 2017, 
eighteen state attorneys general filed brief in support of Evans’s 
petition.264 
On December 11, 2017, the Supreme Court denied the Petition 
for a Writ of Certiorari filed by Lambda Legal, on behalf of Evans, 
asking the Court to review the decision of the court of appeals in this 
case.265 
B.  Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College266 
On August 15, 2014, after five years of applying for a full-time 
position with Ivy Tech, a community college in Indiana, Kimberly 
Hively filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Indiana.267 Ms. Hively’s allegations against 
the school were simple: 
I have applied for several positions at IVY TECH, fulltime, 
in the last 5 years. I believe I am being blocked from fulltime 
employment without just cause. I believe I am being 
discriminated against based on my sexual orientation. I 
believe I have been discriminated against and that my rights 
under the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were 
violated.268 
In dismissing Ms. Hively’s complaint on the merits, the district 
court expressed sympathy for her position, but concluded that it was 
bound by the precedent established in Hamner v. St. Vincent Hospital 
and Health Care Center, Inc.269 In Hamner, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled against a plaintiff who had 
 
 262. See id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017) (No. 17-370) (mem.). 
 266. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 267. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. (Hively I), 2015 WL 926015, at *1 (S.D. Ind., 2015), aff’d, 
830 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 268. Id. at *1–2. 
 269. Id. at *5–6; 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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alleged discrimination in violation of Title VII, when a co-worker 
repeatedly harassed him based on his sexual orientation, eventually 
leading to his termination.270 In its decision, the court of appeals 
squarely addressed the applicability of Title VII to claims of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, ruling that “harassment 
based solely upon a person’s sexual preference or orientation (and not 
on one’s sex) [was] not an unlawful employment practice under Title 
VII.”271 
Nearly two years after Ms. Hively filed her pro se complaint, 
while she subsequently had assistance from Lambda Legal, the court 
of appeals delivered a similarly sympathetic, yet lamenting, decision 
affirming the lower court’s ruling.272 After a comprehensive review of 
claims of sexual orientation discrimination as a form of actionable 
discrimination “because of . . . sex” under Title VII, a three-judge 
panel of the court of appeals ultimately ruled that such discrimination 
was not actionable, unless and until, “either the legislature or the 
Supreme Court says it is so.”273 However, Hively filed a petition for 
an en banc rehearing, which was granted by the court of appeals in 
October of 2016,274 with oral arguments being heard in November of 
that same year.275 
On April 4, 2017, the en banc panel of the court of appeals 
reversed the decision that had been reached by the three-judge 
panel.276 
Writing for a five-judge plurality of the court, Chief Judge Wood 
acknowledged that it was beyond the power of the court to amend the 
language of Title VII to include gay employees as a protected class.277 
However, this was not the task with which the court was charged. 
Rather, the court had been asked to determine what it means to 
discriminate because of sex in violation of Title VII, and, whether 
actions taken because of sexual orientation are within the scope of 
 
 270. Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., 224 F.3d 701, 701 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 271. Id. at 704. 
 272. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. (Hively II), 830 F.3d 698, 718 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d en 
banc, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 273. Id. at 709. 
 274. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. (Hively III), No. 15-1720, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 20302, 
at *1. 
 275. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 339 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 343. 
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Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination “on the basis of sex.”278 
In reversing the original three-judge panel, the en banc court first 
found that the absence of the words “sexual orientation” from Title 
VII’s language was “of no moment” to the analysis of whether 
discrimination on such basis was in fact “because of . . . sex” 
discrimination.279 Relying upon the decision in Oncale, Judge Wood 
reiterated the late Justice Scalia’s conclusions that “it is ultimately the 
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our 
legislators by which we are governed.”280 
The court’s holding in Hively ultimately rested on two distinct, 
yet interrelated, arguments. First, Judge Wood noted that in Price 
Waterhouse, the Supreme Court held that sex discrimination 
encompasses sexual stereotyping, in that treating an employee in a 
discriminatory manner because she fails to conform to gender 
stereotypes constitutes unlawful sex discrimination.281 In analyzing 
this first argument, the court applied a comparative method, “to be 
sure that only the variable of the plaintiff’s sex is allowed to 
change.”282 Under this methodology, the court is to ask whether 
substituting a different gendered employee for the employee in 
question would produce a different result in the factual scenario at 
hand.283 In describing the application of this method to the context of 
this case, Judge Wood stated: 
The fundamental question is not whether a lesbian is being 
treated better or worse than gay men, bisexuals, or 
transsexuals, because such a comparison shifts too many 
pieces at once. Framing the question that way swaps the 
critical characteristic (here, sex) for both the complainant and 
the comparator and thus obscures the key point—whether the 
complainant’s protected characteristic played a role in the 
adverse employment decision. The counterfactual we must 
use is a situation in which Hively is a man, but everything 
else stays the same: in particular, the sex or gender of the 
 
 278. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 279. See id. at 349. 
 280. Id. at 344 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 
(1998)). 
 281. Id. at 345–46. 
 282. Id. at 345. 
 283. Id. 
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partner.284 
In other words, for the court in Hively, the central question under the 
comparative analysis approach was: if Hively had been a man with a 
female partner at home, or a woman with a male partner at home, 
would any adverse employment action have occurred?285 
As the court acknowledged, such clear differential treatment is 
paradigmatic discrimination based on the sex of the employee in 
question.286 On this first argument, the court rejected the idea that a 
“gossamer-thin” line exists between a gender non-conformity claim 
under Price Waterhouse and a sexual orientation claim.287 
Considering Hively’s same-sex relationship as gender non-
conforming activity was, in the court’s opinion, no different from 
considering a woman seeking employment in traditionally male-
dominated workplaces to be gender nonconforming activity.288 In 
 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. As Judge Wood wrote: 
Hively alleges that if she had been a man married to a woman (or living with a 
woman, or dating a woman) and everything else had stayed the same, Ivy Tech would 
not have refused to promote her and would not have fired her. (We take the facts in the 
light most favorable to her, because we are here on a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal; naturally 
nothing we say will prevent Ivy Tech from contesting these points in later proceedings.) 
This describes paradigmatic sex discrimination. To use the phrase from Ulane, Ivy Tech 
is disadvantaging her because she is a woman. Nothing in the complaint hints that Ivy 
Tech has an anti-marriage policy that extends to heterosexual relationships, or for that 
matter even an anti-partnership policy that is gender-neutral. 
Viewed through the lens of the gender non-conformity line of cases, Hively 
represents the ultimate case of failure to conform to the female stereotype (at least as 
understood in a place such as modern America, which views heterosexuality as the norm 
and other forms of sexuality as exceptional): she is not heterosexual. Our panel described 
the line between a gender nonconformity claim and one based on sexual orientation as 
gossamer-thin; we conclude that it does not exist at all. Hively’s claim is no different 
from the claims brought by women who were rejected for jobs in traditionally male 
workplaces, such as fire departments, construction, and policing. The employers in those 
cases were policing the boundaries of what jobs or behaviors they found acceptable for 
a woman (or in some cases, for a man). 
. . . Just so here: a policy that discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation does 
not affect every woman, or every man, but it is based on assumptions about the proper 
behavior for someone of a given sex. The discriminatory behavior does not exist without 
taking the victim’s biological sex (either as observed at birth or as modified, in the case 
of transsexuals) into account. Any discomfort, disapproval, or job decision based on the 
fact that the complainant—woman or man—dresses differently, speaks differently, or 
dates or marries a same-sex partner, is a reaction purely and simply based on sex. That 
means that it falls within Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination, if it affects 
employment in one of the specified ways. 
Id. at 346–47 (emphasis in original). 
 287. Id. at 346. 
 288. Id. 
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discriminating based on Hively’s failure to meet the expected gender 
stereotype, namely, sexual attraction to a man, Ivy Tech engaged in 
actionable discrimination under Title VII’s “because of . . . sex” 
language.289 
Second, Judge Wood relied upon Loving v. Virginia in analyzing 
whether Hively was unlawfully discriminated against under an 
“associational theory” of sex discrimination.290 According to the court, 
“[i]t is now accepted that a person who is discriminated against 
because of the protected characteristic of one with whom she 
associates is actually being disadvantaged because of her own 
traits.”291 Under this ‘associational theory’ of discrimination, 
developed in Loving with respect to racial discrimination, when an 
employer mistreats a worker for marrying or associating with a person 
of a different race, the employer has violated Title VII’s ban on race 
discrimination.292 
Wood easily transferred this logic over to the sex discrimination 
context, by asserting that when Ivy Tech refused to promote Hively 
because of her orientation, it discriminated against her for intimately 
associating with people of the same sex.293 This point had been made 
with some force by Judge Easterbrook during the oral arguments in 
Hively.294 In underscoring this conclusion, the court stated: 
The Court in Loving recognized that equal application of a 
law that prohibited conduct only between members of 
different races did not save it. Changing the race of one 
partner made a difference in determining the legality of the 
conduct, and so the law rested on “distinctions drawn 
according to race,” which were unjustifiable and racially 
discriminatory. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11, 87 S.Ct. 1817. So too, 
here. If we were to change the sex of one partner in a lesbian 
relationship, the outcome would be different. This reveals 
that the discrimination rests on distinctions drawn according 
 
 289. Id. at 347. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 347–49. 
 293. Id. at 349. 
 294. Oral Argument at 31:46–33:30, Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 
20302 (2016) (No. 15-1720), http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2016/nr.15-1720.15-1720_11_ 
30_2016.mp3. 
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to sex.295 
By anchoring its decision in the associational jurisprudence of 
Loving and tying it to the gender stereotyping line of cases beginning 
with Price Waterhouse, the court articulated a clear framework for 
finding that the prohibitions against sex discrimination found in Title 
VII and Title IX include prohibitions against discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity.296 
In concurring with the judgment of the court, Judge Posner argued 
that while Title VII’s drafters did not mean to protect gay employees, 
their intent is of no matter.297 He first identified three separate methods 
of statutory interpretation: (1) an originalist approach; (2) 
“interpretation by unexpressed intent”; and (3) “judicial interpretive 
updating.”298 In his concurrence, Judge Posner put himself squarely in 
support of this third method, writing: 
[I]nterpretation can mean giving a fresh meaning to a 
statement (which can be a statement found in a constitutional 
or statutory text)—a meaning that infuses the statement with 
vitality and significance today. An example of this last form 
of interpretation—the form that in my mind is most clearly 
applicable to the present case—is the Sherman Antitrust Act, 
enacted in 1890, long before there was a sophisticated 
understanding of the economics of monopoly and 
competition. Times have changed; and for more than thirty 
years the Act has been interpreted in conformity to the 
modern, not the nineteenth-century, understanding of the 
relevant economics. The Act has thus been updated by, or in 
the name of, judicial interpretation—the form of 
interpretation that consists of making old law satisfy modern 
 
 295. Hively, 853 F.3d at 348–49. Expanding on this idea, Judge Wood wrote: 
The dissent would instead have us compare the treatment of men who are attracted 
to members of the male sex with the treatment of women who are attracted to members 
of the female sex, and ask whether an employer treats the men differently from the 
women. But even setting to one side the logical fallacy involved, Loving shows why this 
fails. In the context of interracial relationships, we could just as easily hold constant a 
variable such as “sexual or romantic attraction to persons of a different race” and ask 
whether an employer treated persons of different races who shared that propensity the 
same. That is precisely the rule that Loving rejected, and so too must we, in the context 
of sexual associations. 
Id. at 349. 
 296. Id. at 348–49. 
 297. Id. at 353 (Posner, J., concurring). 
 298. Id. at 352–53. 
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needs and understandings. And a common form of 
interpretation it is, despite its flouting “original meaning.” 
Statutes and constitutional provisions frequently are 
interpreted on the basis of present need and present 
understanding rather than original meaning—constitutional 
provisions even more frequently, because most of them are 
older than most statutes.299 
The role of courts, Judge Posner asserted, should be to interpret 
statutes in a manner that “infuses” them “with vitality and significance 
today” rather than relying on their original meaning.300 Judge Posner 
contrasted “judicial interpretive updating” with the conservative 
“originalism” approach to interpretation championed by Justice 
Antonin Scalia.301 
Judge Posner concluded his concurrence by agreeing with the 
judgment of the court that Title VII’s prohibition against 
discrimination because of sex encompasses a prohibition against 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.302 However, Judge Posner 
rejected the interpretive analysis of Judge Wood’s opinion for the 
 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 352. 
 301. Id. at 353–54. Judge Posner described this contrast in this manner: 
It is well-nigh certain that homosexuality, male or female, did not figure in the 
minds of the legislators who enacted Title VII. I had graduated from law school two 
years before the law was enacted. Had I been asked then whether I had ever met a male 
homosexual, I would have answered: probably not; had I been asked whether I had ever 
met a lesbian I would have answered “only in the pages of À la recherché du temps 
perdu.” Homosexuality was almost invisible in the 1960s. It became visible in the 1980s 
as a consequence of the AIDS epidemic; today it is regarded by a large swath of the 
American population as normal. But what is certain is that the word “sex” in Title VII 
had no immediate reference to homosexuality; many years would elapse before it could 
be understood to include homosexuality. 
A diehard “originalist” would argue that what was believed in 1964 defines the 
scope of the statute for as long as the statutory text remains unchanged, and therefore 
until changed by Congress’s amending or replacing the statute. But as I noted earlier, 
statutory and constitutional provisions frequently are interpreted on the basis of present 
need and understanding rather than original meaning. Think for example of Justice 
Scalia’s decisive fifth vote to hold that burning the American flag as a political protest 
is protected by the free-speech clause of the First Amendment, provided that it’s your 
flag and is not burned in circumstances in which the fire might spread. Texas v. Johnson, 
491 U.S. 397, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 
U.S. 310, 110 S.Ct. 2404, 110 L.Ed.2d 287 (1990). Burning a flag is not speech in the 
usual sense and there is no indication that the framers or ratifiers of the First Amendment 
thought that the word “speech” in the amendment embraced flag burning or other 
nonverbal methods of communicating.  
 Id. 
 302. Id. at 356. 
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court, stating: 
The majority opinion states that Congress in 1964 “may not 
have realized or understood the full scope of the words it 
chose.” This could be understood to imply that the statute 
forbade discrimination against homosexuals but the framers 
and ratifiers of the statute were not smart enough to realize 
that. I would prefer to say that theirs was the then-current 
understanding of the key word—sex. “Sex” in 1964 meant 
gender, not sexual orientation. What the framers and ratifiers 
understandably didn’t understand was how attitudes toward 
homosexuals would change in the following half century. 
They shouldn’t be blamed for that failure of foresight. We 
understand the words of Title VII differently not because 
we’re smarter than the statute’s framers and ratifiers but 
because we live in a different era, a different culture. 
Congress in the 1960s did not foresee the sexual revolution 
of the 2000s. What our court announced in Doe v. City of 
Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 572 (7th Cir. 1997), is what 
Congress had declared in 1964: “the traditional notion of 
‘sex.’”303 
In a powerful and eloquent dissent, joined by two other members 
of the en banc court, Judge Sykes rejected the methodology employed 
by both the majority and by Judge Posner. Instead, she embraced the 
originalist methodology that was derided by Judge Posner and stated: 
Respect for the constraints imposed on the judiciary by 
a system of written law must begin with fidelity to the 
traditional first principle of statutory interpretation: When a 
statute supplies the rule of decision, our role is to give effect 
to the enacted text, interpreting the statutory language as a 
reasonable person would have understood it at the time of 
enactment. We are not authorized to infuse the text with a 
 
 303. Id. at 357. Judge Posner further explained his position as follows: 
I would prefer to see us acknowledge openly that today we, who are judges rather 
than members of Congress, are imposing on a half-century-old statute a meaning of “sex 
discrimination” that the Congress that enacted it would not have accepted. This is 
something courts do fairly frequently to avoid statutory obsolescence and concomitantly 
to avoid placing the entire burden of updating old statutes on the legislative branch. We 
should not leave the impression that we are merely the obedient servants of the 88th 
Congress (1963–1965), carrying out their wishes. We are not. We are taking advantage 
of what the last half century has taught.  
Id. 
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new or unconventional meaning or to update it to respond to 
changed social, economic, or political conditions. 
 * * * 
Judicial statutory updating, whether overt or covert, 
cannot be reconciled with the constitutional design. The 
Constitution establishes a procedure for enacting and 
amending statutes: bicameralism and presentment. See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 7. Needless to say, statutory amendments 
brought to you by the judiciary do not pass through this 
process. That is why a textualist decision method matters: 
When we assume the power to alter the original public 
meaning of a statute through the process of interpretation, we 
assume a power that is not ours. The Constitution assigns the 
power to make and amend statutory law to the elected 
representatives of the people. However welcome today’s 
decision might be as a policy matter, it comes at a great cost 
to representative self-government.304 
While Judge Sykes agrees with the majority that “the scope of 
Title VII is not limited by the subjective intentions of the enacting 
legislatures,” she rejects both theories employed by the majority, the 
comparative method of proof and the associational doctrine rooted in 
Loving.305 The heart of Judge Sykes’s dissent is that the common 
 
 304. Id. at 360 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 305. Id. at 362–67. In responding to Judge Flaum’s concurrence, Judge Sykes makes clear her 
objection to the comparator analysis used by the majority, writing: 
Judge Flaum’s concurrence offers a somewhat different way to think about sexual-
orientation discrimination: “Fundamental to the definition of homosexuality is the sexual 
attraction to individuals of the ‘same sex.’ . . . One cannot consider a person’s 
homosexuality without also accounting for their sex: doing so would render ‘same’ . . . 
meaningless.” Flaum, J., concurring, at p. 358. But an employer who categorically won’t 
hire homosexuals is not “accounting for” a job applicant’s sex in the sense meant by 
antidiscrimination law; a hiring policy of “no homosexuals need apply” is gender blind. 
The next sentence in the analysis likewise doesn’t follow: “As such, discriminating 
against that employee because they are homosexual constitutes discriminating against 
an employee because of (A) the employee’s sex, and (B) their sexual attraction to 
individuals of the same sex.” Id. Part (B) is true; part (A) is not. An employer who refuses 
to hire a lesbian applicant because she is a lesbian only “accounts for” her sex in the 
limited sense that he notices she is a woman. But that’s not the object of the employer’s 
discriminatory intent, not even in part. Her sex isn’t a motivating factor for the 
employer’s decision; the employer objects only to her sexual orientation. This attempt 
to conceptually split homosexuality into two parts—a person’s sex and his or her sexual 
attraction to persons of the same sex—doesn’t make sexual-orientation discrimination 
actionable as sex discrimination. 
Id. at 367 n.5. But see Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 52–53 (1st Cir. 2018) (rejecting 
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understanding of the meaning of “because of sex” is to be used in 
interpreting Title VII.306 
 
the narrow comparator analysis championed by Judge Sykes in Hively). In upholding a jury verdict 
of more than $700,000, plus $184,000 in legal fees for a firefighter, Judge Ojetta Rogeriee 
Thompson in Franchina described the treatment experienced by the plaintiff in the following 
manner: 
“Cunt,” “bitch,” “lesbo”: all are but a smattering of the vile verbal assaults the plaintiff 
in this gender discrimination case, Lori Franchina, a former lieutenant firefighter, was 
regularly subjected to by members of the Providence Fire Department (“the 
Department”). She was also spit on, shoved, and — in one particularly horrifying 
incident — had the blood and brain matter of a suicide-attempt victim flung at her by a 
member of her own team. 
Id. at 37. In rejecting the type of rigid evidentiary comparator for which Judge Sykes in Hively and 
the DOJ in Zarda asserted was the proper analytical framework, Judge Thompson wrote: 
The City, it seems, believes that under a sex-plus theory, plaintiffs are required to 
identify a corresponding sub-class of the opposite gender and show that the 
corresponding class was not subject to similar harassment or discrimination. Thus, for 
Franchina to succeed, the City tells us she is required to have presented evidence at trial 
of a comparative class of gay male firefighters who were not discriminated against. 
Without such a showing, the City contends, it would not be possible to prove that any 
sort of differential treatment a plaintiff experiences is necessarily predicated on his or 
her gender. 
This approach—one that we have never endorsed—has some rather obvious 
flaws. Indeed, at oral argument, the City recognized one of them in its concession that 
such a standard would permit employers to discriminate free from Title VII recourse so 
long as they do not employ any subclass member of the opposite gender. But, of course, 
that cannot be. Under such an approach, for example, discrimination against women with 
children would be unactionable as long as the employer employed no fathers. But see, 
Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 41. The result that would follow from the City’s approach would, 
thus, be inapposite to Title VII’s mandate against sex-based discrimination. 
Indeed, at the advent of sex-plus claims, courts recognized that “[t]he effect of 
[Title VII] is not to be diluted because discrimination adversely affects only a portion of 
the protected class.” Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 
1971), cert denied, 404 U.S. 991, 92 S.Ct. 536, 30 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971); see also 
Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 42 n.4 (explaining that “discrimination against one employee 
cannot be remedied solely by nondiscrimination against another employee in that same 
group”). Similarly, the effect of Title VII is not to be diluted because discrimination 
adversely affects a plaintiff who is unlucky enough to lack a comparator in his or her 
workplace. 
Id. at 52–53. 
 306. Hively, 853 F.3d at 362–67 (Sykes, J., dissenting). In making this argument, Judge Sykes 
wrote: 
To a fluent speaker of the English language—then and now—the ordinary meaning of 
the word “sex” does not fairly include the concept of “sexual orientation.” The two terms 
are never used interchangeably, and the latter is not subsumed within the former; there 
is no overlap in meaning. Contrary to the majority’s vivid rhetorical claim, it does not 
take “considerable calisthenics” to separate the two. Majority Op. at p. 350. The words 
plainly describe different traits, and the separate and distinct meaning of each term is 
easily grasped. More specifically to the point here, discrimination “because of sex” is 
not reasonably understood to include discrimination based on sexual orientation, a 
different immutable characteristic. Classifying people by sexual orientation is different 
than classifying them by sex. The two traits are categorically distinct and widely 
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In rejecting the majority’s associational theory of liability under 
Title VII, Judge Sykes argues that Loving and the cases that translated 
the Loving analysis to the Title VII context are fundamentally different 
from this case, in that all those cases ultimately turned on racial 
discrimination.307 As she wrote: 
As these passages from the Court’s opinion make clear, 
Loving rests on the inescapable truth that miscegenation laws 
are inherently racist. They are premised on invidious ideas 
about white superiority and use racial classifications toward 
the end of racial purity and white supremacy. Sexual-
orientation discrimination, on the other hand, is not 
inherently sexist. No one argues that sexual-orientation 
discrimination aims to promote or perpetuate the supremacy 
of one sex. In short, Loving neither compels nor supports the 
majority’s decision to upend the long-settled understanding 
that sex discrimination and sexual-orientation discrimination 
are distinct.308 
Judge Sykes agreed that if Hively “was denied a job because of 
her sexual orientation, she was treated unjustly.”309 However, she did 
not agree that such unjust treatment is unlawful under Title VII, in that 
a remedy for discrimination based on sexual orientation must come 
from Congress.310 In conclusion, Judge Sykes wrote: 
It’s understandable that the court is impatient to protect 
lesbians and gay men from workplace discrimination without 
waiting for Congress to act. Legislative change is arduous 
and can be slow to come. But we’re not authorized to amend 
Title VII by interpretation. The ordinary, reasonable, and fair 
meaning of sex discrimination as that term is used in Title 
VII does not include discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, a wholly different kind of discrimination.311 
 
recognized as such. There is no ambiguity or vagueness here. 
Id. at 363. 
 307. Id. at 368. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. at 372. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. at 373. 
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C.  Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.312 
Donald Zarda was a skydiving instructor, working for Altitude 
Express.313 As a skydiving instructor, Zarda often jumped in tandem 
with people so that he could pull the parachute and ensure the safety 
of clients while jumping.314 When jumping in tandem with female 
clients, he would often notify them that he was homosexual, doing this 
primarily because he believed it helped “mitigate any awkwardness 
that might arise from the fact that he was strapped tightly to [a] 
woman.”315 
In the workplace, Zarda was open about his sexuality with his 
fellow employees.316 Zarda was never offended when his sexual 
orientation was discussed by his colleagues.317 During his 
employment, Zarda concedes, “he was treated just like everyone else” 
at Altitude Express; neither treated differently nor picked on more than 
others because of his sexual orientation.318 
In 2010, David Kengle and Rosanna Orellana came to Altitude 
Express with the intention of skydiving.319 Both Kengle and Orellana 
requested a tandem dive for safety.320 Zarda was designated to be 
Orellana’s partner for the dive.321 At some point prior to the jump, 
Orellana apparently believed that “Zarda was touching her 
inappropriately.”322 Zarda “had his hand on [her] hip” and was 
“resting his chin on [her] shoulder.”323 Kengle noticed that no other 
diving instructor was touching the customer in the same way.324 
During the jump, “[Zarda] sensed that [Orellana] was 
uncomfortable.”325 It was only then that he disclosed to her that he was 
homosexual.326 Specifically, he told her that “I hope I didn’t make you 
 
 312. 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part en banc, 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 
2018). 
 313. Id. at 79. 
 314. Id. at 80. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts at 7, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 
No. 10-4334 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2013). 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Zarda, 855 F.3d at 80. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts, supra note 316, at 9. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. 
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feel uncomfortable on the plane, I’m gay.”327 He also told her that he 
had recently broken up with his boyfriend.328 
After the jump was over, Orellana and Kengle discussed their 
experience of the jump.329 During the conversation, Orellana told 
Kengle about Zarda’s disclosure of his sexual orientation.330 
Following this conversation, Kengle called Altitude Express to 
complain about his girlfriend’s experience and about Zarda’s 
behavior.331 He believed that the complaint was warranted because he 
felt that Zarda’s actions were inappropriate.332 
Shortly after this conversation, Zarda’s manager, Ray Maynard, 
sat down to discuss the incident with Zarda.333 Maynard reiterated the 
fact that Orellana was apparently uncomfortable during the entire 
jump with Zarda.334 Subsequently, Maynard suspended and later fired 
Zarda.335 When firing Zarda, Maynard explained to Zarda that “it 
wasn’t a gay issue.”336 Maynard told Zarda that, in fact, if it had been 
any other employee in the same situation, Maynard would do the same 
thing.337 
Thus, Altitude Express (and Maynard) contended at trial that 
Zarda was fired, not because of his sexual orientation, but because “he 
failed to provide an enjoyable experience for a customer.”338 On the 
other hand, Zarda asserted that he had never acted unreasonably with 
customers and that he was appropriate at all times.339 Zarda claimed 
that Altitude Express fired him “either because of his supervisor’s 
prejudice against homosexuals or because he informed a client about 
his sexuality.”340 
Following these events, Zarda filed an action in the Eastern 
 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. at 10. 
 329. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part en banc, 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts, supra note 316, at 12. 
 333. Id. at 13. 
 334. Id. at 14. 
 335. Id. at 15–16. 
 336. Id. at 16. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part en banc, 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. 
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District of New York against his former employer, Altitude Express, 
and its owner, Ray Maynard.341 In his complaint, Zarda asserted that 
he was discriminatorily fired because of his sexual orientation “in 
violation of New York law.”342 He also claimed that Altitude Express 
violated Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination because they 
“terminated [him] for failing to conform to sex stereotypes.”343 
In the Eastern District of New York, the judge found “a triable 
issue of fact as to whether Zarda, as an employee, faced discrimination 
because of his sexual orientation in violation of New York state 
law.”344 Nevertheless, the jury subsequently found for the employer 
on the state-law claim.345 The Title VII claim did not even make it that 
far.346 Before trial, Zarda produced several instances where he 
believed his employer discriminated against him for not conforming 
to gender stereotypes. Specifically, Zarda alleged that “his employer 
‘criticized [Zarda’s] wearing of the color pink at work’ and his practice 
of painting his toenails pink, notwithstanding Zarda’s ‘typically 
masculine demeanor.’”347 The district court granted summary 
judgment for Altitude Express on the Title VII claim.348 The court’s 
conclusion was rooted in the fact that “Zarda failed to establish the 
requisite proximity between his termination and his proffered 
instances of gender non-conformity.”349 Thus, he had no viable Title 
VII claim for discrimination based on a failure to adhere to gender 
stereotypes.350 
Following the district court’s decision on summary judgment and 
a trial on the state law discrimination claim, Zarda appealed both the 
state law claim and the Title VII claim.351 On appeal, Zarda requested 
that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
“reconsider [its] interpretation of Title VII in order to hold that Title 
VII’s prohibition on discrimination based on ‘sex’ encompasses 
 
 341. Id. at 79. 
 342. Id. at 77. 
 343. Id. at 80–81. 
 344. Id. at 79. 
 345. Id. at 79–80. 
 346. Id. at 80. 
 347. Id. at 81. 
 348. Id. at 79. 
 349. Id. at 81. 
 350. Id. at 80 
 351. Id. at 80. 
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discrimination based on ‘sexual orientation.’”352 Zarda did not, 
however, appeal the district court’s ruling that he failed to establish an 
association between his employment and termination for failing to 
adhere to gender stereotypes.353 The court of appeals was then faced 
with the question of whether to either reconsider its Simonton v. 
Runyon354 precedent regarding treatment of sexual orientation claims 
under Title VII or to continue following Simonton.355 
Simonton has been the precedent for the Second Circuit in Title 
VII disputes regarding sexual orientation discrimination since 2000. 
In Simonton, the plaintiff, Dwayne Simonton, was employed by the 
United States Postal Service in Farmingdale, New York.356 
Throughout his twelve-year career, he always received outstanding 
performance reviews.357 Though his work was commendable, the 
work environment was not.358 Simonton was homosexual, and all his 
co-workers were aware of it.359 On a daily basis, Simonton was 
subjected to abuse, uncouth taunts, and severe verbal abuse by his co-
workers.360 The constant morally reprehensible conduct directed at 
Simonton ended in him having a heart attack.361 
Following his heart attack, Simonton sued his employer; bringing 
a claim under Title VII “for abuse and harassment suffered by reason 
of his sexual orientation.”362 After reviewing the case, the court in the 
Eastern District of New York dismissed Simonton’s Title VII action 
on the grounds that it failed to state a viable claim.363 The court’s 
reasoning was that “Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based 
on sexual orientation.”364 Simonton then appealed the decision to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.365 
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed that Simonton’s situation 
 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. at 82. 
 354. 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 355. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part en banc, 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 356. Simonton, 232 F.3d at 34. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. at 35. 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. at 34. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id. 
 365. Id. 
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was entirely abhorrent.366 However, the court ultimately agreed with 
the prior decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit in Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,367 in which the 
court concluded that “we are called upon here to construe a statute as 
glossed by the Supreme Court, not to make a moral judgment.”368 
Further, the court of appeals in Simonton noted: 
When interpreting a statute, the role of a court is limited to 
discerning and adhering to legislative meaning. The law is 
well-settled in this circuit and in all others to have reached 
the question that Simonton has no cause of action under Title 
VII because Title VII does not prohibit harassment or 
discrimination because of sexual orientation.369 
In Zarda, the primary argument on behalf of Zarda was that 
Simonton was outdated.370 Specifically, Zarda argued that “Simonton, 
realistically, has been abrogated already—this Court just needs to say 
so: the weak pillars on which it stands have crumbled, and the agency 
charged with interpreting Title VII agrees.”371 However, the appeal 
was unsuccessful because a three judge panel of the court of appeals 
refused to reinterpret Title VII to include sexual orientation as grounds 
for a sex discrimination claim.372 
The panel held that the precedent set forth in Simonton could 
“only be overturned by the entire court sitting in banc.”373 Along with 
this, the panel noted that it would be possible for Zarda to make a 
plausible argument for an actionable claim under Title VII if he could 
show that his termination was based on gender stereotyping rather than 
sexual orientation, noting that in Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, the 
court of appeals had remanded the case back to the district court after 
finding that the claim at bar was for gender stereotyping and, therefore, 
could be brought under Title VII.374 
 
 366. Id. at 35. 
 367. 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 368. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Higgins v. New 
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999)), aff’d in part, vacated in part en 
banc, 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 369. Id. 
 370. See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 6, Zarda, 855 F.3d 76 (No. 15-3775). 
 371. Id. at 4. 
 372. Zarda, 855 F.3d at 80. 
 373. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 82 (citing Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 199 (2d 
Cir. 2017)). 
 374. Id. 
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While Christiansen might have provided fertile ground for Zarda, 
“that route is unavailable,” because the district court had concluded 
that Zarda could not establish the link between his failure to conform 
to gender stereotypes and his termination.375 Zarda did not challenge 
this conclusion on appeal.376 Thus, the only issue on appeal was 
whether Zarda could assert a discrimination claim asserting that his 
termination violated Title VII based on sexual orientation alone.377 
However, after reviewing all the issues, the panel embraced Simonton 
and affirmed the judgment of the district court.378 
Following the appeal, one of the judges on the panel that had 
heard the case called for a poll of all the judges on the court of 
appeals.379 The purpose of the poll of judges was to decide whether 
the court would sit en banc to rehear the case.380 A majority of the 
active judges voted in favor of rehearing the case.381 
The only question to be decided on rehearing is: “Does Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation through its prohibition of discrimination ‘because 
of . . . sex’?”382 On May 25, 2017, the court ordered that all entities 
and persons interested in the court’s decision on this issue produce 
amicus curiae briefs to support whatever position they held.383 
Because of the intense interest in this case, particularly following 
the decisions in Evans and Hively, many interested persons and 
entities filed briefs on both sides of the case. As the briefs were 
submitted from various interested persons and entities, an interesting 
dispute arose. The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) took the unusual 
step of filing a brief that supported a finding that Simonton was correct, 
in that the language of Title VII does not encompass protections from 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.384 The position taken by 
 
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. at 82, 84. 
 379. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-3775, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13127, at *6 (2nd 
Cir. May 25, 2017). 
 380. Id. 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Diane Ruggiero & Madison Park, DOJ Files Amicus Brief That Says Title VII Does Not 
Protect Sexual Orientation, CNN (July 27, 2017, 12:47 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/26 
/politics/doj-amicus-brief-title-vii-sexual-orientation/index.html; see also Autumn Callan, DOJ: 
Title VII Does Not Protect Against Discrimination Based On Sexual Orientation, JURIST, (July 27, 
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the DOJ was in direct opposition to the position taken by the EEOC in 
the case.385 The EEOC brief argued that the language of Title VII does 
indeed encompass protections from discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, calling upon the court of appeals to overrule Simonton and 
follow the analysis of the Seventh Circuit in Hively.386 
1.  En banc proceedings 
a.  Arguments that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
i.  Brief of Appellants 
Consistent with the position taken throughout the litigation, 
appellants argued that Zarda was fired because of his sex, in that sex 
is “inextricably intertwined with [his] sexual orientation.”387 Indeed, 
appellants argued that this case is a textbook example of “the ultimate 
gender non-conforming stereotypes.”388 Basically, while on a jump, 
Zarda disclosed to a customer that he was gay.389 The customer, in 
turn, reported her negative experience to the manager who 
subsequently fired Zarda for talking openly about his sexuality with a 
customer.390 
Appellants asserted that the inclusion of sexual orientation 
discrimination within the coverage of Title VII was not outside of the 
parameters established by the language of Title VII.391 The appellants 
 
2017, 12:40 PM), http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2017/07/doj-title-vii-does-not-protect-against-
discrimination-based-on-sexual-orientation.php (“The DOJ argues that Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 [materials], which bans sexual discrimination in the workplace, does not extend to 
protect against discrimination of sexual orientation where there is ‘no showing that an employer 
has treated ‘similarly situated employees’ of different sexes unequally.’”). 
 385. See Juan Vazquez, Justice Department, EEOC Clash Over Civil Rights Act, WWXI NEWS 
(July 28, 2017), http://wxxinews.org/post/justice-department-eeoc-clash-over-civil-rights-act. 
 386. Id.; see also Gail Whittemore, Justice Department Denies the Times in Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination Case, PACE L. LIBR.: BLOGS (July 28, 2017), https://lawlibrary.blogs.pace.edu/ 
2017/07/28/justice-department-denies-the-times-in-sexual-orientation-discrimination-case/ 
(“Contradicting the position taken in the case by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) that sexual orientation discrimination is barred under Title VII, the Justice 
Department brief asserts that the EEOC’s argument is ‘inconsistent with Congress’s clear 
ratification of the overwhelming judicial consensus that Title VII does not prohibit sexual 
orientation discrimination.’”). 
 387. Appellant’s Brief at 8, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 
15-3775). 
 388. Id. at 8–9. 
 389. Id. at 9. 
 390. Id. at 9–11. 
 391. Id. at 32–34, 37, 43. 
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noted that the states within the geographic boundary of the Second 
Circuit all had statutes that considered sexual orientation 
discrimination a prohibited practice in employment.392 Appellants 
argued that, at the federal level within the Second Circuit, Simonton 
was hanging by a thread in the face of developing interpretations of 
the meaning of “because of . . . sex” within Title VII.393 Thus, the 
outcome of this en banc rehearing will have a significant impact on 
how federal remedies for employment discrimination are seen and 
experienced by the LGBT population.394 
Appellants further contended that the theory of associational 
discrimination developed in the sexual orientation context in Hively 
and by the EEOC should be applied.395 Appellants pointed to the court 
of appeals’ decision in Holcomb v. Iona College396 for the proposition 
that the court had already recognized that associational discrimination 
based on race is prohibited by Title VII.397 It follows, appellants 
asserted, that the prohibition against “associational discrimination” 
under Title VII applies not only to cases involving racial 
discrimination, but also applies to cases involving sex discrimination, 
in that Title VII “equally prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
national origin, or the color, or the religion, or . . . sex of the 
associate.”398 This theory applied in this case, appellants argued, 
because the disclosure by Zarda to Orellana that he was gay and that 
he was separated from his ex-husband resulted in his termination.399 
In short, appellants argued that Zarda was fired, in part, because the 
person to whom he had been married (associated) was male, leading 
to unlawful associational discrimination.400 
Consistent with prior decisions in Hively and Christiansen, 
appellants asserted that same-sex attraction is an archetype of a non-
conforming gender stereotype.401 Thus, discrimination based on 
sexual orientation is sex discrimination, in that it is based on a failure 
to conform to an expected gender stereotype, something prohibited 
 
 392. Id. at 26–27. 
 393. Id. at 39–40. 
 394. Id. at 40. 
 395. Id. at 32–34. 
 396. 521 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 397. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 387, at 32–34. 
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under Title VII.402 This argument is rooted in appellants’ assertion that 
“the line between sexual orientation discrimination and discrimination 
‘because of sex’” is hardly clear.403 As a result, appellants argued that 
distinguishing between what is sexual orientation discrimination and 
what is discrimination based on a failure to conform to an expected 
gender stereotype is, in many circumstances, virtually impossible.404 
Appellants encouraged the court to “recognize the unworkability of 
the line between permissible sex-stereotyping and sexual orientation 
discrimination.”405 
Similarly, appellants argued that sexual orientation 
discrimination is per se sex discrimination.406 Appellants contended 
that sexual orientation discrimination “treats otherwise similarly-
situated people differently solely because of their sex,” which is a 
violation of Title VII.407 Equally, discriminating against a person 
based on sex means that the discriminated person is “exposed to 
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which 
members of the other sex are not exposed.”408 Appellants argued that 
it is indisputable that in both discriminatory scenarios, some 
construction of “sex” was necessarily considered, making it 
impossible to assert that one scenario was permissible, while the other 
was not.409 
Appellants argued “that Simonton was incorrectly decided” and 
has been “implicitly overruled” by cases like Price Waterhouse and 
Oncale.410 According to the appellants, appellees mischaracterized 
Simonton and the cases on which it relies.411 As appellants pointed out, 
even the EEOC, the government agency with power to interpret and 
enforce Title VII, took the “position that Simonton is feeble.”412 
Lastly, appellants responded to the argument that congressional 
inaction, somehow, is dispositive on the question of whether Title VII 
 
 402. Id. at 35. 
 403. Id. at 35 (quoting Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
 404. Id. 
 405. Id. at 36. 
 406. Id. at 38. 
 407. Id. (quoting Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(Katzmann, J. and Brodie, J., concurring)). 
 408. Id. (quoting Christiansen, 852 F.3d at 202). 
 409. Id. at 38–39. 
 410. Id. at 39. 
 411. See id. at 40–43. 
 412. Id. at 40. 
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protects against sexual orientation discrimination.413 Appellants 
asserted that “[a] lack of Congressional action is always a weak, 
counter-intuitive manner in which to divine Congressional intent.”414 
The fact that Congress has not amended Title VII to expressly prohibit 
discrimination based on sexual orientation discrimination does not 
mean that decisions by courts on this question have no meaning or are 
somehow trumped by Congressional inaction.415 
ii.  Reply brief of Appellants 
In their reply, appellants sought to further the arguments made in 
their initial brief in support of the various theories under which they 
contended Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination—sex 
stereotyping,416 associational discrimination,417 and that sexual 
orientation discrimination is per se sex discrimination under Title 
VII.418 Appellants attempted to respond to certain arguments made by 
appellees and by various other interested persons and entities in their 
amicus curiae briefs. 
Appellants began by responding to the arguments made by the 
court appointed amicus curiae, Adam Mortara, in his brief.419 
Appellants rejected Mortara’s contention that “verbal calisthenics” are 
necessary to fit sexual orientation into the definition of “sex” under 
Title VII.420 Appellants argued that Mortara misrepresented the 
various cases he used for support in his brief.421 According to 
Appellants, Mortara believes proving discrimination should require 
“hard data and scientific confirmation, as well as the strict rules of 
post-conviction proceedings.”422 In opposition, appellants argued that 
while certainly proof of intent is required in a discrimination case 
under Title VII, the proof that is necessary does not require the kind 
of hard data or scientific confirmation for which Mortara argues.423 In 
 
 413. Id. at 43. 
 414. Id. at 44. 
 415. See id. at 45. 
 416. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 4, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(No. 15-3775). 
 417. Id. at 12. 
 418. Id. at 13. 
 419. Id. at 1. 
 420. Id. 
 421. Id. at 2–3. 
 422. Id. at 2. In their brief, Appellants rejected Mortara’s argument that “discrimination 
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 423. Id. at 2–3. 
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order to deal with the kind of proof necessary to establish a violation 
of Title VII and the difficulty that entails, “the Supreme Court has 
developed tests to find [intent] in certain scenarios.”424 Appellants 
agreed that cases where evidence of discrimination was close to the 
surface proceed more easily, but argued that difficult factual cases, 
like Zarda’s, have merit in that discrimination can still be shown 
without hard data or scientific confirmation.425 
Regarding the methodology of statutory interpretation to be 
employed in this case, appellants asserted that they were not 
advocating for “a Title VII ‘exception’ to statutory interpretation,” but 
rather were asking the court to see that not all statutes are “bound by 
Crazy Glue or governed by definitions found in grimy dictionaries.”426 
Citing Lewis v. City of Chicago, Illinois,427 appellants agreed that “[i]t 
is not for us to rewrite the statute so that it covers only what we think 
is necessary to achieve what we think Congress really intended.”428 
However, as appellants noted, when one examines Title VII through a 
historical hermeneutic, one discovers a history where “[f]irst came the 
words ‘because of . . . sex’; then came sex stereotypes as a means to 
define discrimination; then came gay people, now constitutionally 
protected, demanding again a right to be read into accepted statutory 
interpretation.”429 Echoing Judge Posner’s concurrence in Hively, 
appellants asserted that the mere fact that the statute’s interpretive 
meaning since 1964 has changed is evidence that the statute can be 
read (and interpreted) differently over time, while still being faithful 
to the intent of the drafters.430 
Appellants further argued in reply in support of their assertion 
that sexual orientation discrimination is per se sex discrimination, 
explaining that “same-sex attraction is . . . the ultimate sex-stereotype 
[and] is as immutable as heterosexuality, or as any person’s physical[,] 
affectional, or romantic attraction (or lack thereof) to another 
person.”431 As appellants noted, since Price Waterhouse, 
 
 424. Id. at 1–3. 
 425. Id. at 2–3. 
 426. Id. at 4. 
 427. 560 U.S. 205 (2010). 
 428. Id. at 9 (quoting Lewis v. City of Chi., Ill., 560 U.S. 205, 215 (2010)). 
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(No. 15-3775). 
 430. Id. at 4–5. 
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discrimination based on a failure to conform to expected gender 
stereotypes has been actionable under Title VII.432 Courts have applied 
this gender stereotyping theory increasingly to cases involving 
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.433 
Appellants argued that discriminating against someone on the basis of 
sexual orientation necessarily involves gender stereotyping because it 
maintains an expectation as to whom a person of a particular gender 
should be attracted.434 
Appellants also countered appellees’ argument that what was 
being requested was an improper “advisory opinion.”435 Appellants 
asserted that the question of sexual orientation discrimination under 
Title VII was, indeed, before the court, because it was enough for 
Zarda to have alleged in his EEOC charge that his claim was of 
discrimination based on “sex discrimination.”436 
The EEOC, along with several legal organizations, individuals, 
and states accepted the court’s invitation to submit briefs as amicus 
for the en banc rehearing of this case. In addition to the EEOC, 
included among those submitting briefs in support of Zarda were: 
Lambda Legal Defense and Educations Fund (Lambda Legal), the 
National Education Association (NEA), Matthew Christiansen and 
Professor Anthony Michael Kreis (Christiansen and Kreis), Senators 
in support of the Equality Act, the states of Vermont, New York, and 
Connecticut, and the Legal Aid Society. 
iii.  EEOC brief filed on behalf of Appellants 
Congress delegated the EEOC with the responsibility to interpret 
and enforce Title VII in the employment context.437 The EEOC had a 
 
 432. Id. at 20–21. 
 433. Id.; see, e.g., Burnett v. Union R.R. Co., No. 17-101, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97825, at 
*2–3 (W.D. Pa. June 26, 2017) (allowing a sex-stereotyping claim to proceed where plaintiff was 
subjected to ongoing and pervasive sexually-explicit harassment by co-workers and supervisors); 
EEOC v. Scott Med. Health Ctr., P.C., 217 F. Supp. 3d 834, 839–40 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (finding no 
meaningful difference between sexual orientation discrimination and gender stereotyping 
discrimination included under “because of… sex” in Title VII); Thompson v. CHI Health Good 
Samaritan Hosp., No. 8:16CV160, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132331, at *5 (D. Neb. Sep. 27, 2016) 
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 434. See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 21, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 
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 435. Id. at 25. 
 436. Id. at 25–26. 
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significant interest in this case because Zarda’s claim “necessarily 
involve[d] impermissible consideration of [Zarda’s] sex, gender-based 
associational discrimination, and sex stereotyping.”438 Zarda’s Title 
VII claim, the EEOC argued, resides within the confines of Title VII’s 
prohibition of “because of . . . sex” discrimination.439 Thus, given its 
prior decisions in this area and its interpretation of Title VII, the EEOC 
submitted a brief in this case, asserting that Title VII’s prohibition of 
discrimination because of sex encompasses claims alleging 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.440 
The EEOC has, for some time now, taken the position that Title 
VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation, such as that 
which transpired in Zarda’s case.441 The main three arguments offered 
in the EEOC brief for this position are that discrimination based on 
sexual orientation, “(1) involves impermissible sex-based 
considerations, (2) constitutes gender-based associational 
discrimination, and (3) relies on sex stereotyping.”442 
Proponents of the position that sexual orientation is included in 
Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination “because of . . . sex” argue 
that when an employer discriminates against an employee based on 
sexual orientation, that employer must take the employee’s sex into 
account.443 It is hard to imagine that one could consider a person’s 
sexual preference without also considering that person’s sex.444 To do 
so would make little sense. In this case, the EEOC looked at the 
decision in Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart445 
to provide a baseline for whether a sex-based violation of Title VII 
had occurred.446 Manhart employed “the simple test of whether the 
evidence shows treatment of a person in a manner which, but for that 
person’s sex, would be different” to determine whether or not there 
had been a sex-based violation under Title VII.447 
Employing this comparator analysis in cases similar to Zarda 
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allows a court to focus on the fundamental question of whether a 
particular individual would have been treated adversely in the same 
situation had their sex been different.448 A person who is discriminated 
against because of their sexual orientation is directly targeted because 
of their sex. Without the initial reference to that individual’s sex, there 
would be no way to determine sexual orientation. Logically, this 
argument leads to the conclusion that sexual orientation discrimination 
necessitates referring to sex first; sexual orientation discrimination 
literally becomes discrimination “because of . . . sex” under Title 
VII.449 
Along with discriminating purely on the basis of sex, “[s]exual 
orientation discrimination also violates Title VII’s prohibition against 
sex discrimination because it treats individuals differently based on 
the sex of those with whom they associate.”450 Initially, courts 
recognized that associational discrimination violated Title VII by 
establishing racial discrimination in employment cases where an 
employee was discriminated against for interracial relationships with 
others.451 Similarly, courts have now recognized that associational 
discrimination applies to more than just race.452 As the Seventh Circuit 
explained in Hively: 
The fact that Loving, Parr, and Holcomb deal with racial 
associations, as opposed to those based on color, national 
origin, religion, or sex is of no moment. The text of the statute 
draws no distinction, for this purpose, among the different 
varieties of discrimination it addresses . . . [T]o the extent 
that the statute prohibits discrimination on the basis of the 
race of someone with whom the plaintiff associates, it also 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of the national origin, or 
the color, or the religion, or (as relevant here) the sex of the 
associate.453 
The EEOC asserted in its brief that “the analysis of race-based 
associational discrimination . . . should apply with equal force to 
claims of sex-based associational discrimination.”454 Specifically, in 
 
 448. Id. at 5–9. 
 449. Id. at 5. 
 450. Id. at 10. 
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 454. Id. at 12. 
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this case, Zarda was in a relationship with another man. An adverse 
employment consequence occurred because he disclosed that 
information to a customer. Therefore, Zarda should be entitled to bring 
his discrimination claim using an associational discrimination theory 
under Title VII.455 
As a matter of discrimination, sexual orientation discrimination 
naturally includes an appeal to sexual stereotypes.456 The 
manifestation of sexual orientation by the employee is seen from the 
employer’s point of view as either appropriate or inappropriate for a 
particular gender.457 It is not disputed that discrimination based on sex 
stereotyping is a cognizable violation under Title VII based on Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.458 However, the plaintiff in Zarda had not 
challenged the district court’s decision regarding sexual stereotyping 
on appeal. 
The EEOC strongly argued in its brief that the precedent 
established by Simonton has long outlived its justification in the face 
of recent legal developments.459 Specifically, the three main cases that 
Simonton relied on (DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telephone 
Company,460 Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,461 and 
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.462) have all been overruled.463 
DeSantis held that Title VII does not protect against sex stereotypes.464 
This has been clearly abrogated by the decision in Price 
Waterhouse.465 Williamson relied entirely on the decision in DeSantis 
and contains no further analysis.466 Lastly, Wrightson relied entirely 
on both DeSantis and Williamson.467 The derailment of Simonton 
begins here because the cases upon which the decision is based are no 
longer followed.468 
 
 455. See id. at 13. 
 456. Id. 
 457. Id. 
 458. 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see EEOC Zarda Amicus Brief, supra note 437, at 14–15. 
 459. EEOC Zarda Amicus Brief, supra note 437. 
 460. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated by Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 
864 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 461. 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 462. 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 463. EEOC Zarda Amicus Brief, supra note 437, at 18. 
 464. Id. at 19. 
 465. Id. 
 466. Id. 
 467. Id. 
 468. Id. 
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Along with asserting the lack of justification for continuing to 
treat Simonton as precedent, the EEOC also argued that Simonton 
could not distinguish between permissible sexual orientation 
discrimination and impermissible gender stereotyping.469 Within the 
bounds of the Second Circuit, employers are not allowed to 
discriminate against their employees based on “animus toward their 
exhibition of behavior considered to be stereotypically inappropriate 
for their gender.”470 Yet, they “can discriminate ‘because of sexual 
orientation.’”471 
According to the EEOC, homosexuality is, in itself, a behavior 
which does not conform to gender stereotypes. Therefore, based on 
the precedence of Simonton, how could the court of appeals possibly 
distinguish between discrimination based on sex stereotyping and 
discrimination based on sexual orientation?472 According to the 
EEOC, the logic necessary to distinguish between the two “leads to 
the absurd result that only those gay men who act ‘stereotypically 
feminine’ and those lesbians that act stereotypically masculine are 
entitled to protection from discrimination” under Title VII.473 
Receiving protection from discrimination under federal law should not 
be allowed to hinge on the capricious nature of the courts on a given 
day.474 
The EEOC closed its brief by refuting opposing arguments rooted 
in inaction by both the Congress and the Supreme Court on the 
question of whether the protections of Title VII extend to 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.475 
First, the argument that Congressional failure to amend Title VII 
to include sexual orientation is somehow dispositive in determining 
the meaning of the statute has been regularly refuted by the Supreme 
Court itself. As the Court has stated, “[s]ubsequent legislative history 
is . . . a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an 
interpretation of a prior statute when it concerns . . . a proposal that 
 
 469. Id. at 20. 
 470. Id. (quoting Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217–18 (2nd Cir. 2005)). 
 471. Id. (quoting Dawson, 398 F.3d at 217–18). 
 472. Id. 
 473. Id. at 21 (quoting Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 200 (2nd Cir. 
2017)). 
 474. Id. 
 475. Id. at 22–24. 
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does not become legislation.”476 Inferences can easily be drawn that 
Congressional inaction regarding a statutory interpretation means that 
“existing legislature has already incorporated the offered change.”477 
Even in the face of Congressional inaction regarding Title VII and 
sexual orientation, courts, in a multitude of cases, have interpreted 
Title VII to include a prohibition on discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. 
Second, even though Congress back in 1964 could not likely 
predict that Title VII would be used in sexual orientation 
discrimination cases, this does not invalidate its application to such 
instances.478 The Supreme Court has indicated that “[s]tatutory 
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil . . . to cover reasonably 
comparable evils.”479 This is the ultimate purpose of laws like Title 
VII: to protect those who suffer from wrongdoing that is equitably 
similar to the wrongdoing initially protected in the law. Accordingly, 
if a situation meets statutory requirements and is related to what the 
law intends to protect, then the law can arguably cover that situation, 
regardless of what the law originally might have been anticipated to 
cover.480 
iv.  Lambda Legal brief filed on behalf of Appellants 
Lambda Legal, a prominent legal organization supporting civil 
rights for LGBT persons, based its brief on three main premises: (1) 
under basic sex discrimination, discrimination necessarily involves 
sex-based considerations as well (sex-plus theory); (2) associational 
discrimination under Title VII is applicable to individuals who are 
discriminated against because of the sexual orientation of their 
partners; and (3) sexual orientation discrimination unavoidably 
involves sex stereotypes about how men and women should act.481 
Under a “sex-plus” theory, Lambda Legal argued, “sexual 
orientation discrimination is sex discrimination for the simple reason 
that such discrimination treats otherwise similarly-situated people 
 
 476. Id. at 24 (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990)). 
 477. Id. 
 478. Id. at 23. 
 479. Id. at 22 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Oil Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)). 
 480. Id. at 23. 
 481. Brief of the Lambda Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal at 3–4, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 
2017) (No. 15-3775) [hereinafter Brief of Lambda Legal]. 
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differently solely because of their sex.”482 The reasoning for this, 
Lambda Legal purports, is because “sexual orientation is inseparable 
from and inescapably linked to sex.”483 Following this logic, when an 
employer fires someone because of their sexual orientation, they must 
first take into consideration the employee’s sex, which is prima facie 
discrimination “because of . . . sex.”484 
Like the EEOC, Lambda Legal argued that prior case law 
prohibiting associational discrimination towards individuals in 
interracial relationships applies to individuals in LGBT relationships 
as well.485 As Lambda Legal asserted, the court of appeals in Holcomb 
v. Iona College486 held that “where an employee is subjected to 
adverse action because an employer disapproves of interracial 
association, the employee suffers discrimination because of the 
employee’s own race.”487 Lambda Legal claimed that the Holcomb 
holding should apply equally where the discrimination is rooted in an 
employer’s beliefs about an employee’s sexual orientation.488 In this 
case specifically, Zarda was fired, in part, because he had disclosed 
his breakup with his boyfriend to a customer. If the court of appeals 
were not to overturn Simonton, it would result in an application of Title 
VII in conflict with Holcomb.489 Lastly, Lambda Legal argued that 
discrimination against a gay person is fundamentally based on sex 
stereotypes; something that is strictly prohibited by Price 
Waterhouse.490 
Lambda Legal also offered responsive arguments to those 
anticipated from the opposing side. First, it responded to the argument 
made by the dissent in Hively, namely that any reimagining of the 
reach of Title VII to include sexual orientation improperly interprets 
the statutory term “sex” in Title VII.491 Based on an appeal to a 
 
 482. Id. at 4 (quoting Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 2017)). 
 483. Id. (quoting Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 (EEOC July 16, 
2015)). 
 484. Id. at 5–6. 
 485. Id. at 13. 
 486. 521 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 487. Brief of Lambda Legal, supra note 481, at 7 (quoting Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 139). 
 488. Id. (“Holcomb’s holding that discrimination based on an employee’s interracial 
associations constitute race discrimination cannot ‘be legitimately reconciled’ with an argument 
that discrimination based on a worker’s same-sex intimate relationships is not sex discrimination.”) 
(quoting Boutillier v. Hartford Pub. Sch., 221 F. Supp. 3d 225, 268 (D. Conn. 2016)). 
 489. Id. at 7–8. 
 490. 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Brief of Lambda Legal, supra note 481, at 8. 
 491. Brief of Lambda Legal, supra note 481, at 8. 
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common sense historical meaning, those reinterpreting Title VII to 
include sexual orientation do not believe that “sexual orientation” is at 
all synonymous with the term “sex” within Title VII. Lambda Legal 
stated that the question of “whether antigay discrimination is 
discrimination because of a person’s sex” does not require “Plaintiffs-
Appellants to demonstrate that ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘sex’ are 
synonyms or that they are interchangeable concepts or terms.”492 
According to Lambda Legal, no reason exists to narrowly interpret the 
statutory meaning of “sex” in Title VII, when it is a statutory scheme 
aimed at being broadly defined and operated.493 Finally, Lambda 
Legal cited several instances, post-Simonton, where the law regarding 
sexual orientation discrimination has become well-settled, implying 
that if the court were to rule contrary to these decisions, it could upset 
these related precedents.494 
v.  Christiansen and Kreis brief filed on behalf of Appellants 
In their brief, Christiansen and Kreis raised arguments that had 
been made in Christiansen’s case before the court of appeals.495 
Christiansen and Kreis argued that sexual orientation discrimination is 
a cognizable claim under Title VII’s existing framework.496 They 
relied on the idea that sex stereotypes and sexual orientation 
discrimination are almost indistinguishable and should be treated as 
such, echoing Judge Katzmann’s concurrence in Christiansen, that 
“homosexuality is the ultimate gender non-conformity, the 
prototypical sex stereotyping animus.”497 According to Christiansen 
 
 492. Id. 
 493. Id. at 13–16. 
 494. Id. at 22–28. 
 495. Brief of Amici Curiae Matthew Christiansen & Professor Anthony Michael Kreis in 
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(No. 15-3775) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae Christiansen & Kreis]; see Christiansen v. 
Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 2017). In their brief, Christiansen and Kreis 
initially urged that: 
This Court should overturn Circuit precedent and hold in line with the Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, multiple federal district courts and the [EEOC] that 
there is no principled reason to distinguish sexual orientation discrimination and sex 
stereotyping because both are forms of impermissible discrimination “because of sex” 
under Title VII. 
Brief of Amici Curiae Christiansen & Kreis, supra at 3. 
 496. Id. 
 497. Id. at 3–4. Katzmann elegantly articulated this concept in Christiansen as follows: 
The binary distinction that Simonton and Dawson establish between permissible gender 
stereotype discrimination claims and impermissible sexual orientation discrimination 
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and Kreis, the court was presented with an opportunity to overturn the 
“antiquated and cramped approach distinguishing sex stereotyping 
unrelated to sexual orientation” that was handed down by Simonton.498 
b.  Briefs arguing that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does 
not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
i.  Brief of Appellees (Altitude Express) 
In their brief, Appellees primarily relied upon the arguments 
made in their prior briefs in this proceeding, seeking to focus the court 
on a narrow legal question: Does Title VII prohibit sexual orientation 
discrimination under its prohibition of discrimination “because of . . . 
sex?” Appellees asserted that the answer to this question is a clear 
“no,” in that no proper interpretation of “sex” under Title VII includes 
sexual orientation.499 Further, Appellees argued that this case is an 
inappropriate vehicle to decide this question, given the procedural 
history of the case.500 
Appellees contended that the decision of the lower court 
dismissing Zarda’s “gender stereotype discrimination, hostile work 
environment, and overtime claims” was correct.501 They asserted that 
the question raised on appeal regarding the efficacy of a Title VII 
sexual orientation discrimination claim was never raised in the lower 
court. As a result, Zarda’s estate “lack[ed] the legal standing to raise a 
 
claims requires the factfinder, when evaluating adverse employment action taken against 
an effeminate gay man, to decide whether his perceived effeminacy or his sexual 
orientation was the true cause of his disparate treatment. See Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. 
Connecticut, 172 F.Supp.3d 509, 524 n.8 (D. Conn. 2016). This is likely to be an 
exceptionally difficult task in light of the degree to which sexual orientation is 
commingled in the minds of many with particular traits associated with gender. More 
fundamentally, carving out gender stereotypes related to sexual orientation ignores the 
fact that negative views of sexual orientation are often, if not always, rooted in the idea 
that men should be exclusively attracted to women and women should be exclusively 
attracted to men—as clear a gender stereotype as any. 
Christiansen, 852 F.3d at 205–206 (Katzmann, J., concurring). As Kreis previously wrote: 
[T]he question of whether sexual orientation discrimination claims are colorable under 
Price Waterhouse must turn on whether the root of the animus harbored against sexual 
minorities stems from sex-stereotypes—not whether all sexual minorities uniformly 
manifest a set of gender non-conforming characteristics. 
Anthony Michael Kreis, Against Gay Potemkin Villages: Title VII and Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination, 96 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 6 (2017). 
 498. Brief of Amici Curiae Christiansen & Kreis, supra note 495, at 4. 
 499. See Appellee’s Brief at 1, Zarda v. Altitude Express, 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 15-
3775). 
 500. Id. at 17–18. 
 501. Id. at 7–9. 
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new Title VII allegation” on appeal.502 
In fact, Zarda had specifically stated: “I am not making this 
charge on my sexual orientation.”503 In his testimony, Zarda 
summarily described his experiences while working at Altitude 
Express.504 Zarda indicated that he had never had any negative 
interactions with his supervisor or coworkers regarding his sexual 
orientation.505 Regarding his termination, Zarda testified that when he 
was fired, he did not know the motivation of his employer for the 
termination.506 Appellees argued that, given all these facts, no record 
existed on which the court could possibly conclude that a Title VII 
sexual orientation claim had ever been raised by Zarda before 
appeal.507 
Further, Appellees asserted that Zarda failed to follow the 
required steps in order to even assert a valid Title VII claim of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, specifically failing to file 
a charge for this claim in a timely manner with the EEOC.508 As with 
any claim, appellees noted, EEOC claims are subject to “statute of 
limitations, waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”509 Here, however, 
Zarda never raised a specific claim under Title VII for discrimination 
based on sexual orientation with the EEOC or with the district court.510 
Given this, appellees asserted, his estate must surely be barred by the 
doctrines of statute of limitations or estoppel from bringing such a 
claim now.511 Appellees argued that Zarda’s failure to timely file an 
EEOC charge alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation 
completely distinguishes his case from Hively, the primary case used 
as a basis for appellants’ arguments.512 As a result, appellees asserted 
that any decision by the court recognizing a cause of action for 
discrimination based on sexual orientation under Title VII would 
provide no relief to the specific party before the court.513 
 
 502. Id. at 8. 
 503. Id. at 9. 
 504. Id. 
 505. Id. at 10. 
 506. Id. at 11. 
 507. Id. at 18–20. 
 508. Id. at 20–21. 
 509. Id. at 21. 
 510. Id. at 24. As appellees point out, Zarda “failed to allege sexual orientation discrimination 
under Title VII in his amended complaint or second complaint.” Id. 
 511. Id. at 21–22. 
 512. Id. at 23. 
 513. Id. at 22. 
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Therefore, given these procedural infirmities, appellees argued 
that what was actually being sought in the case was an advisory 
opinion on the reach of Title VII.514 Relying on Preiser v. Newkirk, 
appellees asserted that “[i]t is well-settled that ‘a federal court has 
neither the power to render an advisory opinion nor to decide questions 
that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.’”515 
Thus, “this en banc panel has no effect on the ‘rights of the litigants in 
the case before them’” and, because of this, “no relief flows from their 
finding of the question of law presented.”516 
ii.  Department of Justice brief filed on behalf of Appellees 
While not requested by the court of appeals, the United States 
Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a brief in this case that contradicted 
the position taken by the EEOC.517 The DOJ asserted that it had an 
interest in this case because it enforces and regulates Title VII against 
both state and local government employers and because it was an 
employer itself.518 While the EEOC and DOJ are assumed to work in 
conjunction to exclude sex discrimination from the workplace under 
Title VII, in this case, their positions were in conflict.519 In asserting 
the position of the United States government in this proceeding, the 
DOJ demanded that the court maintain an interpretation of Title VII 
that is consistent with the specific language of the text and the 
precedent of Simonton.520 According to the DOJ, courts have long held 
that the plain meaning of Title VII does not encompass sexual 
orientation discrimination.521 The DOJ argued in its brief that the 
 
 514. See id. at 3. 
 515. Id. at 17 (citing Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)). 
 516. Id. at 18 (noting that “if the panel reaches a conclusion, the panel must dismiss the appeal 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”). 
 517. By way of background to this unusual filing by the DOJ, it is important to note that when 
the EEOC decided in 2015 that Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination does protect gay employees, 
the DOJ, under President Obama, took no position. However, in July 2017, the Trump DOJ, led by 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions, switched positions and filed an amicus brief in this case arguing 
that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 15-
3775). At oral argument in Zarda, the Second Circuit indicated some frustration with the DOJ’s 
intrusion in the case. U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIR., 
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/49f87e29-3d5f-4e01-bfb9-4c4db493c953/221-
230/list/.  
 518. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 517, at 1. 
 519. See id. 
 520. Id. at 1–2. 
 521. Id. 
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question before the court was a strict matter of law based upon 
statutory language and not a policy question that should be decided by 
the courts.522 
The DOJ pointed to instances in the legislative history of Title 
VII where unsuccessful attempts were made to expressly expand the 
definition of “sex” to include sexual orientation.523 Further, with 
regard to the language of Title VII, “Congress [has] neither added 
sexual orientation as a protected trait nor defined discrimination on the 
basis of sex to include sexual orientation discrimination.”524 Thus far, 
there have been no successful attempts to change the plain meaning or 
wording of the statute to include sexual orientation.525 
Like a scriptural fundamentalist, the DOJ argued that reliance on 
a plain reading of the statute demands a strict interpretation of the 
specific language included in the statute.526 The DOJ attempted to 
offer such an interpretation in its brief by simplistically looking at the 
words “sex” and “discrimination.”527 According to the reading offered 
by the DOJ, the meaning of “sex” in Title VII is meant to correspond 
to biological “maleness” or “femaleness,” thereby only prohibiting sex 
discrimination when men and women are treated differently.528 The 
DOJ asserted that while the term “sex” is defined nowhere within Title 
VII nor discussed by Congress in debates on the statute, the 
Congressional authors of the statute intended “sex” to correspond with 
biological “maleness” or “femaleness.”529 
The DOJ noted that the Supreme Court has held that 
“discrimination” under Title VII requires a “showing that an employer 
has ‘treated similarly situated employees’ of different sexes 
unequally.”530 Under this type of “disparate treatment” claim, 
according to the DOJ, “[t]he central focus of the inquiry is whether the 
employer has treated ‘some people less favorably than others because 
of their . . . sex.’”531 
 
 522. Id. at 2. 
 523. Id. at 3. 
 524. Id. 
 525. Id. (noting that “every Congress from 1974 to the present has declined to enact proposed 
legislation that would prohibit discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation”). 
 526. Id. 
 527. Id. 
 528. Id. at 4. 
 529. Id. at 6. 
 530. Id. at 4 (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258–59 (1981)). 
 531. Id. (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 569, 577 (1978)). 
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Under Title VII, a sexual harassment claim can be brought against 
an employer if the harassment constituted discrimination “because of 
. . . sex.”532 However, as the DOJ asserts, sexual harassment is not 
“automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the 
words used have sexual content or connotations.”533 Rather, “[t]he 
critical issue . . . is whether members of one sex are exposed to 
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which 
members of the other sex are not exposed.”534 Further, under Title VII, 
an employer is not allowed to evaluate any of its employees predicated 
on an understanding that the employee should match any stereotypes 
associated with their sex.535 According to the DOJ, under this analysis, 
“[t]he plaintiff must show that the employer actually relied on her [or 
his] gender in making its decision.”536 Prior to the Seventh Circuit 
decision in Hively, according to the DOJ, courts had consistently 
applied this analysis, limiting the reach of Title VII to cases focused 
on the gender of the plaintiff, not the sexual orientation.537 In its brief, 
the DOJ argued that this narrow interpretation is correct and it should 
not be expanded or modified to include sexual orientation unless the 
Congress so acts. 
The DOJ argued that both the EEOC and the Seventh Circuit in 
Hively incorrectly applied Title VII and are wrong about three basic 
arguments.538 First, in relying upon the comparator theory to support 
the conclusion that Title VII includes sexual orientation, the EEOC 
and the Hively court wrongly applied the “but for the employee’s sex” 
comparator test.539 The DOJ, agreeing with the dissent in Hively, 
argued that a court using the “but-for” comparator test cannot “do its 
job of ruling in sex discrimination as the actual reason for the 
employer’s decision . . . if we’re not scrupulous about holding 
everything constant except the plaintiff’s sex.”540 The DOJ argued that 
the manner in which the EEOC and the Seventh Circuit applied the 
Manhart test was improper, in that where sexual orientation is kept 
 
 532. Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)). 
 533. Id. at 4–5. 
 534. Id. at 5 (alteration in original). 
 535. Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion)). 
 536. Id. 
 537. Id. at 6. 
 538. Id. at 15. 
 539. Id. at 15–16. 
 540. Id. at 16 (citing Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. Of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 366 (7th Cir. 
2017) (Sykes, J., dissenting)). 
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constant and gender is a variable, the resulting discrimination is based 
not on the sex of the individual, but on the sexual orientation of that 
individual.541 This, according to the DOJ, is not actionable under Title 
VII.542 
Second, the DOJ pointed to the contention made by the EEOC 
and the Hively court that where an employer discriminates against an 
employee based on sexual orientation, the employer is necessarily 
discriminating based on sexual stereotypes, because such 
discrimination “allegedly targets an employee’s failure to conform to 
the gender norm of opposite-sex attraction.”543 The DOJ categorically 
rejected any argument that “presumes that sexual orientation 
discrimination always reflects a gender-based stereotype.”544 The DOJ 
asserted that it is simply a wrongheaded analysis to believe that 
discrimination based on sexual orientation must happen on the basis 
of gender, but rather could be based on “moral beliefs about sexual, 
marital, and familial relationships.”545 
The DOJ further argued that even if some sexual orientation 
discrimination cases are based on sex stereotypes, the opposite-sex 
sexual attraction stereotype is not one of them, in that discrimination 
that results from a sexual attraction based stereotype is equivalent 
across both genders.546 For example, the DOJ pointed out, if a man is 
discriminated against because he does not conform to the stereotype 
of being attracted to women, but would be treated no better or worse 
than a woman who is discriminated against for not being attracted to 
men, then no unfair discrimination based on sex occurs, thereby 
resulting in no Title VII claim.547 
Lastly, the DOJ rejected the associational discrimination 
argument set forth by both the EEOC and the Seventh Circuit in 
Hively. The DOJ asserted that the logical analogy between 
associational race discrimination and associational sex discrimination 
is “fundamentally inapposite.”548 Discrimination based on the race of 
 
 541. Id. at 16. 
 542. Id. 
 543. Id. at 18. 
 544. Id. 
 545. Id. at 19. 
 546. Id. 
 547. Id. Apparently, the DOJ recognizes that this situation is somehow different from when 
men are discriminated against for being too feminine or women are discriminated against for being 
too masculine. 
 548. Id. at 21. 
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an employee’s spouse is treating an employee differently because of 
their race. The DOJ agreed that this constitutes prima facie race 
discrimination prohibited under Title VII.549 Having agreed that 
discrimination based on the race of an employee’s spouse is race 
discrimination, the DOJ then made the wholly illogical argument that 
“an employer who discriminates against an employee in a same-sex 
relationship is not engaged in sex-based discrimination” of that 
person, even though the discrimination occurs because of the gender 
or sex of the spouse.550 Rather, the DOJ argued, the employer is 
discriminating based on sexual orientation; a claim that is not 
cognizable under Title VII’s plain reading.551 
In conclusion, the DOJ asserted that the facts in Zarda do not 
present actionable discrimination within this strict reading of Title 
VII.552 
iii.  Brief of Court appointed amicus curiae 
Adam Mortara, as court-appointed amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief favoring the appellees. Similar to the DOJ, Mortara asserted that 
“it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that, unless 
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, 
contemporary, and common meaning.”553 Accordingly, he argued, 
discrimination “because of . . . sex” does not encompass sexual 
orientation.554 
Mortara contended that the only proper way to apply a “but-for” 
test for sex discrimination is to be consistent in its application.555 No 
substitutions or extraneous methods of using the comparator test 
should be used.556 Mortara argued that if the court were to use the 
comparator test laid out in Manhart, it should look to the axiomatic 
questions of whether the employer in the case fired Zarda because he 
was gay or because he was a man.557 Men and women can have any 
kind of sexual orientation and be discriminated against based on their 
 
 549. Id. 
 550. Id. at 22. 
 551. Id. 
 552. Id. 
 553. Brief of Adam Mortara as Amicus Curiae at 1, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 
76 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 15-3775). 
 554. Id. 
 555. Id. at 2–3. 
 556. Id. 
 557. Id. at 3. 
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gender. This is prohibited under Title VII. 
Men and women can also be discriminated against solely because 
of their sexual orientation; regardless of gender. According to 
Mortara, there is a distinction between these two scenarios.558 When 
an employer discriminates based on sexual orientation, they are not 
saying that they do not believe that a man or a woman specifically can 
be homosexual, they are acting on the basis that human beings should 
not be homosexual.559 This is not an example of discrimination based 
on gender. Zarda attempted to broaden this distinction, ultimately 
making it more difficult for courts to rule on Title VII sex 
discrimination cases.560 Furthermore, “the court ha[d] never once 
endorsed using a comparative or ‘but-for’ test to interpret the text of 
Title VII and, in effect, to supply an alternative motive to the actual 
and true reasons that the evidence shows motivated the employment 
decision.”561 
Like others who filed in support of the position of the defendants-
appellees, Mortara looked to the specific wording of Title VII’s sex 
discrimination prohibition. According to Mortara, the term “sex” 
under Title VII is intended to mean biological men and women and 
does not include sexual orientation.562 Mortara argued that a strong 
inference supports the truth of this assertion, because the word sex is 
within the words “homosexual,” “bisexual,” and the phrase “sexual 
orientation.”563 In other words, the word “sex” is necessary to define 
“sexual orientation,” but not the other way around.564 
Consistent with the arguments offered by the DOJ, Mortara also 
rejected the associational discrimination argument. He notes that 
associational discrimination claims were intended to combat racism; a 
prime component of Title VII prohibition.565 Mainly, he asserted that 
the recognition of associational discrimination claims was to protect 
people from being punished for interracial relationships.566 
He further argued that racial associational discrimination and sex 
 
 558. Id. at 2–3. 
 559. Id. at 3. 
 560. Id. at 5. 
 561. Id. at 11. 
 562. Id. at 6–7. 
 563. Id. 
 564. Id. 
 565. Id. at 14. 
 566. Id. 
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associational discrimination are clearly dissimilar. In support of this 
contention, Mortara asserted that the cases relied upon by appellants 
in support of the associational discrimination theory were not relevant 
in this context, in that none of the cases cited involved a plaintiff 
(regardless of sexual orientation) being fired or treated disparagingly 
different for being married to or associating with other homosexual 
individuals.567 According to Mortara, being homosexual was an 
independent status, one not defined by associating with or being in a 
relationship with other homosexuals. For example, he argued, a person 
can associate with homosexuals regardless of her own sexual 
orientation. Thus, discrimination occurs because of an individual’s 
innate sexual orientation (status) as a homosexual, not as a result of 
the individual’s intimate association with persons of the same 
gender.568 
Lastly, Mortara addressed the issue of sex stereotyping as a basis 
for a sexual orientation claim under Title VII. Mortara disagreed with 
Zarda and those supporting the position that where discrimination 
based on sexual orientation exists, discrimination based on sexual 
stereotyping or gender nonconformity also necessarily exists, giving 
rise to an actionable sexual orientation claim.569 While he did agree 
that sex stereotyping could “be evidence of sex discrimination” under 
Price Waterhouse,570 he asserted that, to the degree any sex 
stereotyping occurred in the case of Zarda, it was not specifically 
rooted in unlawful discrimination towards Zarda as a man.571 
c.  En banc oral argument 
On September 26, 2017, oral arguments were held in the case 
before the en banc court of appeals. While scheduled for only one 
hour, the arguments actually lasted for almost two hours.572 
Gregory Antollino, representing appellants, first addressed the 
procedural questions associated with whether arguments regarding sex 
 
 567. Id. at 16–17. 
 568. Id. at 16 (citing Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1259–60 (Pryor, J., concurring), 
cert. denied, No. 17-370, 138 S. Ct. 557 (Dec. 11, 2017)). 
 569. Id. at 17–18. 
 570. Id. at 19. 
 571. Id. at 21. 
 572. Oral Argument, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (No. 15-
3775) [hereinafter Oral Argument, Zarda], http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/bb77 
d7d7-614b-4223-9d6d-8e38ca9c5260/228/doc/15-3775%20En%20Banc.mp3. 
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stereotyping were even before the court, given that they were not 
directly raised on appeal. Antollino asserted that discrimination based 
on sexual orientation was the ultimate case of sex stereotyping, in that 
it went to the heart of sexual expectations for men and women in a 
heteronormative society.573 Antollino’s arguments basically tracked 
the arguments that had been made in appellants’ briefs.574  
Following Antollino was Jeremy D. Horowitz, arguing on behalf 
of the EEOC.575 It fell to Horowitz to make the substantive argument 
regarding the question of whether the prohibition against 
discrimination because of sex found in Title VII could be interpreted 
broadly enough to include a prohibition against discrimination based 
on sexual orientation.576 Horowitz effectively explained the three main 
arguments offered by the EEOC, namely that discrimination based on 
sexual orientation (1) involves impermissible sex-based 
considerations, (2) constitutes gender-based associational 
discrimination, and (3) relies on sex stereotyping.577 Horowitz rooted 
these arguments in the foundational idea that “sexual orientation 
cannot be separated from sex.”578 
After Horowitz made the affirmative argument in support of the 
positions asserted by the appellants and the EEOC, it fell to Greg 
Nevins of Lambda Legal to directly counter the arguments that had 
been set forth by the DOJ in its brief filed on behalf of the appellees.579 
Nevins painstakingly sought to show in the brief period of time that 
he was allotted that the DOJ position was a “radical reinterpretation of 
Title VII” rooted in a “parlor trick.”580 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Hashim M. Mooppan made 
the primary argument in support of the appellants.581 Before Mooppan 
was even able to begin his substantive argument, the judges 
interrupted him with a series of questions regarding the unusual 
scenario of one executive agency arguing against another executive 
agency.582 Several of the judges seemed quite disturbed by the 
 
 573. Id. at 01:40–12:15. 
 574. See supra Part V(C)(1)(a)(i)–(ii). 
 575. Oral Argument, Zarda, supra note 572, at 13:00. 
 576. Oral Argument, Zarda, supra note 572. 
 577. Id. at 19:19. 
 578. Id. at 19:19. 
 579. Id. at 36:26. 
 580. Id. at 43:42, 38:52. 
 581. Id. at 1:02:29. 
 582. Id. at 1:02:43. 
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situation, with Judge Katzmann asking “[w]hat is the process with 
regard to the EEOC and the DOJ in terms of filing a brief?”583 Rather 
than directly answering the question, Mooppan responded “[t]hat’s a 
fairly complicated question.”584 However, Judge Katzmann was not 
satisfied and continued to press Mooppan for a direct answer.585 
Mooppan ultimately told the court in regard to questions about the 
DOJ procedures that “[t]hat’s not appropriate for me to disclose.”586 
Undeterred, Judge Pooler followed up on Judge Katzmann’s 
questions, asking “[d]oes the Justice Department sign off on a brief 
that EEOC intends to file?”587 Again, Mooppan responded “[t]hat’s 
not appropriate for me to speak to,” causing Judge Pooler to point out 
that she was asking for procedural information, “not internal 
deliberations.”588 Mooppan refused to discuss why two executive 
branch agencies were taking diametrically opposing positions in a 
significant matter.589 
After this procedural discussion, Mooppan moved to the major 
argument of the DOJ. Basically, the DOJ’s argument was that for sex 
discrimination in violation of Title VII to occur, the discrimination had 
to be predicated on a belief that one gender is inferior to the other 
gender.590 Mooppan argued that because discrimination based on 
sexual orientation did not rest on such a predicate, discrimination 
based on sexual orientation could not be included in the protection 
offered by Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination “because of 
sex.”591 
Judge Jacobs pushed Mooppan to address the associational 
discrimination theory that was argued by the EEOC and which had 
been accepted by the Seventh Circuit in Hively.592 In response, 
Mooppan asserted that “[w]hen you discriminate against interracial 
marriage, you are promoting ‘racial superiority.’”593 Mooppan 
pursued this argument further by claiming, for example, that 
 
 583. Id. at 1:03:53. 
 584. Id. at 1:04:32. 
 585. Id. at 1:04:34. 
 586. Id. at 1:04:50. 
 587. Id. at 1:05:13. 
 588. Id. at 1:05:18. 
 589. See id. at 1:05:26. 
 590. Id. at 1:08:05. 
 591. Id. at 1:18:53. 
 592. Id. at 1:06:20. 
 593. Id. at 1:07:32. 
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discrimination against interfaith marriages was rooted in some idea of 
“religious superiority.”594 
This argument is just wrong, in that it is inconsistent with all prior 
interpretations of Title VII. Federal courts have always held that a 
violation of Title VII may be proven by showing that the employer 
took sex, religion, race, or age into account in making an adverse 
employment decision.595 Nowhere has the Supreme Court ever held 
that the language of Title VII requires that a plaintiff alleging a 
violation of Title VII must prove that the discrimination that she 
suffered was because the employer believed that one gender or one 
race or one religion or one age group was superior to another. This 
fictional requirement, asserted by the DOJ, that a showing of animus 
by a Title VII plaintiff is necessary, has no support in the law. 
Imposing such a requirement would reject decades of court decisions 
and turn the protections provided by Title VII on their head. 
The questions asked by the court during oral argument and the 
tone of the oral argument would suggest that the Second Circuit is 
likely to follow the lead of the Seventh Circuit in Hively, concluding 
that the prohibition against discrimination “because of sex” found in 
Title VII includes a prohibition against discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.596 
d.  En banc decision 
On February 26, 2018, the court of appeals issued its en banc 
decision in Zarda.597 Unsurprisingly, given the oral argument, the 
court held, 10-3, that the prohibition against discrimination “because 
of sex” in Title VII includes discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.598 In addition to the opinion of the court, written by Chief 
Judge Katzmann, four members of the court wrote separate concurring 
opinions and three members of the court wrote separate dissenting 
 
 594. Id. at 1:14:10. 
 595. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 557 (2009); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & 
Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 977 (1988); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971); see also 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753–54 (1998) (“When a plaintiff proves that a 
tangible employment action resulted from a refusal to submit to a supervisor’s sexual demands, he 
or she establishes . . . [an] actionable [claim] under Title VII.”); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 
524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998); Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 596. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. Of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 351–352 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 597. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 100 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 598. Id. at 106–08. 
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opinions.599 
Writing for the majority, Judge Katzmann began his analysis with 
a discussion of the text of Title VII, writing: 
In deciding whether Title VII prohibits sexual 
orientation discrimination, we are guided, as always, by the 
text and, in particular, by the phrase “because of . . . sex.” 
However, in interpreting this language, we do not write on a 
blank slate. Instead, we must construe the text in light of the 
entirety of the statute as well as relevant precedent. As 
defined by Title VII, an employer has engaged in 
“impermissible consideration of . . . sex . . . in employment 
practices” when “sex . . . was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice,” irrespective of whether the employer 
was also motivated by “other factors.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(m). Accordingly, the critical inquiry for a court assessing 
whether an employment practice is “because of . . . sex” is 
whether sex was “a motivating factor.” Rivera v. Rochester 
Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11, 23 (2d Cir. 
2014).600 
Judge Katzmann then offered three primary arguments in support of 
the court’s holding that the prohibition against discrimination 
“because of sex” in Title VII did include a prohibition against 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.601 
First, sexual orientation discrimination constitutes sex 
discrimination because “sexual orientation is a function of sex.”602 
Firing a man because he is attracted to men “is motivated, at least in 
part, by sex and is thus a subset of sex discrimination.”603 In this 
situation, the fired male employee would not have been fired “but for” 
his sex.604 According to Judge Katzmann, in order to “identify the 
sexual orientation of a particular person,” an employer must “know 
the sex of the person and that of the people to whom he or she is 
attracted.”605 As Judge Katzmann further explained: 
Because one cannot fully define a person’s sexual orientation 
 
 599. See id. at 132–69. 
 600. Id. at 111–12. 
 601. See id. at 113, 119, 124. 
 602. Id. at 113. 
 603. Id. at 112. 
 604. See id. at 119. 
 605. Id. at 113. 
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without identifying his or her sex, sexual orientation is a 
function of sex. Indeed sexual orientation is doubly 
delineated by sex because it is a function of both a person’s 
sex and the sex of those to whom he or she is attracted. 
Logically, because sexual orientation is a function of sex and 
sex is a protected characteristic under Title VII, it follows 
that sexual orientation is also protected.606 
To reach this conclusion, Judge Katzmann employed the 
“comparative test” that had been used by the majority in Hively.607 
According to Judge Katzmann (and the majority in Hively), this test 
“determines whether the trait that is the basis for discrimination is a 
function of sex by asking whether an employee’s treatment would 
have been different ‘but for that person’s sex.’”608 In strongly rejecting 
the approach to the “comparative test” that had been argued by the 
dissent in Hively and by the defendant and the DOJ in Zarda, Judge 
Katzmann wrote: 
But the real issue raised by the government’s critique is the 
proper application of the comparative test. In the 
government’s view, the appropriate comparison is not 
between a woman attracted to women and a man attracted to 
women; it’s between a woman and a man, both of whom are 
attracted to people of the same sex. Determining which of 
these framings is correct requires understanding the purpose 
and operation of the comparative test. Although the Supreme 
Court has not elaborated on the role that the test plays in Title 
VII jurisprudence, based on how the Supreme Court has 
employed the test, we understand that its purpose is to 
determine when a trait other than sex is, in fact, a proxy for 
(or a function of) sex. To determine whether a trait is such a 
proxy, the test compares a female and a male employee who 
both exhibit the trait at issue. In the comparison, the trait is 
the control, sex is the independent variable, and employee 
treatment is the dependent variable.609 
Applying this test to the facts of Zarda led Judge Katzmann to the 
 
 606. Id. 
 607. Id. at 116–18. 
 608. Id. at 116 (quoting City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 
(1978)). 
 609. Id. at 116–17. 
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following analytical conclusion: 
Zarda was allegedly fired after he revealed his sexual 
attraction to men—his sexual orientation. Had Zarda been a 
woman who revealed her attraction to men—her sexual 
orientation—presumably Zarda would not have been fired.610 
Thus, the control factor in this analysis is “attraction to men,” sex 
(male or female) is the independent variable, and the employment 
action (termination or not) is the dependent variable.611 Therefore, 
“but for” his sex, Zarda would not have been terminated and, 
concomitantly, suffered discrimination.612 As Judge Katzmann stated: 
Having addressed the proper application of the comparative 
test, we conclude that the law is clear: To determine whether 
a trait operates as a proxy for sex, we ask whether the 
employee would have been treated differently “but for” his 
or her sex. In the context of sexual orientation, a woman who 
is subject to an adverse employment action because she is 
attracted to women would have been treated differently if she 
had been a man who was attracted to women. We can 
therefore conclude that sexual orientation is a function of sex 
and, by extension, sexual orientation discrimination is a 
subset of sex discrimination.613 
Second, Judge Katzmann, relying on the analysis of Price 
Waterhouse, concluded that discrimination based on sexual 
orientation constituted discrimination “because of sex” because 
“sexual orientation discrimination is almost invariably rooted in 
stereotypes about men and women.”614 As Judge Katzmann explains: 
Applying Price Waterhouse’s reasoning to sexual 
orientation, we conclude that when, for example, “an 
employer . . . acts on the basis of a belief that [men] cannot 
be [attracted to men], or that [they] must not be,” but takes 
no such action against women who are attracted to men, the 
employer “has acted on the basis of gender.” Cf. 490 U.S. at 
250, 109 S.Ct. 1775.615 
 
 610. See id. at 113–14, 117–19. 
 611. Id. at 117. 
 612. See id. at 119. 
 613. Id. 
 614. Id. 
 615. Id. at 120–21 (footnote omitted).  
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Discrimination based on sexual orientation is violative of Title VII 
when it is rooted in gender stereotypes and expectations “that ‘real’ 
men should date women, and not other men.”616 Relying on Hively, 
Judge Katzmann concluded that “same-sex orientation ‘represents the 
ultimate case of failure to conform’ to gender stereotypes (majority), 
and aligns with numerous district courts’ observation that ‘stereotypes 
about homosexuality are directly related to our stereotypes about the 
proper roles of men and women.’”617 
Third, relying on Loving, Judge Katzmann asserted that 
discrimination based on sexual orientation violates Title VII’s 
prohibition against discrimination “because of sex” under an 
“associational” theory of discrimination.618 Following Loving, courts 
have incorporated its “associational” analysis into the employment 
context, holding that “where an employee is subjected to adverse 
action because an employer disapproves of interracial association, the 
employee suffers discrimination because of the employee’s own race” 
in violation of Title VII.619 
Since courts have consistently held that discrimination on the 
basis of race and sex are equally forbidden under Title VII, Judge 
Katzmann concluded that this “associational” theory applied equally 
to cases that raised claims of sex discrimination.620 Under this theory, 
Judge Katzmann asserts that where an employee suffers 
discrimination because of her associations with a partner of the same-
sex, she has experienced illegal sex discrimination.621 As Judge 
Katzmann explained: 
If an employer disapproves of close friendships among 
persons of opposite sexes and fires a female employee 
because she has male friends, the employee has been 
discriminated against because of her own sex. “Once we 
accept this premise, it makes little sense to carve out same-
sex [romantic] relationships as an association to which these 
 
 616. Id. at 121–23. 
 617. Id. (quoting Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002)); see also, e.g., 
Boutillier v. Hartford Pub. Schs., 221 F. Supp. 3d 255, 269 (D. Conn. 2016); Videckis v. Pepperdine 
Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1160 (C.D. Cal. 2015); Terveer v. Billington, 34 F. Supp. 3d 100, 116 
(D.D.C. 2014); Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224 (D. Or. 
2002). 
 618. Zarda, 833 F.3d at 124–28 (relying on Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). 
 619. Id. at 124 (quoting Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
 620. Id. at 125. 
 621. Id. at 124–25, 128. 
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protections do not apply.” Id. Applying the reasoning of 
Holcomb, if a male employee married to a man is terminated 
because his employer disapproves of same-sex marriage, the 
employee has suffered associational discrimination based on 
his own sex because “the fact that the employee is a man 
instead of a woman motivated the employer’s discrimination 
against him.” Baldwin v. Foxx, 2015 WL 4397641, at *6 
(E.E.O.C. July 16, 2015).622 
Any of these three rationales are adequate for the court to 
conclude that discrimination based on sexual orientation is prohibited 
by Title VII as discrimination because of sex, according to Judge 
Katzmann.623 Relying upon Oncale, Judge Katzmann acknowledges 
that, while sexual orientation discrimination is “assuredly not the 
principal evil that Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title 
VII,” “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to 
cover reasonably comparable evils.”624 As applied to the specific facts 
before the court in Zarda, Judge Katzmann concludes: 
Zarda has alleged that, by “honestly referr[ing] to his sexual 
orientation,” he failed to “conform to the straight male macho 
stereotype.” J.A. 72. For this reason, he has alleged a claim 
of discrimination of the kind we now hold cognizable under 
Title VII. The district court held that there was sufficient 
evidence of sexual orientation discrimination to survive 
summary judgment on Zarda’s state law claims. Even though 
Zarda lost his state sexual orientation discrimination claim at 
trial, that result does not preclude him from prevailing on his 
federal claim because his state law claim was tried under “a 
higher standard of causation than required by Title VII.” 
Zarda, 855 F.3d at 81. Thus, we hold that Zarda is entitled to 
bring a Title VII claim for discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.625 
In concurring with the judgment of the court, Judge Jacobs joined 
with the conclusion that under an associational discrimination theory, 
discrimination based on sexual orientation is encompassed by Title 
 
 622. Id. at 125. 
 623. Id. at 131–32. 
 624. Id. at 132. 
 625. Id. 
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VII’s prohibition against discrimination because of sex.626 Judge 
Jacobs rejected the other two rationales offered by Judge Katzmann as 
nothing more than “woke dicta.”627 Judge Sack also concurred in the 
decision based on the theory of associational discrimination.628 
For his part, Judge Cabranes concurred in the judgment, but did 
so because he thought the decision was an easy, straightforward case 
of statutory interpretation.629 As Judge Cabranes wrote: 
This is a straightforward case of statutory construction. Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination 
“because of . . . sex.” Id. Zarda’s sexual orientation is a 
function of his sex. Discrimination against Zarda because of 
his sexual orientation therefore is discrimination because of 
his sex, and is prohibited by Title VII. 
That should be the end of the analysis.630 
In his concurrence, Judge Lohier joined in the portion of Judge 
Katzmann’s opinion that he believed to be most firmly rooted in the 
 
 626. Id. at 132–33 (Jacobs, J., concurring). As Judge Jacobs writes: 
Supreme Court law and our own precedents on race discrimination militate in 
favor of the conclusion that sex discrimination based on one’s choice of partner is an 
impermissible basis for discrimination under Title VII. This view is an extension of 
existing law, perhaps a cantilever, but not a leap. 
First: this Circuit has already recognized associational discrimination as a Title 
VII violation. In Holcomb v. Iona Coll., we considered a claim of discrimination under 
Title VII by a white man who alleged that he was fired because of his marriage to a black 
woman. We held that “an employer may violate Title VII if it takes action against an 
employee because of the employee’s association with a person of another race . . . The 
reason is simple: where an employee is subjected to adverse action because an employer 
disapproves of interracial association, the employee suffers discrimination because of 
the employee’s own race.” 
Second: the analogy to same-sex relationships is valid because Title VII “on its 
face treats each of the enumerated categories exactly the same”; thus principles 
announced in regard to sex discrimination “apply with equal force to discrimination 
based on race, religion, or national origin.” And, presumably, vice versa. 
Third: There is no reason I can see why associational discrimination based on sex 
would not encompass association between persons of the same sex. In Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., a case in which a man alleged same-sex harassment, 
the Supreme Court stated that Title VII prohibits “‘discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . 
sex’” and that Title VII “protects men as well as women.” 
This line of cases, taken together, demonstrates that discrimination based on 
same-sex relationships is discrimination cognizable under Title VII notwithstanding that 
the sexual relationship is homosexual. 
Id. at 132–33 (Jacobs, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
 627. Id. at 134. 
 628. Id. at 135 (Sack, J., concurring). 
 629. Id. (Cabranes, J., concurring). 
 630. Id. 
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text of Title VII.631 He does, however, directly challenge the textual 
analysis offered by those writing in dissent, stating: 
Time and time again, the Supreme Court has told us that the 
cart of legislative history is pulled by the plain text, not the 
other way around. The text here pulls in one direction, 
namely, that sex includes sexual orientation.632 
In a powerful and eloquent dissent reminiscent of that offered by 
Judge Sykes in Hively, Judge Lynch rejected the three rationales 
offered by Judge Katzmann in support of the decision. Judge Lynch 
begins his opinion by noting that, while he certainly favored the result 
reached by the majority, he firmly believed that the result was not 
supported by the text and history of Title VII.633 
In his dissent, Judge Lynch discusses the lengthy legislative 
history and statutory meaning behind Title VII and its application.634 
This discussion forms the basis for the analysis that follows. Judge 
Lynch stresses the importance of the legislative history recounted in 
his introduction.635 For Judge Lynch, this history: 
tells us something important about what the language of Title 
VII must have meant to any reasonable member of Congress, 
and indeed to any literate American, when it was passed—
what Judge Sykes called the “original public meaning” of the 
statute. That history tells us a great deal about why the 
legislators who constructed and voted for the Act used the 
specific language that they did.636 
As Judge Lynch wrote: 
I do not cite this sorry history of opposition to equality 
for African-Americans, women, and gay women and men, 
and of the biases prevailing a half-century ago, to argue that 
 
 631. Id. at 136 (Lohier, J., concurring). 
 632. Id. at 137. 
 633. Id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). Judge Lynch described his position as follows: 
I would be delighted to awake one morning and learn the Congress had just passed 
legislation adding sexual orientation to the list of grounds of employment discrimination 
prohibited under Title VII . . . . I would equally be pleased to awake to learn that 
Congress had secretly passed such legislation more than half a century ago—until I 
actually woke up and realized that I must have been still asleep and dreaming. Because 
we all know that Congress did no such thing.  
Id. 
 634. Id. at 138–43. 
 635. Id. at 143. 
 636. Id. at 143 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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the private intentions and motivations of the members of 
Congress can trump the plain language or clear implications 
of a legislative enactment. (Still less, of course, do I endorse 
the views of those who opposed racial equality, ridiculed 
women’s rights, and persecuted people for their sexual 
orientation.) Although Chief Judge Katzmann has observed 
elsewhere that judicial warnings about relying on legislative 
history as an interpretive aid have been overstated, see 
Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes 35–39 (2014), I agree 
with him, and with my other colleagues in the majority, that 
the implications of legislation flatly prohibiting sex 
discrimination in employment, duly enacted by Congress and 
signed by the President, cannot be cabined by citing the 
private prejudices or blind spots of those members of 
Congress who voted for it. The above history makes it 
obvious to me, however, that the majority misconceives the 
fundamental public meaning of the language of the Civil 
Rights Act. The problem sought to be remedied by adding 
“sex” to the prohibited bases of employment discrimination 
was the pervasive discrimination against women in the 
employment market, and the chosen remedy was to prohibit 
discrimination that adversely affected members of one sex or 
the other. By prohibiting discrimination against people based 
on their sex, it did not, and does not, prohibit discrimination 
against people because of their sexual orientation.637 
Indeed, Judge Lynch argued that Title VII’s “because of . . . sex” 
clause meant exactly what the drafters of the document meant at the 
 
 637. Id. Judge Lynch continued: 
The words used in legislation are used for a reason. Legislation is adopted in 
response to perceived social problems, and legislators adopt the language that they do to 
address a social evil or accomplish a desirable goal. The words of the statute take 
meaning from that purpose, and the principles it adopts must be read in light of the 
problem it was enacted to address. The words may indeed cut deeper than the legislators 
who voted for the statute fully understood or intended: as relevant here, a law aimed at 
producing gender equality in the workplace may require or prohibit employment 
practices that the legislators who voted for it did not yet understand as obstacles to gender 
equality. Nevertheless, it remains a law aimed at gender inequality, and not at other 
forms of discrimination that were understood at the time, and continue to be understood, 
as a different kind of prejudice, shared not only by some of those who opposed the rights 
of women and African-Americans, but also by some who believed in equal rights for 
women and people of color. 
Id. at 143–44 (emphasis in original). 
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time it was created.638 The meaning of “sex” within “the language of 
the Act itself” was understood by members of Congress and the 
general public to create a “prohibition of discrimination . . . to secure 
the rights of women to equal protection in employment . . . [and] to 
prohibit employers from . . . [creating] workplace inequalities that 
held women back from advancing in the economy.”639 This was 
constructed the same way in Title VII as it was to “protect African-
Americans and other racial, national, and religious minorities from 
similar discrimination.”640 Judge Lynch agreed with Judge Sykes in 
her 7th Circuit dissent of Hively, that in 1964, “sex” in the context of 
Title VII meant “biological sex” rather than “sexual orientation.”641 
Judge Lynch disagrees with the majority’s view that employing 
Title VII to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace 
is supported by the fact that the word “sex” is in the text of the statute 
and the word “sex” has new connotative meaning.642 He states that: 
[T]he fact that a prohibition on discrimination against 
members of one sex may have unanticipated consequences 
when courts are asked to consider carefully whether a given 
practice does, in fact, discriminate against members of one 
sex in the workplace does not support extending Title VII by 
judicial construction to protect an entirely different category 
of people.643 
An interpretation of the words in a statute that was previously 
unanticipated may occur without changing the overall meaning of the 
statute. As Judge Lynch writes: 
But such interpretations of employment “discrimination 
against any individual . . . based on sex” do not say anything 
about whether discrimination based on other social 
categories is covered by the statute. Just as Congress adopted 
broader language than discrimination “against women,” it 
adopted narrower language than “discrimination based on 
personal characteristics or classifications unrelated to job 
performance.” Title VII does not adopt a broad principle of 
 
 638. Id. at 145. 
 639. Id. 
 640. Id. 
 641. Id. 
 642. Id. 
 643. Id. 
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equal protection in the workplace; rather, its language singles 
out for prohibition discrimination based on particular 
categories and classifications that have been used to 
perpetuate injustice—but not all such categories and 
classifications. That is not a matter of abstract justice, but of 
political reality. Those groups that had succeeded by 1964 in 
persuading a majority of the members of Congress that unfair 
treatment of them ought to be prohibited were included; 
those who had not yet achieved that political objective were 
not.644 
To illustrate this, Judge Lynch used an example of the original 
prohibition on discrimination against women from equal pay and 
opportunity in the workplace.645 He compared this original meaning 
to a prohibition that was adopted later, which forbade using sexual 
favors for advancement or bonuses, basically quid pro quo 
exchanges.646 While this “Mad Men” culture was still discrimination 
based on sex that was not originally anticipated by the drafters of Title 
VII, it did not change the class of persons that it was aimed at.647 Judge 
Lynch argued that incorporating sexual orientation within the meaning 
of “sex” in Title VII changed the fundamental meaning that would 
constitute an entirely different class of persons, rather than accounting 
for a previously unanticipated “matter of abstract justice.”648 He also 
noted that there are many things that are “offensive or immoral or 
economically inefficient” but are not yet illegal.649 Yet, “if the view 
that a practice is offensive or immoral or economically inefficient does 
not command sufficiently broad and deep political support to produce 
legislation prohibiting it, that practice will remain legal.”650 
Essentially, Judge Lynch argued that, unless Congress makes the 
explicit decision to protect LGBT individuals in the workplace, the 
courts should not use Title VII as an anchor to do so, because “simply 
put, discrimination based on sexual orientation is not the same thing 
as discrimination based on sex.”651 
 
 644. Id. at 147. 
 645. See id. at 146. 
 646. Id. at 146. 
 647. Id. 
 648. Id. at 147. 
 649. Id. at 148. 
 650. Id. 
 651. Id. 
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Judge Lynch analyzed the majority’s linguistic argument of “sex” 
within the context of Title VII. He acknowledged that the majority did 
not actually dispute the “common-sense proposition” that “sex 
discrimination” in the ordinary meaning of the term is not the same 
thing as “sexual orientation discrimination.”652 Rather, as Judge Lynch 
articulated it, “the majority argues that discrimination based on sex 
encompasses discrimination against gay people because 
discrimination based on sex encompasses any distinction between the 
sexes that an employer might make for any reason.”653 In making this 
argument, the majority “[read] ‘discriminate’ to mean pretty much the 
same thing as ‘distinguish.’”654 Judge Lynch agreed with the majority 
that, in the common English understanding, the definitions and usages 
of both words are incredibly similar.655 However, in the context of 
statutory construction, they have two completely different 
meanings.656 He argued that “it is an oversimplification to treat the 
statute as prohibiting any distinction between men and women in the 
workplace . . . [because] the law prohibits discriminating against 
members of one sex or the other in the workplace.”657 
Judge Lynch compared situations distinguishing between 
genders, which is legal in some instances, with situations 
discriminating against genders, which is illegal in all instances.658 He 
stated that Title VII does not prevent creation of “separate men’s and 
women’s toilet facilities . . . separate dress codes . . . “ and “some 
different fitness requirements.”659 From this premise, he raised two 
points: 
First, it is not the case that any employment practice that can 
only be applied by identifying an employee’s sex is 
prohibited. Second, neither can it be the case that any 
discrimination that would be prohibited if race were the 
criterion is equally prohibited when gender is used.660 
 
 652. Id. at 149. 
 653. Id. 
 654. Id. 
 655. Id. 
 656. Id. 
 657. Id. 
 658. Id. at 149–150. 
 659. Id. at 150. 
 660. Id. at 151. Judge Lynch concludes this argument by saying: 
Obviously, Title VII does not permit an employer to maintain racially segregated 
bathrooms, nor would it allow different-colored or different-designed bathing costumes 
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The next argument presented by Judge Lynch countered the 
“legislative inaction” argument used by the majority. He stated that 
the legislative inaction argument “is further supported by the 
movement, in both Congress and state legislatures, to enact legislation 
protecting gay men and women against employment 
discrimination.”661 Of the twenty-two states that have passed such 
legislation, “[i]n none of those states did the prohibition of sexual 
orientation discrimination come by judicial interpretation of a pre-
existing prohibition on gender-based discrimination to encompass 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.”662 Furthermore, as 
pointed out by the DOJ in its brief in this case, Congress arguably 
ratified certain prior judicial interpretations of “sex” in Title VII as 
excluding sexual orientation in amending the Civil Rights Act in 1991 
and failing to address prior judicial decisions concluding that Title VII 
did not cover sexual orientation discrimination.663 Even though Judge 
Lynch stated that he did not want to “rely heavily” on the 
“congressional actions and omissions” to define “sex,” he did find it 
compelling that “over twenty-five amendments ha[ve] been proposed 
to add sexual orientation to Title VII between 1964 and 1991,” and 
“[a]ll ha[ve] been rejected.”664 
He summarized the above arguments by saying that merely 
distinguishing between genders and calling it discrimination is “the 
 
for white and black lifeguards. Such distinctions would smack of racial subordination 
and would impose degrading differences of treatment on the basis of race. Precisely the 
same distinctions between men and women would not . . . . A refusal to hire gay people 
cannot serve as a covert means of limiting employment opportunities for men or for 
women as such; a minority of both men and women are gay, and discriminating against 
them discriminates against them, as gay people, and does not differentially disadvantage 
employees or applicants of either sex. Id. at 151–52 (emphasis in original). 
 661. Id. at 152. 
 662. Id. 
 663. Id. at 153–154. 
 664. Id. at 154. He further states: 
Although the Supreme Court has rightly cautioned against relying on legislative 
inaction as evidence of congressional intent, because “several equally tenable inferences 
must be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that the existing legislation 
already incorporated a change,” surely the proposal and rejection of over fifty 
amendments to add sexual orientation to Title VII means something. And it is pretty 
clear what it does not mean. It is hardly reasonable, in light of the EEOC and judicial 
consensus that sex discrimination did not encompass sexual orientation discrimination, 
to conclude that Congress rejected the proposed amendments because senators and 
representatives believed that Title VII “already incorporated the offered change.” 
Id. at 154–55 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
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simplistic argument.”665 Noticing the gender of an individual is surely 
required in order to target someone for being sexually attracted to the 
same sex.666 However, simply noticing gender “is not a fair reading of 
the text of the statute, and has nothing to do with the type of unfairness 
in employment that Congress legislated against in adding “sex” to the 
list of prohibited categories of discrimination in Title VII.”667 By not 
explicitly adding sexual orientation to the list of protected classes 
under Title VII, Congress has yet to attack the unfairness in 
employment that LGBT individuals currently suffer. 
Judge Lynch next addressed the other two arguments presented 
by the majority: the arguments for gender stereotyping and 
associational discrimination.668 He stated that, though “[they] have the 
merit of attempting to link discrimination based on sexual orientation 
to the social problem of gender discrimination at which Title VII is 
aimed . . .,” these arguments unsuccessfully try to “shoehorn sexual 
orientation discrimination into the statute’s verbal template of 
discrimination based on sex.”669 
To start, Judge Lynch defined “sex stereotyping” in terms of its 
meaning and application in Title VII.670 Judge Lynch stated that 
“[i]nvidious stereotyping of members of racial, gender, national, or 
religious groups is at the heart of much employment 
discrimination.”671 For example, the “perception that women . . . are 
not suited to executive positions, or are less adept . . . can be a 
significant hindrance to women seeking such positions . . . even when 
a particular woman is demonstrably qualified . . . .”672 This type of 
“sex stereotyping” “treats applicants or employees . . . as members of 
a class that is disfavored for purposes of the employment decision by 
reason of a trait stereotypically assigned to members of that group.”673 
Judge Lynch then asserted that this traditional type of sex stereotyping 
is discernible from stereotyping based on gender roles and norms: 
Clearly, sexual orientation discrimination is not an example 
 
 665. Id. at 156. 
 666. Id. 
 667. Id. 
 668. Id. 
 669. Id. 
 670. Id. 
 671. Id. 
 672. Id. at 156–57. 
 673. Id. at 157. 
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of that kind of sex stereotyping; an employer who disfavors 
a male job applicant whom he believes to be gay does not do 
so because the employer believes that most men are gay and 
therefore unsuitable. Rather, he does so because he believes 
that most gay people (whether male or female) have some 
quality that makes them undesirable for the position, and that 
because this applicant is gay, he must also possess that trait. 
Although that is certainly stereotyping, and invidiously so, it 
does not stereotype a group protected by Title VII, and is 
therefore not (yet) illegal.674 
Judge Lynch acknowledged that this “is not the only way in which 
stereotyping can be an obstacle to protected classes of people in the 
workplace.”675 For example, stereotyping can also include beliefs 
about how people within a certain group should behave.676 This was 
exactly the type of discrimination based on gender stereotypes that the 
Supreme Court sought to prohibit in its decision in Price Waterhouse. 
Judge Lynch stated that “[n]ot only does such discrimination require 
women to behave differently in the workplace than men, but it also 
actively deters women from engaging in kinds of behavior that are 
required for advancement in certain positions.”677 The “systematic 
disadvantage” that this type of stereotyping creates is the crux of the 
argument for its inclusion under Title VII’s protection, because it 
disadvantages one sex over another.678 
However, Judge Lynch, agreeing with Judge Syke’s dissent in 
Hively, argued that employers discriminating based on sexual 
orientation are not “deploying” the sort of stereotyping recognized in 
 
 674. Id. 
 675. Id. 
 676. Id. As Judge Lynch writes: 
The stereotyping discussed above involves beliefs about how members of a particular 
protected category are, but there are also stereotypes (or more simply, beliefs) about how 
members of that group should be. In the case of sex discrimination in particular, 
stereotypes about how women ought to look or behave can create a double bind. For 
example, a woman who is perceived through the lens of a certain “feminine” stereotype 
may be assumed to be insufficiently assertive for certain positions by contrast to men 
who, viewed through the lens of a “masculine” stereotype, are presumed more likely to 
excel in situations that demand assertiveness. At the same time, the employer may fault 
a woman who behaves as assertively as a male comparator for being too aggressive, 
thereby failing to comply with societal expectations of femininity. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 677. Id. at 158. 
 678. Id. 
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Price Waterhouse.679 Judge Lynch summed up this argument as 
follows: 
But as Judge Sykes points out in her Hively dissent, the 
homophobic employer is not deploying a stereotype about 
men or about women to the disadvantage of either sex. Such 
an employer is expressing disapproval of the behavior or 
identity of a class of people that includes both men and 
women. 853 F.3d at 370. That disapproval does not stem 
from a desire to discriminate against either sex, nor does it 
result from any sex-specific stereotype, nor does it 
differentially harm either men or women vis-à-vis the other 
sex. Rather, it results from a distinct type of objection to 
anyone, of whatever gender, who is identified as 
homosexual. The belief on which it rests is not a belief about 
what men or women ought to be or do; it is a belief about 
what all people ought to be or do—to be heterosexual, and to 
have sexual attraction to or relations with only members of 
the opposite sex. That does not make workplace 
discrimination based on this belief better or worse than other 
kinds of discrimination, but it does make it something 
different from sex discrimination, and therefore something 
that is not prohibited by Title VII.680 
According to Judge Lynch, if conduct is truly discriminatory because 
of gender, then the discriminatory conduct by the employer must 
single out one specific gender to be advantaged to the disadvantage of 
the other gender. Based on Judge Lynch’s analysis, in order to be 
prohibited by Title VII, the discrimination cannot be applied equally 
to both genders. 
Judge Lynch then turned to the “associational discrimination” 
argument offered by the majority, which he found unpersuasive.681 He 
says that the kind of discrimination against Zarda is “not 
discrimination of the sort at issue in either Holcomb [or] Barrett.”682 
Those cases involved employers who discriminated against employees 
because they associated with someone of a different ethnicity or race; 
 
 679. Id. at 157–58. 
 680. Id. at 158. 
 681. Id. 
 682. Id. at 160. 
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clearly protected groups under Title VII.683 In the case of Zarda, 
however, no facts or explanations exist in the record that would 
reasonably lead someone to believe that the employer discriminated 
against Zarda because he associated with another male.684 Rather, the 
employer discriminated against Zarda because he associated with a 
gay man.685 Judge Lynch argues that “[a]n employer who practices 
such discrimination is hostile towards gay men, not to men in general; 
the animus runs not, as in the race and religion cases . . . against a 
‘protected group’ to which the employee’s associates belong, but 
against an (alas) unprotected group . . . gay men.”686 Since LGBT 
persons are not expressly a protected group under Title VII, the 
associational discrimination argument falls short.687 
Judge Lynch acknowledged that the arguments presented on both 
sides of this issue ultimately depend on how one characterizes 
discrimination based on sex.688 However, because sexual orientation 
is not an enumerated protected class in the language of Title VII, the 
majority is required to “reconceptualize discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation as discrimination on the basis of sex.”689 For “if the 
law expressly prohibited sexual orientation discrimination,” no reason 
would exist for this “recharacterization” and no reasonable opponent 
could argue that Title VII did not protect individuals from being 
discriminated on such grounds.690 The majority argues that 
“discrimination against gay people is nothing more than a subspecies 
of discrimination against one or the other gender.”691 Judge Lynch 
agrees that the majority is correct in attempting to halt this 
discrimination because “it denies the dignity and equality of gay men 
and lesbians.”692 However, according to Judge Lynch, this type of 
discrimination cannot be said “to [fundamentally] treat men 
differently from women” within the “evident meaning of the language 
of Title VII.”693 To conclude that Title VII prohibits discrimination 
 
 683. Id. 
 684. Id. 
 685. Id. 
 686. Id. 
 687. Id. at 161–62. 
 688. Id. at 161. 
 689. Id. 
 690. Id. at 162. 
 691. Id. 
 692. Id. 
 693. Id. 
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based on sexual orientation is to ignore the language of the statute, 
“the social realities that distinguish [] the kinds of biases that the 
statute sought to exclude . . . and the distinctive nature of anti-gay 
prejudice.”694 For all these reasons, Judge Lynch concludes that the 
arguments of the majority fail.695 
Finally, Judge Lynch examined how the laws have evolved since 
1964 following the passage of the Civil Rights Act. While, during that 
time, both the Supreme Court and State governments have taken 
significant steps to help protect LGBT individuals, none of those 
decisions supports the argument that Title VII protects Zarda from 
sexual orientation discrimination.696 Judge Lynch asserts that “none of 
the Supreme Court” cases supporting gay rights “depend on the 
argument that laws disadvantaging” gays violate equal protection 
based on gender.697 Instead, these cases were decided “based on the 
guarantee of ‘liberty’ embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.”698 
Additionally, Judge Lynch notes that “[t]he Supreme Court’s 
decisions in this area are based on the Constitution . . . rather than a 
specific statute, and the role of the courts in interpreting the 
Constitution is distinctively different from their role in interpreting 
acts of Congress.”699 
Essentially, Judge Lynch argues that while the Constitution is 
broad, moldable, and able to accommodate societal changes, statutes 
are enacted to more minutely define rules that encompass those 
changes.700 In this case, the court is not presented with a Constitutional 
question, which might allow some flexibility in interpreting meaning 
and application.701 Rather, in this case, the court is tasked with 
interpreting the language of Title VII; which has been narrowly 
tailored and custom-fit for the problems it was intended to tackle, 
which does not encompass sexual orientation discrimination.702 
Therefore, Judge Lynch argues that the court is compelled to “respect 
the choices made by Congress about which social problems to address, 
 
 694. Id. 
 695. Id. 
 696. Id. at 162–63. 
 697. Id. at 163. 
 698. Id. 
 699. Id. 
 700. Id. at 165. 
 701. Id. at 166. 
 702. See id. at 164–66. 
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and how to address them.”703 For these textualist reasons, Judge Lynch 
disagreed with the interpretation of the reach of Title VII adopted by 
the majority.704 
In separate dissents, Judge Livingston705 and Judge Raggi706 
agreed with the textual analysis offered by Judge Lynch and joined in 
those parts of his dissent. For her part, Judge Livingston expressly did 
not sign on to the constitutional discussion contained in the dissent of 
Judge Lynch, but did agree with his textual analysis.707 
On May 29, 2018, following the en banc decision by the court of 
appeals, Altitude Express filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 
asking the Supreme Court to review the decision of the court of 
appeals.708 In the petition, the Supreme Court was asked to answer the 
following question: 
Whether the prohibition in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), against employment 
discrimination “because of . . . sex” encompasses 
discrimination based on an individual’s sexual orientation.709 
As of January 1, 2019, the Supreme Court had yet to consider the 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As seen in both the decision by the en banc Seventh Circuit in 
Hively and by the en banc Second Circuit in Zarda, arguments against 
including a prohibition against sexual orientation discrimination 
within Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination “because of sex” 
are rooted in a rigid and false dichotomy between one’s status as a 
gendered sexual being and one’s conduct as that same gendered sexual 
being. Lived gender is seen as disconnected from the status of gender. 
 
 703. Id. at 166. 
 704. Id. at 167. 
 705. Id. at 167 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
 706. Id. at 169 (Raggi, J., dissenting). 
 707. Id. at 168. As Judge Livingston wrote: 
I agree with Judge Lynch . . . that constitutional and statutory interpretation should not 
be confused: that while courts sometimes may be called upon to play a special role in 
defending constitutional liberties against encroachment by government, in statutory 
interpretation, courts “are not in the business of imposing on private actors new rules 
that have not been embodied in legislative decision.” 
Id. (Livingston, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
 708. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) 
(No. 17-623). 
 709. Id. at i. 
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Courts have historically allowed workplace discrimination cases 
brought by gay or lesbian persons to advance under the rubric of Title 
VII only when it could be shown that the discrimination was based on 
the failure of the effeminate gay man or the butch lesbian woman to 
conform to accepted lived gender expectations.710 
Historically, society and courts have been locked in a biological 
binary understanding of gender, attempting to place individuals in the 
narrow-gendered boxes that the law seems to require. The narrow-
gendered boxes have been treated as if they are void of any 
constitutive conduct that defines who is understood to fit within the 
narrow-gendered box. However, the expansion of the protections 
provided by Price Waterhouse and its progeny allow for a much 
broader view of gender and of the protections provided by the law 
against discrimination because of sex. The sexual stereotyping theory 
seen in Price Waterhouse and its progeny transgresses traditional 
binary notions of gender by recognizing that the protections provided 
by antidiscrimination laws encompass discrimination based on a 
nonconforming gender expression that flows organically from an 
individual’s gender identity.711 
 Gay and lesbian individuals live lives that are, at the core, 
significantly distinct from the traditional societal expectations of how 
men and women are to live out their lives. Sylvia Law describes the 
importance of this, writing: 
Both women and homosexual people appeal to 
venerable liberal values. A core feminist claim is that women 
and men should be treated as individuals, not as members of 
a sexually determined class. This claim rejects notions that 
gender characteristics are natural, immutable and universal. 
Similarly, homosexuals’ claim to freedom from state 
suppression relies upon classical liberal ideals of individual 
liberty and equal personhood, rejecting the notion that 
heterosexual attraction is natural and universal. 
 
 710. See William N. Eskridge, Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination 
Argument for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 353, 373 (2017). 
 711. Sonia Katyal, The Numerus Clausus of Sex, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 389, 479 (2017); see also 
id. at 492 (“[A] related possibility is to simply interpret gender identity to include gender 
expression, instead of describing it as a separate category. For example, gender identity, at least in 
an earlier version of the ENDA federal bill, is defined as ‘the gender-related identity, appearance, 
or mannerisms or other gender-related characteristics of an individual, with or without regard to 
the individual’s designated sex at birth.’”). 
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. . . . 
Gay and women’s liberation built on these experiences 
through mutually reinforcing processes. By talking about 
their own experiences, women came to understand the 
dynamic that had for so long prevented them from asserting 
even straightforward claims to equal treatment in the public 
and economic spheres. Traditional concepts of gender cast 
man as strong, woman subservient; man as not responsible 
for family care, woman as nurturant; man as sexually 
aggressive, and woman as passive victim, whether virgin or 
whore. These social meanings ascribed to gender shape our 
ideas about who we are. The social and economic 
arrangements built upon gender shape the texture of our daily 
lives. Under the normal prevailing arrangements of market 
and family, the woman pays a price for the warmth, support 
and legitimacy of family: she subordinates her capacity to 
achieve and contribute in the public world to the nurturing 
needs of children, parents and men. Multiple cultural 
messages, and the material reality of women’s second-class 
position as wage workers, define the search for a husband as 
the central goal of women’s lives. Even today most people 
believe that a successful marriage demands that the man be 
older, stronger, smarter, and better-paid than the woman.712 
What could possibly be more transgressive of normative 
gendered stereotypes than a woman sexually attracted to other women 
or a man sexually attracted to other men? Andrew Koppelman has 
described this transgression as follows: 
[T]he taboo against homosexuality reinforces the inequality 
of the sexes, and that is, at least in large part, why the taboo 
exists. From an antidiscrimination perspective, the problem 
with the prohibitions of both miscegenation and 
homosexuality is not that they interfere with individual 
liberty—the incest prohibition also interferes with sexual 
freedom—but the reasons for the interference. To say it once 
more: The equal respect that the state owes its citizens, and 
that the citizens owe one another, is incompatible with the 
 
 712. See Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 
187, 207–08 (footnotes omitted). 
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idea that sexual penetration is a nasty, degrading violation of 
the self, and that there are some people (black women, or 
women simpliciter) to whom, because of their inferior social 
status, it is acceptable to do it, and others (white women, or 
men) who, because of their superior social status, must be 
rescued (or, if necessary, forcibly prevented) from having it 
done to them.713 
It is utterly impossible to separate what is discrimination based on 
sexual orientation from discrimination based on a failure to conform 
to gender stereotypes.714 Judge Rosenbaum followed this same logic 
in her dissent in Evans, when she concluded that “when a woman 
 
 713. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex 
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 284 (1994). 
 714. As Judge Katzmann wrote in his concurrence in Christiansen: 
Relying on common sense and intuition rather than any “special training,” see 
Back, 365 F.3d at 120 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256, 109 S.Ct. 1775), 
courts have explained that sexual orientation discrimination “is often, if not always, 
motivated by a desire to enforce heterosexually defined gender norms. In fact, 
stereotypes about homosexuality are directly related to our stereotypes about the proper 
roles of men and women . . . . The gender stereotype at work here is that ‘real’ men 
should date women, and not other men,” Centola v. Potter, 183 F.Supp.2d 403, 410 (D. 
Mass. 2002); see also Boutillier v. Hartford Pub. Sch., No. 3:13-CV-01303-WWE, 2016 
WL 6818348 (D. Conn. Nov. 17, 2016) (“[H]omosexuality is the ultimate gender non–
conformity, the prototypical sex stereotyping animus.”). Indeed, we recognized as much 
in Dawson when we observed that “[s]tereotypical notions about how men and women 
should behave will often necessarily blur into ideas about heterosexuality and 
homosexuality.” 398 F.3d at 218 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) Having conceded this, it is logically untenable for us to insist that this particular 
gender stereotype is outside of the gender stereotype discrimination prohibition 
articulated in Price Waterhouse. 
Numerous district courts throughout the country have also found this approach to 
gender stereotype claims unworkable. See, e.g., Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 
F.Supp.3d 1151, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (collecting cases) (“Simply put, the line between 
sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination is ‘difficult to draw’ because 
that line does not exist, save as a lingering and faulty judicial construct.”). The binary 
distinction that Simonton and Dawson establish between permissible gender stereotype 
discrimination claims and impermissible sexual orientation discrimination claims 
requires the factfinder, when evaluating adverse employment action taken against an 
effeminate gay man, to decide whether his perceived effeminacy or his sexual orientation 
was the true cause of his disparate treatment. See Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Connecticut, 
172 F.Supp.3d 509, 524 n.8 (D. Conn. 2016). This is likely to be an exceptionally 
difficult task in light of the degree to which sexual orientation is commingled in the 
minds of many with particular traits associated with gender. More fundamentally, 
carving out gender stereotypes related to sexual orientation ignores the fact that negative 
views of sexual orientation are often, if not always, rooted in the idea that men should 
be exclusively attracted to women and women should be exclusively attracted to men—
as clear a gender stereotype as any. 
Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 205–06 (2d Cir. 2017) (Katzmann, J., 
concurring) (alterations in original); see also Kreis, supra note 497, at 4–9. 
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alleges . . . that she has been discriminated against because she is a 
lesbian, she necessarily alleges that she has been discriminated against 
because she failed to conform to the employer’s image of what women 
should be—specifically, that women should be sexually attracted to 
men only.”715 
In The Numerus Clausus of Sex, Sonia Katyal argued for 
recognition of a much more robust understanding of gender pluralism, 
centering the power of defining gender in the individual, rather than 
in the law, the school, or the state in some other fashion.716 
Approaching the prohibition against discrimination based on sex 
contained in Title VII from a stance of gender pluralism that allows an 
individual’s claim of gender identity to emerge organically from his 
or her lived experience would allow the law to provide broader 
protection against discrimination based on sex. This broad protection 
would reject a rigid and unequal binary understanding of gender, and 
would embrace the myriad ways in which gender identity is 
experienced, defined, and, ultimately, expressed. Tying together the 
plurality of gender identity and the manner in which that identity is 
expressed does not result in a wholesale rejection of current Title VII 
jurisprudence. In fact, tying these ideas together is consistent with the 
gender stereotyping jurisprudence that the courts have developed in 
the context of Title VII following Price Waterhouse.717 
 
 715. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1261 (11th Cir. 2017) (Rosenbaum, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting). 
 716. See Katyal, supra note 711, at 479; see also id. at 475 (“Years ago, Professor Mary Dunlap 
noted, ‘If the individual’s authority to define sex identity were to replace the authority of law to 
impose sex identity, many of the most difficult problems currently associated with the power of 
government to probe, penalize, and restrict basic freedoms of sexual minorities would be resolved.’ 
As Currah has brilliantly noted, Dunlap’s transformative project has become obscured, largely due 
to the deployment of legal arguments that serve to reify, rather than challenge, the dominance of 
gender norms. The result of this approach risks what Currah describes as a ‘pyrrhic’ victory, one 
that disadvantages not just gender nonconforming and transgender individuals, but many others 
who fall outside those categories as well.” (footnotes omitted)); Paisley Currah, Defending 
Genders: Sex and Gender Non-conformity in the Civil Rights Strategies of Sexual Minorities, 48 
HASTINGS L.J. 1363, 1364 (1997); Mary C. Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of Sexual 
Minorities: A Crisis of the Male/Female Dichotomy, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1132–39 (1979); 
Sonia Katyal, Exporting Identity, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97, 133–48 (2002); Gayle Rubin, Of 
Catamites and Kings: Reflections on Butch, Gender, and Boundaries, in THE TRANSGENDER 
STUDIES READER 471, 479 (Susan Stryker & Stephen Whittle eds., 2006); Susan Stryker, 
(De)Subjugated Knowledges: An Introduction to Transgender Studies, 1 THE TRANSGENDER 
STUD. READER 1, 14 (Susan Stryker & Stephen Whittle eds., 2006). 
 717. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). See generally Katyal, supra note 711, 
at 491–92 (“[A] focus on expression starts from a wholly different vantage point. Rather than 
addressing the state as a benign protector, the state might be viewed through a comparably more 
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The core purpose of Title VII was to “strike at the entire spectrum 
of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes.”718 Over time, courts concluded that, likewise, Title VII 
was also intended “protect . . . male employees” from restrictions that 
restricted men’s liberty and reinforced the traditional hierarchy of 
gender roles.719 In both Price Waterhouse and Oncale, the Supreme 
Court concluded that Title VII not only bars formal sex discrimination, 
but that it also prohibits discrimination based on historical obsolete 
stereotypes about how each gender should behave.720 Since the 
adoption of Title VII, courts have progressively expanded the 
understanding of the reach of the protections provided under Title VII, 
but the fundamental goal of striking at the heart of restrictions in the 
workplace based on gendered stereotypes has remained unchanged. 
The drafters of Title VII understood that “the enforcement of 
traditional sex and family roles” has long been uniquely “detrimental 
to women and their families.”721 Yet, allowing employers to 
discriminate against gay or lesbian persons because they openly live 
out this transgressive element of their being serves to reinforce these 
traditional sex and family roles. Allowing discrimination based on 
sexual orientation confirms this gendered hierarchy by furthering the 
belief that men and women have constitutively different roles and 
responsibilities in the world, such that it is violative of a traditional 
and natural norm for men or women to undertake familial, sexual, and 
expressive activities believed to be reserved for the other sex. 
According to Catharine MacKinnon, “[w]hen perceived and punished 
as gay men and lesbian women, [individuals] are discriminated against 
for flouting gender hierarchy, for failing to conform to male-dominant 
society’s requirements for women and femininity, men and 
 
suspicious lens. The concern about state regulation stems from a desire to protect expression and 
avoid the coercion of conformity, which is closely linked to traditional First Amendment 
jurisprudence. A more pluralist model would include the term ‘gender identity and expression,’ 
which broadens its protections beyond gender dysphoric individuals alone.” (emphasis added) 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 718. Cty. of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 180 (1981) (quoting Los Angeles Dep’t of 
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). 
 719. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 681–82 (1983). 
 720. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (concluding that an 
employer may not fire a man because the employer believes that he is too soft-spoken or more 
effeminate than a man is expected to be); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256 (holding that an 
employer may not refuse to promote a woman because the employer believes that she is more 
“aggressive” than a woman is expected to be). 
 721. Franklin, supra note 35, at 1326. 
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masculinity.”722 
Concluding that discrimination based on sexual orientation is not 
discrimination “because of sex” is to further the misunderstanding that 
sex discrimination is primarily about women, while sexual orientation 
discrimination is primarily about gay and lesbian persons. In fact, both 
of these forms of discrimination are ultimately about the elevation of 
masculinity over femininity and the traditional demand on normative 
gender performance in order to preserve this hierarchy. “Reading 
gender to be essentially about women does not capture the relational 
nature of gender, the role of power relations, and the way that 
structures of subordination are reproduced.”723 
Separating an individual’s sexual orientation from their manner 
of living that reality out in the world is “an exceptionally difficult task 
in light of the degree to which sexual orientation is commingled in the 
minds of many with particular traits associated with gender.”724 The 
result of this inseparable intersection between gendered expectations 
and sexual orientation is that the refusal to see the transgressive nature 
of sexual orientation as a violation of gender norms results in a 
diminution of the protection provided by Title VII, rooted in the 
acceptance of the general hierarchy of male superiority as normative. 
In Price Waterhouse, Justice Brennan wrote: 
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate 
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the 
stereotype associated with their group, for “[i]n forbidding 
employers to discriminate against individuals because of 
their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum 
of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex 
 
 722. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 1068–69 (3d ed. 2016); see also Catharine 
A. MacKinnon, The Road Not Taken: Sex Equality in Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1081, 
1085 (2004); Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 18 (1994). 
 723. Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waiving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human 
Rights in the United Nations, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 15 (2005). As Catharine MacKinnon 
explains it: 
  Male inviolability and female violation are cardinal tenets of gender hierarchy. If 
men can do to men what men do to women sexually, women’s sexual place as man’s 
inferior is not a given, natural one, because a biological male can occupy it. That male 
sexual aggression could be directed at a biological male vitiates the biological basis upon 
which gender inequality ideologically rests. 
MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY, supra note 722, at 1354. 
 724. Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 205–06 (2d Cir. 2017) (Katzmann, J., 
concurring). 
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stereotypes.”725 
The trail leading from Price Waterhouse, with Justice Brennan’s 
insistence that Title VII was intended to cover the “entire spectrum” 
of gender stereotypes, through the decisions in Hively, Zarda, and 
Evans inevitably lead one to the conclusion that discrimination against 
persons based on sexual orientation is discrimination “because of sex.” 
 
 725. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (second alteration in original) (quoting City of L.A. 
Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). 
